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Johnson, C.S.
Sandia Labs., Albuquerque, NM (USA)1979
Sandia Labs., Albuquerque, NM (USA)1979
AbstractAbstract
[en] The use of unattended video surveillance systems places some unique requirements on the systems and their hardware. The systems have the traditional requirements of video imaging, video storage, and video playback but also have some special requirements such as tamper safing. The technology available to meet these requirements and how it is being applied to unattended video surveillance systems are discussed in this paper
Primary Subject
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1979; 12 p; 20. annual meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management; Albuquerque, NM, USA; 16 - 19 Jul 1979; CONF-790707--7; Available from NTIS., PC A02/MF A01
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Johnson, C.S.
Sandia Labs., Albuquerque, N.Mex. (USA)1977
Sandia Labs., Albuquerque, N.Mex. (USA)1977
AbstractAbstract
[en] This report describes the operation of the Bilevel Alarm Monitoring Multiplexer used in the Adaptive Intrusion Data System (AIDS) to transfer and control alarm signals being sent to the Nova 2 computer, the Memory Controlled Data Processor, and its own integral Display Panel. The multiplexer can handle 48 alarm channels and format the alarms into binary formats compatible with the destination of the alarm data
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Jun 1977; 13 p; Available from NTIS., PC A02/MF A01
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An introduction to video image compression and authentication technology for safeguards applications
Johnson, C.S.
Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States). Funding organisation: USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)1995
Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States). Funding organisation: USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)1995
AbstractAbstract
[en] Verification of a video image has been a major problem for safeguards for several years. Various verification schemes have been tried on analog video signals ever since the mid-1970's. These schemes have provided a measure of protection but have never been widely adopted. The development of reasonably priced complex video processing integrated circuits makes it possible to digitize a video image and then compress the resulting digital file into a smaller file without noticeable loss of resolution. Authentication and/or encryption algorithms can be more easily applied to digital video files that have been compressed. The compressed video files require less time for algorithm processing and image transmission. An important safeguards application for authenticated, compressed, digital video images is in unattended video surveillance systems and remote monitoring systems. The use of digital images in the surveillance system makes it possible to develop remote monitoring systems that send images over narrow bandwidth channels such as the common telephone line. This paper discusses the video compression process, authentication algorithm, and data format selected to transmit and store the authenticated images
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1995; 6 p; 36. annual meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management; Palm Desert, CA (United States); 9-12 Jul 1995; CONF-950787--17; CONTRACT AC04-94AL85000; Also available from OSTI as DE95015076; NTIS; US Govt. Printing Office Dep
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Johnson, C.S.
Sandia Labs., Albuquerque, N.Mex. (USA)1976
Sandia Labs., Albuquerque, N.Mex. (USA)1976
AbstractAbstract
[en] An Adaptive Intrusion Data System (AIDS) was developed to collect data from intrusion alarm sensors as part of an evaluation system to improve sensor performance. AIDS is a unique digital data compression, storage, and formatting system. It also incorporates capability for video selection and recording for assessment of the sensors monitored by the system. The system is software reprogrammable to numerous configurations that may be utilized for the collection of environmental, bi-level, analog and video data. The output of the system is digital tapes formatted for direct data reduction on a CDC 6400 computer, and video tapes containing timed tagged information that can be correlated with the digital data
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1976; 6 p; International telemetry conference; Los Angeles, California, United States of America (USA); 28 Sep 1976; CONF-760923--1; Available from NTIS. $3.50.
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Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.
Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States). Funding organisation: USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)1994
Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States). Funding organisation: USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)1994
AbstractAbstract
[en] From the beginning, equipment to support IAEA Safeguards could be characterized as that which is used to measure nuclear material, Destructive Assay (DA) and Non Destructive Assay (NDA), and that which is used to provide continuity of knowledge between inspection intervals, Containment ampersand Surveillance (C/S). C/S equipment has often been thought of as Cameras and Seals, with a limited number of monitors being employed as they became available. In recent years, technology has advanced at an extremely rapid rate, and continues to do so. The traditional film cameras are being replaced by video equipment, and fiber optic and electronic seals have come into rather widespread use. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this evolution, and that which indicates the wave of the future without much question, is the integration of video surveillance and electronic seals with a variety of monitors. This is demonstrated by safeguards systems which are installed in several nuclear facilities in France, Germany, Japan, the UK, the USA, and elsewhere. The terminology of Integrated Monitoring Systems (IMS) has emerged, with the employment of network technology capable of interconnecting all desired elements in a very flexible manner. Also, the technology for transmission of a wide variety of information to off-site locations, termed Remote Monitoring, is in widespread industrial use, requiring very little adaptation for safeguards use. This paper examines the future of the Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in International Safeguards, including technical and other related factors
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1994; 13 p; International symposium on nuclear material safeguards; Vienna (Austria); 14-18 Mar 1994; IAEA-SM--333/109; CONF-940307--14; CONTRACT AC04-94AL85000; Also available from OSTI as DE94006600; NTIS; US Govt. Printing Office Dep
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Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.
Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States). Funding organisation: USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)1994
Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States). Funding organisation: USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)1994
AbstractAbstract
[en] Becoming aware of the significant events of the past four years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on which direction the development of nuclear safeguards in a new era needs to take and the implications. The lime proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factor's and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. Within such a regime, the associated measures need to be determined and technological support identified. This paper will identify the proven techniques which, with appropriate implementation support, could most quickly make available additional measures for a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. In particular, it will examine the future of Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in international safeguards, including technical and other related factors
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1994; 6 p; Institute of Nuclear Materials Management annual meeting; Naples, FL (United States); 17-20 Jul 1994; CONF-940748--31; CONTRACT AC04-94AL85000; Also available from OSTI as DE94015785; NTIS; US Govt. Printing Office Dep
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Hale, W.R.; Johnson, C.S.
Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States). Funding organisation: USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)1996
Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States). Funding organisation: USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)1996
AbstractAbstract
[en] For the past two years Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has been involved in developing and installing Remote Monitoring Systems (RMS) at a number of sites around the world. Through the cooperation of the various countries and facilities, it has been possible to collect data on the requirements and performance of these systems that are for monitoring the movement of spent nuclear fuel. The data collected shows that the front end detection method can be a very useful concept to reduce the amount of data that has to be collected and, more importantly, reviewed by inspectors. Spent fuel storage monitoring is a major part of the non-proliferation monitoring that must be done since spent fuel is the by-product of all the power and research reactors worldwide. The movement of spent fuel is easier in many respects to monitor since it always requires protective shielding. This paper will describe a number of the Remote Monitoring Systems that have been installed to monitor spent fuel movement and the resulting decrease in data from the use of a sensor-driven front detection system. The reduction of the data collected and stored is also important to remote monitoring since it decreases the time required to transmit the data to a review site
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1996; 5 p; 37. annual meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management; Naples, FL (United States); 28-31 Jul 1996; CONF-960767--16; CONTRACT AC04-94AL85000; Also available from OSTI as DE96013396; NTIS; US Govt. Printing Office Dep
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Johnson, C.S.; Dupree, S.A.
Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States). Funding organisation: USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)1995
Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States). Funding organisation: USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)1995
AbstractAbstract
[en] Remote monitoring systems presently operating in facilities in a number of countries around the world are providing valuable information on the installation and operation of such systems. Results indicate they are performing reliably. While the technology for remote monitoring exists today, it may be some time before numerous constraints on implementation can be resolved. However, the constraints should not prevent the designing of systems that can be used for remote monitoring. Selection of the proper technology path for future development should include a flexible approach to front-end detection, data formats, data processing, and other areas. A brief description of two of the existing remote monitoring systems, and some general recommendations for future remote monitoring systems, will be presented
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1995; 11 p; 5. international conference on facility-safeguards interface; Jackson Hole, WY (United States); 24-30 Sep 1995; CONF-950923--6; CONTRACT AC04-94AL85000; Also available from OSTI as DE96000722; NTIS; US Govt. Printing Office Dep
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AUSTRALIA, BARSEBAECK-1 REACTOR, DESIGN, FIELD TESTS, MATERIALS HANDLING, MOTION DETECTION SYSTEMS, NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION, NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT, PERFORMANCE, REACTOR FUELING, RECORDING SYSTEMS, REMOTE SENSING, REMOTE VIEWING EQUIPMENT, SPENT FUEL STORAGE, SPENT FUELS, SWEDEN, WATER COOLED REACTORS
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Corlis, N.E.; Johnson, C.S.
Sandia Labs., Albuquerque, N.Mex. (USA)1978
Sandia Labs., Albuquerque, N.Mex. (USA)1978
AbstractAbstract
[en] An Adaptive Intrusion Data System (AIDS) was developed to collect data from intrusion alarm sensors as part of an evaluation system to improve sensor performance. AIDS is a unique digital data compression, storage, and formatting system. It also incorporates a capability for video selection and recording for assessment of the sensors monitored by the system. The system is software reprogrammable to numerous configurations that may be utilized for the collection of environmental, bi-metal, analog, and video data. This manual covers the procedures for operating AIDS. Instructions are given to guide the operator in software programming and control option selections required to program AIDS for data collection. Software diagnostic programs are included in this manual as a method of isolating system problems
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Mar 1978; 72 p; Available from NTIS., PC A04/MF A01
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Campbell, J.W.; Johnson, C.S.; Stieff, L.R.
Sandia Labs., Albuquerque, NM (USA)
Sandia Labs., Albuquerque, NM (USA)
AbstractAbstract
[en] The growing acceptance of containment and surveillance as a means to increase safeguards effectiveness has provided impetus to the development of improved surveillance and containment devices. Five recently developed devices are described. The devices include one photographic and two television surveillance systems and two high security seals that can be verified while installed
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nd; 9 p; IAEA symposium on nuclear material safeguards; Vienna, Austria; 2 - 6 Oct 1978; CONF-781007--4; Available from NTIS., PC A02/MF A01
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