Frederic Eger’s Post

RSIS | S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies report on Syria’s trials ahead Factionalism in Syria’s Future Governance Both Bashar Assad and his father, Hafez Assad, relied on sectarian and ethnic divisions to consolidate power, thereby institutionalising factionalism. This factionalism – deeply influenced by external forces – exacerbates instability and fragmentation. Porous borders facilitate the influx of foreign fighters, weapons, and resources, fueling the proliferation of militant factions. Jihadist and Kurdish groups, entrenched within Syria’s fractured landscape, form the structural core of its factionalised conflict. These overlapping divisions underscore the immense challenges to achieving political cohesion and sustainable stability in a post-Assad era. The critical concern with these groups lie in their competing ideologies and divergent sub-interests. As the unifying goal of removing the Assad regime disintegrates, these ideological rivalries are likely to crystallise, transforming them into adversarial entities. Upcoming challenges A complete transition by HTS to civilian governance, severing its Islamist and jihadist ties, would likely alienate hardline elements within HTS ranks while provoking opposition from other factions, including Kurdish Islamist forces and remnants of ISIS. Such a shift risks internal fragmentation and external hostility, leaving HTS ideologically and militarily isolated. Corruption, deeply embedded in Syrian society since the Hafez Assad era and further entrenched under Bashar Assad, remains a systemic issue. Its pervasive nature is likely to endure, obstructing any incoming government’s efforts to establish a just and stable order and leaving the state structurally weakened from the get-go. The exposure of the Assad regime’s brutal prison system reveals a legacy of profound psychological trauma and systemic repression. This enduring trauma threatens societal cohesion and fosters long-term resistance, undermining prospects for stable governance. The “Islamist” Factor The “Islamist” factor is the most critical driver of possible confusion, external intervention, and internal conflict in Syria. The Muslim Brotherhood’s tenure in Egypt from 2012 to 2013 highlights the challenges Islamist movements face in transitioning from opposition to governance. Their experience, which led it to be banned in several Arab countries, reinforced fears among regimes of the destabilising potential of Islamist groups in power. This apprehension stemmed from concerns that such movements could embolden domestic Islamist factions, threatening regime survival. Additionally, Islamist groups often struggle to balance ideological commitments with the pragmatic demands of governance, limiting the feasibility of Islamist rule despite strong grassroots support. https://lnkd.in/gbra7hyk

Why Does Hamas & Hezbollah Enjoy Such Widespread Support? If there is one question that has vexed me since 7/10 last year, it is how seemingly 'average' and educated people in the West, could have lined up behind Hamas (and lately Hezbollah) in this conflict with Israel, despite not being anti-Semitic nor generally anti-Israel. I think the answer is this - it is very difficult for people in the West, especially younger people, to understand (let alone accept), that values and a lifestyle that we enjoy and take for granted in the West, are NOT the same values that most Palestinians nor other Islamic fundamentalists aspire to. While not defending the so-called educated & 'average' Westerners' position taken in this conflict – it’s really difficult to accept that we don’t all want the same things in life (education for all, equal treatment of men and women, the ability to adopt a secular life etc) – BUT it’s a critical mistake to view Islamic fundamentalism through a Western liberal lens. We must all do a better job at informing those that traditionally adopt a more moderate & centrist position, that just because we in the West may subscribe to particular values & ideals, doesn’t mean that Hamas & other Islamic fundamentalists want the same things we do. So when one sees the innocent deaths in & the decimation of the Gaza strip, it’s so much easier to blame Israel as the cause of this death & decimation THAN to accept that the cause of this horror is Hamas (and by extension the majority of the Palestinians) in Gaza and lately Hezbollah for the destruction in Lebanon. This I believe is why it is Israel, that is continually pressed for ceasefires, to cease its ‘hostilities’, to ‘de-escalate’ the conflict and negotiate a peace settlement with Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran – but how do you do that when NONE of these groups want peace AND their stated (and repeated) desire is to destroy Israel and kill all Jews. The conflict could have ended on 8/10 IF: 1. Hamas returned the hostages; 2. Hamas denounced terrorism and stopped launching rockets into Israel; & 3. Hamas' leadership surrendered We all know none of these 3 conditions were met - so how could Israel not respond? Hamas has repeatedly said they welcome death & that all Palestinians in Gaza are prepared to be 'martyred' in order to support their stated aim to destroy Israel. Hezbollah’s participation in this conflict was initiated by it – in ‘support’ of Hamas on 8/10 BEFORE Israel had even entered Gaza. When there is an understanding/appreciation that we do not all yearn for the same ideals, only then will there be a shift in the support given by many in the West for Hamas, Hezbollah, the Iranian theocracy and all other Islamic fundamentalist groups. Until then (while unjustified) Israel will continue to be seen as the aggressor and the root cause of all of this death and destruction. We must all try and and do whatever we can to explain this position to all that are open to listening.

