[en] The Swedish Radiation Protection Institute, SSI, regularly performs control measurements of waste packages produced by Swedish nuclear power plants. The report presents the results of the gamma-spectrometric measurements made during the fall of 1996. The agreement between the nuclear facilities own measurements and SSI's results is generally good

[en] This thesis is based on work at the Lund Pelletron accelerator facility in order to improve the accuracy and efficiency of the Lund Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (AMS) system. To obtain high accuracy, all measurements are performed relative to a standard of known activity. Charge state distributions have been obtained for a number of isotopes: ⁹Be, ¹²C, ¹³C, ¹⁶O, ¹⁹F, ²⁷Al, ³⁵Cl, ⁴⁸Ti and ⁵⁸Ni order to improve the transmission through the system and to reduce the isotopic fractionation in the measurements. For carbon, charge states distributions were obtained both under foil and gas stripping. The pressure profile of the Lund Pelletron system has been calculated, both under foil and gas stripping, to make possible to perform transmission calculations for a carbon beam. These results were used to design a new terminal stripper of the accelerator system. A new ion source has, during the last few years, been constructed providing a multiple sample wheel, enabling more accurate relative measurements and also providing more efficient measurements, due to a higher beam current. A new detection technique suitable for AMS measurements on heavier radionuclides, such as ³⁶Cl,⁴⁴Ti and ⁵⁹Ni, has been evaluated and detection limits for ⁵⁹Ni have been derived. 59 refs, 13 figs

[en] The Swedish Radiation Protection Institute, SSI, regularly performs control measurements of waste packages produced by Swedish nuclear power plants. The report presents the results of the gamma spectrometric measurements made during the fall of 1997. The agreement between the nuclear facilities own measurements and SSI's results is generally good

[en] In its recently issued guidance on geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI) develops the concepts of the regulatory risk target, best available technique (BAT) and optimisation, and gives recommendations on how to demonstrate compliance with SSI's regulations for different time periods after closure of a geological repository. Because a post-closure risk analysis will always be associated with inescapable uncertainties, the application of BAT is seen as an important complementary requirement to risk calculations. The guidance states that the implementer should be able to motivate all important choices and decisions during the development of a repository, including siting, design, construction and operation, in relation to the repository's long-term protective capability. Although the risk target is in principle independent of time, i.e. the basic premise is that future generations should be given the same protection as today generation, the guidance acknowledges the increasing difficulty of making meaningful assessments of risk in the distant future. This is reflected in a differentiated expectation in the reporting of compliance arguments: for long-time periods after closure (beyond 100 000 years) more emphasis is given on robust measures of repository performance than on calculated risks that are based on speculative assumptions on, e.g. future climate and human society. (authors)

[en] OKG AB has to SSI submitted an application for a license according to the Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3) concerning a shallow land burial/landfill for low-level nuclear waste in Simpevarp in the Oskarshamn municipality. The application for a license covers permission to build, possess and operate a shallow land burial/landfill for low-level nuclear waste. Attached to the application is an environmental impact statement. An application for a license according to the Environmental Act (1998:808) has been submitted to the Environmental Court in Vaexjoe. SSI has circulated the application for consideration to the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, the County Government Board of Kalmar and the Oskarshamn municipality. SSI has informed the European Commission about the application in accordance with the EURATOM Treaty, article 37. This assessment report constitutes the base for the decision by SSI 2000-09-18 for approval and radiation protection conditions. In the report, earlier permissions for shallow land burials/landfills at the Swedish nuclear installations are described. This report shows the development of the legal system during the last years, the premises for the assessment of the application, and SSI's review of OKG's plans, consequence analysis and environmental impact statement

[en] The paper gives a brief description of the shallow land disposal facilities in Sweden and how they are regulated by the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI). Some experiences from up to twenty years of operations are given, and further development of the SSI regulations is discussed. (author)

[en] At the geological repository for short lived waste (SFR) at the Forsmark NPP, radioactive operational waste from NPPs and similar waste from other Swedish nuclear facilities is disposed. This includes short lived waste from, e.g., research and industry, that has been treated at the facilities in Studsvik. SFR is operated by the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co (SKB) and has been in operation since 1988. In 2012, SKB reported that it was suspected that some waste packages disposed at the SFR, following conditioning at the Studsvik facility, might contain waste not in accordance with the waste acceptance criteria. SKB planned to retrieve the waste containers in the 2030s. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) has since 2012 asked for complementary information regarding the suspected content of radioactive substances in the waste, as well as an analysis of the risks involved in retrieving the containers and the radiological risk if the containers were not to be retrieved. In 2020, based on the review of the presented studies, SSM supported SKB’s intention to retrieve the waste. SSM judged that SKB had presented a credible plan for handling containers with questionable structural integrity due to corrosion. Furthermore, according to SSM the need for retrieval is mainly due to the potential for very high doses in the event of inadvertent intrusion into repository, combined with an assessed non-negligible probability that a drinking water well could be drilled into the repository, at a depth of only 50 meters below the surface. The paper describes the background to the identified problem and the relevant regulatory requirements leading to the position taken by SSM. The paper also describes the ambiguity that recently has arisen when one of the waste consignors at Studsvik has disclaimed both nuclear and financial responsibility for large quantities of Swedish legacy waste, including a significant proportion of the waste intended for retrieval. (author)

[en] In the report SSI's review of SKB's RDandD programme 2001 is presented. In the review SSI comments, among other things, the decision making process, the need of a strategy document, SKB's safety and system analysis and SKB's biosphere studies

[en] The Swedish Repository for Radioactive Operational Waste (SFR 1) has been reviewed by the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI) and the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI). One of the conditions for operating SFR 1 is that a new safety assessment should be conducted once every 10 years by the licensee, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co (SKB). Regarding the operational safety of SFR 1, the overall conclusion from the review is that the facility is being operated in a safe manner. Regarding the safety and radiation protection after closure, SKB's new report demonstrates the significant development in safety assessment methods, which has taken place since the publication of the previous safety report a decade ago. However, in their review the authorities' concluded that a conclusive assessment of compliance is hampered by the lack of a systematic uncertainty analysis, weaknesses in the justification of scenarios, conservative assumptions and some model simplifications. In their regulatory decisions based on this review, SSI and SKI therefore have asked SKB for supplementary information analyses. (author)

[en] The ¹⁴CO₂ and the total airborne ¹⁴C releases from two Swedish light-water reactors, the BWR Ringhals-1 and the PWR Ringhals-4, have been analyzed using accelerator mass spectrometry. Five two-week samples, continuously collected from the stack of each reactor, showed that of the total airborne ¹⁴C effluents, on the average 93% for the BWR and 14% for the PWR were released as ¹⁴CO₂. 21 refs, 2 tabs