What to Know About the Man Who Toppled Assad

After 13 years of devastating civil war, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime was toppled in a stunning offensive led by the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

The country now confronts an uncertain future—not least of which is how HTS, which evolved out of an al Qaeda affiliate with ties to the founder of the Islamic State, will approach governance.

HTS’s leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa—better known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani—has worked for years to distance himself from his al Qaeda roots, but establishing legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, particularly the United States, will be an uphill battle.

There’s also a major question about whether Syria’s instability could cause it to once again become a safe haven for terrorist groups such as the Islamic State to flourish.

Foreign Policy spoke with Aaron Zelin, a terrorism expert and senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who wrote a book on HTS, to find out more about Jolani’s origins, his efforts to rebrand, and what’s potentially in store for Syria now that he’s the country’s de facto ruler.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Foreign Policy: Bashar al-Assad is gone, and HTS has taken over in Syria. Can you talk about the evolution of Jolani and HTS and how we got to this point?

Aaron Zelin: Jolani was originally a foreign fighter in the Iraq War. He went from Syria to Iraq and joined up with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and [his organization] al Qaeda in Iraq. He spent some time in the infamous Camp Bucca prison. And then he became the emir or leader of the Nineveh region in western Iraq for the Islamic State of Iraq, which was essentially the predecessor group to what we now call the Islamic State.

After the Syrian uprising began, Jolani talked to [Islamic State leader] Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi about a project in Syria. By summer 2011, Jolani went to Syria to build a new organization called Jabhat al-Nusra. It was essentially an official branch of the Islamic State of Iraq. They began to conduct operations once the Syrian civil war became militarized, and they became more integrated within some of the insurgency, especially those that were more Islamist in nature.

Due to the successes that were seen in the initial year or so, Baghdadi wanted to essentially show publicly what was known behind the scenes—that Jabhat al-Nusra was one and the same as the Islamic State of Iraq. In April 2013, Baghdadi announced the Islamic State [of Iraq and Syria], or ISIS.

However, Jolani rebuffed this because he knew that Baghdadi was trying to begin liquidating opposition activists with assassinations and going against other rebel groups. Therefore, to pivot [but still] maintain some level of jihadi legitimacy, Jolani pledged allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri—the leader of al Qaeda at the time. But Zawahiri began to send operatives from Afghanistan to Syria, which Jolani wasn’t too happy about. So Jolani pivoted once again and broke ties with al Qaeda in July 2016.

Many at the time were a bit skeptical [of that breakup] because it seemed as if it was a mutual decision with al Qaeda [meant] to try and legitimize [Jabhat al-Nusra’s] project [in Syria]. However, over time it became clear that there were truly problems between the two. And then as a rebrand, Jabhat al-Nusra officially became HTS in January 2017.

In the intervening time, they’ve gone after both the Islamic State and al Qaeda, both groups that they previously got along with. As this happened, we also saw them beginning to start a local governance project called the Syrian Salvation Government—essentially a civilian, technocratic-led government. It has had various iterations over the last seven years or so since it was founded.

But if there’s a quick way of understanding it, HTS essentially went from global jihad to a local regime. They aren’t liberal democrats, but they also aren’t part of the global jihadi movement anymore. They’re still conservative Islamists who run an authoritarian government, though.

FP: Assad, who used chemical weapons on his own people, is viewed as a war criminal by much of the world. His demise is being celebrated, but there are also questions as to whether the forces replacing him will be any better. Is it good news or bad news that HTS is now steering the ship—or is it more complicated than that?

AZ: It’s complicated. In a general sense, it’s excellent news that the Assad regime is gone. He’s been one of the worst criminals we’ve seen since Nazi Germany. And I don’t say that lightly. In fact, many of the Nazis who fled actually went to Syria and taught some of their tricks to the Syrian government under Bashar’s father. So, we shouldn’t underestimate that aspect of it. In many ways, anything is better.