https://lnkd.in/d9H3kbVB Is Jordan’s King Abdullah II a “Dead Man Walking”? By Michael Rubin 19fortyfive.com December 11, 2024 Syrian President Bashar al-Assad may be the chief casualty of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)’s capture of Damascus, but he may not be alone. Just as the Arab Spring began in Tunisia but then steamrolled through the region claiming the scalps of the leaders of Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. The same dynamics that contributed to Assad’s fall—conscript armies, corruption, and stagnant or declining living standards among ordinary citizens—are present in other countries: Iran, Egypt, Azerbaijan, and Jordan, for example.  Jordan’s King Abdullah II especially should be very worried. Like Former Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, King Abdullah II is much more popular outside his country than inside. Too often, Washington think tank scholars and international correspondents allow their desire for access to skew their perspective. Decades of relative poverty primes Jordanians toward extremism. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Iraqi Sunni insurgents from 2003 until his 2006 death, was both Jordanian and more the rule rather than the exception in certain corners of the country. That Jordan is majority Palestinians, too, also makes the kingdom vulnerable. Neither Erdogan nor HTS have to worry about Hamas seeking power in Turkey or Syria because Hamas is movement that fuses Islamism with Palestinian nationalism. Jordan, however, comprises more than 70 percent of historic Palestine by territory, and is two-thirds Palestinian by demography. Hamas resonates inside Jordan.  It was one thing for Queen Rania to carry water for Hamas earlier this year in Congress when the group was isolated in Gaza, separated from Jordan by Israel itself. Now that Turkey may enable Hamas to use Syria as its new base, it is an entirely different story. Abdullah II may not fall—neither Israel nor the United States want that outcome—but he nevertheless has a target on his back, and like his great-grandfather and namesake, he may not survive.  Jordan is a cornerstone of the moderate Arab coalition and a country upon which the United States relies disproportionately in its support for regional security and peace. It is for this reason as well that many Islamists hate the country. Just the Assad’s fall sent reverberations throughout the region, Jordan’s fall could be as momentous, putting extremists on Israel’s border and enabling a new land bridge for the region’s reactionaries to take their terror to Israel’s borders.

