[en] Full-text: The advent of new technologies and knowledge have emphasised the need for countries to rely on one another for progress and development. At the same time, new challenges to development, which are beyond the capacity of any country to approach individually, have emerged. These have led to greater need for international co-operation, particularly among the developing countries. In Malaysia, international technical co-operation has contributed significantly towards the development of nuclear technology. Malaysia has received technical assistance through the multilateral, regional and bilateral co-operation. This assistance complements the efforts of the government to meet the primary objectives of science and technology programme, which are, intensification of R&D capacity and applications of technologies, both acquired and developed, in national development. This report reviews the technical assistance received through the international co-operation and its contributions towards the development of nuclear technology in Malaysia for period 2010-2017. (author)

[en] Nuclear Malaysia is mandated by the Government of Malaysia, inter alia, to spearhead Research and Development (R&D) in nuclear and related technology. Technically, nuclear technology is a highly specialised subject in which expertise are thinly spread over the globe with concentration in mainly developed countries. Nuclear technology also tends to be politically sensitive and handling of radioactive materials and equipment needs high level of skills and knowledge for the safe and secured uses of this technology and needs to be regulated. Hence international cooperation and multilateral approach is of vital importance for the development and sustainability of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and to provide assurance that the interests of all parties are safeguarded and remains in check. In this context, the International Atomic Energy Agency or the IAEA, a UN agency, plays a vital role where international cooperation in nuclear technologies is centred. Malaysia also contributed a fair amount of financial resources to the IAEA as part of its international obligations to keep the Agency afloat. This paper provides an insight into various services and facilities offered or available at the IAEA in which researchers in Nuclear Malaysia could utilize in order to expand and enhance their R&D activities in nuclear and related technologies, as mandated by the Government of Malaysia, as well as ensuring that the investments will provide good returns in terms of socio-economic benefits, both tangible and intangible. (author)

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[en] Using the approach first introduced by Smale, we study a duopolistic market where agents have bounded memory and rationality. A stable cooperative equilibrium is achieved by employing a dynamical system that takes into account repeated interactions between firms and a set of behavioural rules

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[en] Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is determined by the payoff difference and a teaching activity characterizing the donor's capability to enforce its strategy on the opponent. Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied by an increase in the donor's teaching activity. By applying an optimum value of the increment, this simple mechanism spontaneously creates relevant inhomogeneities in the teaching activities that support the maintenance of cooperation for both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game

[en] Understanding the emergence and maintenance of cooperation is one of the most challenging topics of our time. Evolutionary game theory offers a very flexible framework within which to address this challenge. Here we use the prisoner's dilemma game to investigate the performance of individuals who are capable of adopting reactive strategies in communities structurally organized by means of Barabási-Albert scale-free networks. We find that basic cognitive abilities, such as the capability to distinguish their partners and act according to their previous actions, enable cooperation to thrive. This result is particularly significant whenever fear is the leading social tension, as this fosters retaliation, thus enforcing and sustaining cooperation. Being able to simultaneously reward fellow cooperators and punish defectors proves instrumental in achieving cooperation and the welfare of the community. As a result, central individuals can successfully lead the community and turn defective players into cooperative ones. Finally, even when participation costs—known to be detrimental to cooperation in scale-free networks—are explicitly included, we find that basic cognitive abilities have enough potential to help cooperation to prevail. (paper)