TL/DR; my time on the tools heavily influences my thinking here, as do the experiences interacting with TP over the years on safety philosophy and practice.
I also have a huge degree of empathy for the poor sods on site, especially the Team Leader. As one Lineman to another, <fist bump>, brother.
Interesting. After the initial speed-read, I went back for a second look.
What I can't seem to pick out in this weighty 73 page tome, is where the 'how did we get to a point where a TL and TAs were the sole decision-makers in a procedure that directly interacted with the structural integrity of the tower?'
This further compounds when you get to the bit about the TL doing the sand blasting. It's pretty clear that no one in the authorship chain has ever used a sand-blaster. S8.26; "it seems probable"... There's no 'probable' about it. If you're even trying to supervise someone else while using a sand-blaster, you're doing both things wrong, terribly wrong.
Having been out of the loop for a while, I'm wondering where the connection is between 'authorised and competent' and 'constant and direct supervision'. You either have one, or you have the other, or you will have none.
It sounds like the TL ended up in an invidious situation, and while I don't disagree with 8.29, I can't help but ask 'well, why was that?'
I also note the very clear assertion that the design and delivery of the contracting model had no influence on the event. Nada, zilch, zip.... Right. The contractor will say the same, with feeling and obvious conviction, because they're bunch of highly intelligent people.
It's unfortunate that the report was scoped to include recovery and restoration, as it could benefit from its own review focussed on what went 'right'.
If you remove the padding, it still takes a hell of a volume of text to say;
- The tower fell over because the crew removed too many of the wrong nuts, because;
- The crew did not pick up on the risk of failure when removing too many of the wrong nuts because;
- A deficit of knowledge and/or experience existed at both individual and team levels and
- The composition of the crew did not enable all of the tasks within the activity to be undertaken concurrently using an and/or competent/supervised approach because;
Then it goes silent.
Is that it? Public flogging for the TL, the same for the TAs but at a reduced pace, call it a day?
I hope not, but acknowledge that hope is a noble virtue, even when gravely misplaced.
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Today we’re releasing our investigation report into the electricity transmission tower fall at Glorit. We commissioned an investigation as we wanted to understand how and why it happened, so we can make sure it doesn’t ever happen again. The report has a range of recommendations which we accept and are already working on. Read it here:
https://bit.ly/4conmaZ
The report confirms the initial findings announced by Transpower and service provider Omexom on 24 June. The tower fell because the Omexom crew that was performing routine baseplate maintenance work did not follow Omexom’s standard practice and removed all of the nuts from three of the tower’s four legs.
We apologise again to those who were impacted by the power cut caused by the tower fall. Thank you to the lines companies and generators who supported us to manage the incident, our industry truly comes together at times like these. Thank you also to the large industrial companies and services like the hospital who went without power or relied on their standby generation for several days to ensure that we could make the available electricity go further.
The people that work on our assets are proud of the mahi they do to keep the lights on for Aotearoa, and it is important to note that an incident of this nature is exceptionally rare. Those involved in the incident have been deeply impacted and we thank Omexom for ensuring they have the support they need.
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