While HTS might have, over the last seven years or so, been conducting themselves as an authoritarian regime, it’s nowhere near the style of totalitarianism of the Assad regime. But at the same time, many of those who rose up against the regime originally in 2011 were calling for democracy, openness, rights, freedom. So, there’s going to be some tension now. That’s one of the reasons why we saw these outreach statements [from HTS] during the actual battle to take Aleppo, and then eventually the country itself, related to providing assurances to minorities as well as other countries. HTS’s messaging has been quite smart.

In the initial week or so after the taking of Aleppo, it seems that minorities have been treated fine. There hasn’t been harassment. Nobody’s been hurt or anything along those lines. But we also have to see a longer trend of this.

We should recall that prior to the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan—again—there were all these people touting that the Taliban was like this “Taliban 2.0.” And yet we’re three years later, and women are treated horribly again, just as in the late 1990s, and have no part in society.

That being said, I don’t think HTS is the same as the Taliban. On a relative scale, they’re more open.

FP: Jolani has clearly worked to rebrand himself for years now. Is it genuine?

AZ: There’s some genuineness. HTS broke ties with al Qaeda, and there hasn’t been any sign that they’ve gone back on it. They’ve taken out every single Islamic State cell in the area that they’ve been controlling. They also dismantled al Qaeda’s attempt to create another branch in Syria.

But [HTS] is still extreme compared to most people because al Qaeda and the Islamic State are the extreme of the extreme.

HTS still has a conservative Islamist worldview, which is part of the reason why I call them more like political jihadis. Many people call al Qaeda and the Islamic State “Salafi” jihadis, meaning their [Salafi Islamic] theology is up front, and they make a lot of their decision-making based off of that. Whereas with HTS, they’re considering the realities and practicalities more and what could go into something that’s more sustainable over a longer period of time.

But again, the biggest question is: What are the limitations of how far they can actually go? It’s been one of the questions I’ve had over the years as we’ve seen this transformation.

Many are surprised or unsure because a lot of people stopped paying attention to Syria back around the 2016 time period, when the [Assad] regime, Russia, and Iran took back Aleppo, or maybe when the United States and the coalition took the territory from the Islamic State between 2017 and 2019. The last time many saw these guys, they may have still been with al Qaeda.

I’ll be frank: Back when they broke the ties, I was quite skeptical as well. And at some level, I was skeptical until we saw them dismantling al Qaeda’s new branch back in June 2020. But because it’s been a slow, gradual process that we’ve seen now since July 2016, these changes seem real. But, again, just because they’re no longer [affiliated with] the Islamic State or al Qaeda doesn’t mean that they’re like the Green Party or anything.

FP: What are the most important things to know about Jolani in terms of his beliefs, ambitions, and leadership style?

AZ: He’s definitely a charismatic leader. That also could lead to problems down the line, just as we’ve seen with other charismatic leaders in the past in the region, with sort of a cult of personality.

But he’s highly respected. He’s sharp in the way that he operates, and he understands when it’s good to make decisions and pivot and change, as we’ve seen over the last 13.5-plus years since the beginning of the uprising. But skeptics might call him a chameleon.

But because of what HTS accomplished, and the fact that they did something that most people thought maybe was impossible or might not happen until another generation, I suspect that there will be some level of a honeymoon period that respects what they’re trying to accomplish, especially due to all the various challenges that there are within Syria.

FP: HTS is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, which has also placed a $10 million bounty on Jolani. What steps could Jolani take to garner goodwill in Washington? And do you think it’s likely that the United States will eventually review and remove HTS’s terrorist designation?

AZ: It’s definitely an issue that’s been brought up internally within the U.S. government, especially since HTS took over Aleppo. I don’t think it’ll necessarily happen quickly. The U.S. government will probably have a number of asks for Jolani. There are concerns about a resurgence of the Islamic State potentially. But based on HTS’s history, I don’t think they would have an issue continuing to fight against the Islamic State. They both hate each other.

There are also worries about the remnants of the chemical weapons program from the Assad regime. Obviously, we’ve seen that the Israelis have kind of preemptively done their own thing [by carrying out airstrikes targeting chemical weapons sites in Syria]. Though it’s hard to say whether they’ve taken out all chemical weapons assets. So, I imagine that that’s something that would be on the table as well.

