[en] Full text: The Director General will open the symposium by presenting a series of challenges facing the international safeguards community: the need to ensure a robust system, with strong verification tools and a sound research and development programme; the importance of securing the necessary support for the system, in terms of resources; the effort to achieve universal participation in the non-proliferation regime; and the necessity of re-energizing disarmament efforts. Special focus will be given to the challenge underscored by recent events, of strengthening international efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. (author)

[en] Uzbekistan's current SSAC has been developed and fully satisfies the IAEA safeguards requirements. The Republic of Uzbekistan supports the introduction of the 'integrated safeguards'. There is need to further strengthen the relationship between Uzbekistan's SSAC and the IAEA under an integrated safeguards regime to provide more effective and efficient safeguards application

[en] Full text: Throughout a decade of verification activities in Iraq, the IAEA Iraq Action Team has developed an extensive information system in order to support inspection activities and the associated analytical efforts. Original documents, declarations, inspection results, analytical data, etc. are available through a unique system combining the flexibility of raw data and the efficiency of structured databases. Examples of specific tools will be presented. (author)

[en] Full text: Since the beginning of its United Nations Security Council mandate in 1991, the Agency has used extensively overhead imagery to support, supplement and enhance inspections activities. Following the suspension of inspection since 16 December 1998 and the availability of new sources of high resolution satellite imagery, the Action Team has continued to develop its capabilities in this area, including the development of a multipurpose Geographic Information System (GIS). Examples of application of overhead imagery supporting a verification mandate will be presented. (author)

[en] An Integrated Physical Protection System (IPPS) was developed for the consolidation of all sub systems, sensors and elements related to physical protection for an efficient and effective security environment of a facility. An effective physical protection system discharges the functions of detection, delay, communication, response, access control etc. IPPS performs, controls and monitors all the above functionality and helps in taking quick action on occurrence of unusual incidents by instantly reporting the incident in easily understandable audio, video, graphical and textual format and also by initiating automatic interactions among sub-systems

[en] Uzbekistan became independent of the Soviet Union in 1991. Before this independence, the nuclear activities in Uzbekistan had been part of a nuclear programme of the former Soviet Union. Uzbekistan acceded to the NPT in 1992 and joined the IAEA the same year. The safeguards agreement entered into force in October 1994. Uzbekistan signed and ratified the Additional Protocol with its entry into force in December 1998. This paper will describe the activities involved in the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Uzbekistan such as evaluation of the Declaration; visits and complementary accesses as well as evaluation thereof; and the Safeguards Conclusions. There is no declared uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing activities in Uzbekistan, but there is a significant uranium mining and milling industry

[en] Full text: The NPA in its present status is at the end of its physiological life, the AP and the provisions of the Integrated Safeguards requires a revisit of the present arrangements with EURATOM. In this regard the following elements could be considered: a) Some of the Euratom functions could be transferred to the State/Operator making Easier the use of short notice or unannounced inspections; b) The use of authenticated surveillance with remote transmission capabilities; c) Electronic seals and unattended monitoring/measuring systems with simultaneous remote transmission to the IAEA HQ and to Euratom. For the Additional Protocol the IAEA has the infrastructure to deal with all requirements of the AP and this can be taken into account to avoid duplications in Euratom. Some of the functions of the Euratom could be also taken over by the IAEA in order to avoid duplications and increase the efficiency provided that the necessary. Financial resources are made available by the EU. (author)

[en] Full text: In 1994 discussions began with South Africa on special measures to strengthen IAEA Safeguards for a storage facility containing an amount of highly enriched uranium. This activity served as a pivotal activity for the remote monitoring aspect of 'Programme 93+2' and would then be utilised in the mainstream safeguards application for Strengthening of the Safeguards System, application of the Additional Protocol and Integrated Safeguards. This paper will discuss the experience gained in South Africa from the first experiments to the current situation where remote monitoring is an integral component of the safeguards implementation in South Africa. (author)

[en] Full text: The requirement to verify the correctness and completeness of the information provided by a State in its initial declaration arises from the comprehensive safeguards agreement between a State and the Agency. The objective of safeguards is to provide credible assurance of the non- diversions of nuclear material from declared activities, and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities based on the Agency's conclusions from activities it performs in a State and on all information available to it. The cornerstone of the IAEA safeguards is and remains nuclear material accountancy verification. The strengthening safeguards system including the provisions of the Additional Protocol have provided the Agency access to a variety of new information. This together with a number of new tools such as environmental sampling, usage of satellite imagery, novel NDA methods for spent fuel available combined with enhanced information analysis provide the Agency with new capabilities is meeting its verification obligation. (author)

[en] The Additional Protocol between Japan and the IAEA entered into force in December 1999. To come into force a series of implementation trials of Additional Protocol was carried out at two Japanese representative nuclear research centers, i.e. Tokai Research Establishment of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Oarai Engineering Center of Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC). These trials were proposed by Japan and were conducted in cooperation with the IAEA Secretariat. In addition, Japan amended 'the Law for the Regulation of Reactors etc.', to collect adequate information to submit to the IAEA, to arrange the surrounding for the complementary access, etc. In addition, Japan Submitted the Initial Declaration of the Additional Protocol within 180 days of the entry into force of the Protocol, in the middle of June, 2000