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[en] The Atoms for Peace Program started in 1954 is first discussed. As a result of the Indian test and plans by France and Germany to export enrichment and reprocessing facilities, US policy has veered from the Atoms for Peace approach. US policy now emphasizes technical abstinence rather than technical leadership. Dr. Wolfe concludes that the US, in attempting to discourage nuclear technologies it believes inimical to its non-proliferation objectives, has instead accelerated their independent development abroad. He states that the meaningful issue that must be faced in today's world is not whether the US can delay promising, but sensitive, technologies such as laser enrichment and reprocessing; rather, it is whether the US can play a lead role in determining the future institutional framework in which such technologies will be deployed. US ability to take this lead depends largely on its ability to maintain technological leadership. Thus, it is ironic to find US nuclear power capacity weakened in the name of non-proliferation objectives. Dr. Wolfe feels that technical leadership by the US in exploiting the immense energy-supply potential of nuclear energy can, as in the past, provide a means to help determine how nuclear technologies are utilized internationally. As an incidental benefit, such technological leadership may in the future help to solve our own energy-supply problem. 20 references

[en] The reason why nuclear power has promise is because of the promise of its fuel cycle. The fuel cycle is in fairly good shape and has demonstrated the characteristics of good economics, good general characterization, and good maintenance of the various parts of the fuel cycle. The thermal recycling of fuel is an area in which the economics have changed to the point that, at least in many parts of the world, it's no longer economical

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[en] At present, that portion of the nuclear fuel cycle involving reprocessing, waste management, and mixed-oxide fuel fabrication is in an unsettled state. Government regulatory requirements with respect to all aspects of the back end of the fuel cycle are still being formulated, and there is little positive experience on the operation of commercial reprocessing or mixed-oxide fabrication plants. In view of this unsettled situation, it will be difficult to meet the reprocessing and mixed-oxide fabrication needs of the next decade in the pattern previously anticipated. The costs in the back end of the fuel cycle are much higher than had been anticipated several years ago, a situation similar to that of almost all large endeavors in this country. On the other hand, the added costs are small relative to total power costs and do not affect the economic advantage of nuclear power as compared to other power sources. A rough economic analysis indicates that the question for the back end of the fuel cycle has changed from one of optimizing profitability to one of determining the most economic disposition of spent fuel. Long-term spent fuel storage is a practical and economically acceptable way to provide time for determining a sound course of action for the back end of the fuel cycle. Indeed, if one could count on a breeder economy before the end of the century, one possible course of action is to store light-water fuel until the plutonium can be used in breeders. However, for philosophical as well as practical reasons, it is important that the uncertainties in the course of action should be resolved as quickly as possible. Long-term storage should not be an excuse to delay resolution of the basic questions. (U.S.)

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[en] The problems of developing a new central station power source utilizing advanced technology are discussed in the article. Its thesis is that the task of developing a new power system may be generally underestimated; that our present social, financial, and political approach may not be suitable to the task and that therefore development along our present course can result in very large expenditures without timely success. In particular, even after technological success has been achieved, it is not clear that a new system can be introduced in time to avoid serious economic and social dislocations. The history of nuclear power and the development of the breeder are used as illustrative examples of some of the problems to be faced in developing new power sources. In facing a future problem, it is foolish to ignore past experience. On the other hand, it can also be dangerous to generalize and draw analogies. Some conclusions that appear to be generally applicable to the development of new energy sources are summarized

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[en] The US first approached nuclear energy with that of secrecy as embodied in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Even such states as the UK and Canada which helped the US develop the bomb were excluded from its nuclear information. Despite this secrecy, the USSR exploded its first nuclear device in 1949 and, by 1953, the UK had nuclear weapons capability. The American response was the 1954 Atoms for Peace program in which the US proposed to lead a worldwide effort to make available the fruits of peaceful nuclear power, in return for agreements on the part of recipient states not to develop nuclear weapons. Dr. Wolfe points out that nuclear weapons proliferation is a problem predating commercial nuclear power; and the development of peaceful nuclear power by the US was not the cause of the problem, but was pursued as a means to help control it. Limiting the spread of nuclear weapons is desired, but the moral basis of the policy is clouded by the nuclear arsenal the US maintains. The US has sought to discourage reprocessing abroad by imposing restrictions on enriched uranium fuel and other nuclear exports; and partly as a result of recent US policies Dr. Wolfe feels, there is widespread determination to develop independent fuel-cycle capabilities in a large number of countries of the world. He believes the US should reconsider its position on reprocessing, recycle, and the breeder. Of all the nuclear power issues that separate the US from a major part of the world, this is the most abrasive