And related to the terrorism issue specifically, there are a number of foreign fighters in HTS’s ranks, mainly from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Uyghurs. That will definitely be a sticking point for the U.S. government because some of those smaller groups within HTS’s ranks are also foreign terrorist organizations.

And then another angle related to the terrorism issue is how HTS might deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly Hamas. As we know, Hamas has had a base in Damascus going back years. The question is: Would HTS provide an office for Hamas there, especially as it’s now been beaten up in Gaza and been discredited in many ways, with rumors about their office leaving Doha? That’s one of the bigger questions, especially since, pre-Oct. 7, 2023 [when Hamas launched its major offensive against Israel], HTS would support any Hamas rocket attacks across the border. And then HTS cheered on the Oct. 7 attacks and eulogized [Hamas leaders] Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar when they were killed. They’re very pro-Palestinian.

I imagine that there will be back-channeling going on. But because all of this is happening so quickly, there will be many in the [U.S.] government who will be apprehensive about doing something quickly and will want to see more behavioral changes before anything.

FP: The United States already appears to be worried that Syria could become a breeding ground for terrorism and has carried out a number of strikes against Islamic State targets since Assad fell. Are these concerns fair?

AZ: I don’t know if it would be in relation to HTS. The question is more whether the eastern part of that country would become destabilized due to Turkey backing the Syrian National Army [or SNA] and continuing to fight against the Syrian Democratic Forces [or SDF], the U.S.-backed [and Kurdish-led] group that’s been fighting against the Islamic State. Because if the SNA continues to fight the SDF and potentially undermines the stability and security of the area, that could provide more space for the Islamic State to take advantage.

We’ve seen that the number of attacks by the Islamic State in Syria has gone up three times as much this year compared to last year, which is the first time we’ve seen an uptick in this trend since the fall of their territorial control in 2019. There are warning signs, slightly. Of course, it’s nowhere near the same levels as it had been previously. The number of attacks this year was probably on par with three years ago. But there are already concerns about this.

And now that the regime is gone, it could provide a space for the Islamic State to expand. That’s part of the reason why we saw those U.S. airstrikes because it was in former regime areas in central Syria. I would expect that there’ll be far more offensive airstrikes by the United States and the global coalition against Islamic State assets going forward.

And that doesn’t even get into the whole issue of the 10,000 male prisoners who remain in northeast Syria under the SDF, as well as all the women and children in the IDP [internally displaced persons] camps.

That’s why it’s necessary for Turkey to stop its proxies from fighting the SDF. Otherwise, it can create a huge problem not only for Syria but Turkey itself, as well as Iraq and possibly Western countries.

FP: Can Jolani bring order to Syria after so many years of civil war and with so many competing groups and factions? Is Jolani really the man for the job? And what kind of relationship will he have with Turkey—and the Kurds?

AZ: In terms of the Kurds, I’m less concerned of potential deals being cut. HTS already reached out to the Kurds and the SDF, and it seems as if they’re more willing to discuss and negotiate. There’s also the fact that there have been rumors behind the scenes that the two groups had already been engaging with one another going back a couple of years.

The issue is more whether Turkey wants to continue to push its cards against the Kurds in Syria and how that could then further create more cascading destabilization vis-à-vis the Islamic State. I believe that the U.S. government as well as European countries are probably in talks with Ankara now over this issue.

In terms of stability, besides the Islamic State, the SNA is the biggest problem right now.

FP: What would you say are the biggest misconceptions about HTS and Jolani that are really important to dispel in terms of grasping the situation in Syria and its potential future?

AZ: One of the things is just coming to grips with the fact that they’re no longer global jihadis or related to the Islamic State or al Qaeda. That’s old news.

At the same time, we need to be cognizant that they also aren’t these liberal democrats, like many of the folks who came out to protests in 2011, either. It’s very complicated, and people need to get used to being in the gray instead of making it a black-and-white issue.