https://lnkd.in/eTGrqj7V The “Palestinian emirates” plan is a proposal by Orientalist Dr. Mordechai Kedar to establish city-state emirates, based on the structure of Arab society which is hyper-local and tribal. The Wall Street Journal on Saturday reported that Israel is preparing to establish something reminiscent of Dr. Kedar’s plan in Gaza. According to the report, some officials are proposing a strategy to establish designated zones or enclaves where Gazan civilians who are not affiliated with Hamas could find temporary refuge while Israeli forces continue operations against remaining terrorists. Meanwhile, certain Likud party members, including those in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s circle, advocate for a different approach that involves dividing Gaza using two east-west corridors and creating a reinforced border area, allowing Israeli military forces to conduct incursions as needed. According to Dr. Kedar, the harsh climate of the Middle East has created a cultural climate in which the only way to survive is by totally belonging to a local clan that takes care of all the needs of its children. This affiliation is even stronger than religious affiliation. According to Kedar, in countries with a robust tribal culture, it is a definite predictor of a country’s success. A legitimate government is usually a government accepted by the people, being from the tribal majority that exists in the country and works for it. An illegitimate rule is the dictatorial rule of a minority over a different ethnic/tribal/cultural majority, or a crumbling democracy created as a result of European colonialist pressure, and adapted to the structure of the individualistic European society and not to the tribal Arab society from its foundation. Kedar lists the successful and stable Arab regimes as Bahrein, Kuwait, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Saudi Arabia, whose common denominator is their being ruled by a majority tribal leadership. Arab failed states are invariably those where the clans are being ignored by the political class: Algeria, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, and Egypt. These proposed strategies, regardless of their full implementation, highlight often unspoken challenges likely to arise in the conflict’s aftermath. Two key issues emerge: Palestinian civilians may face prolonged confinement to restricted areas within Gaza while combat operations persist elsewhere. Israeli military forces might need to maintain a significant presence in the region for an extended period, potentially years until Hamas’s influence is substantially reduced. The WSJ report noted that “Netanyahu, in rare comments addressing the issue last week, said the government would soon begin a phased plan to establish a civil administration run by local Palestinians in areas of the north—ultimately, he said he hopes, with security help from Arab states.” .

Iran's Cynical Sacrifice of Gaza: The Ayatollahs' Quest for Regional Power Iran’s public declarations of solidarity with the Palestinian cause have consistently fallen flat, exposing the hollowness behind its claims of pan-Islamic unity. The truth is that Iran’s engagement with the Palestinian territories, particularly its sponsorship of Hamas, is driven by cold geopolitical calculus, not genuine empathy for Palestinian suffering. In reality, Iran’s leadership under the Ayatollahs views Gaza and its Sunni population as expendable pieces in their broader strategy of regional hegemony. The October 7th attacks, carried out by Hamas but closely coordinated with Tehran, were the culmination of this cynical strategy. Far from being an act of solidarity, Iran’s role in these attacks served to provoke an Israeli response that they knew would devastate Gaza. The intention was clear: to further Iran’s own geopolitical ambitions, regardless of the human cost for Palestinians. By backing Hamas in its reckless escalation, Iran ensured that the conflict would inflict maximum suffering on Gaza’s Sunni population, sacrificing them for Tehran's broader goal of positioning itself as the leader of the "axis of resistance." This dynamic has deep roots. From the outset, the Islamic Republic of Iran has positioned itself as a champion of the Palestinian cause. However, Iran’s real focus has always been less on liberating Palestine and more on using it as a tool to expand its influence and disrupt the regional status quo. Iranian leaders like Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have long spoken in terms of Muslim unity, but their actions tell a different story. For decades, Iran has manipulated groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) as proxies to project its power across the Middle East. The decision to align with Hamas was never about Palestinian liberation but about undermining Iran's Sunni rivals, particularly Saudi Arabia. Hamas, despite its Sunni identity, has become increasingly dependent on Iran, especially as traditional Arab support for the group dwindled. The cash-strapped Palestinian faction had little choice but to re-establish ties with Tehran after its financial woes intensified following the Syrian civil war, where Hamas briefly opposed Iran’s ally, Bashar al-Assad. The October 7th attack was another manifestation of Iran’s control over Hamas, one designed to derail the potential Saudi-Israeli normalization—a deal that Tehran sees as an existential threat to its influence. This strategic manipulation comes at the cost of Palestinian lives. The October 7th attacks were a blatant provocation meant to invite Israeli retaliation, and the people of Gaza are paying the price. Iranian leadership, from its Revolutionary Guard commanders to Ayatollah Khamenei, was well aware of the consequences that would follow such a large-scale assault. Yet, they https://lnkd.in/d_ai3Jjf

Sheikh Subhi al-Tufaili, the former general secretary of Hezbollah, articulated in his Friday sermon the significant role that Syrian rebels play in the liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem. He asserted that the Americans and the Zionists are attempting to create the perception that Gaza has weakened and is isolated, particularly in the context of Hezbollah's defeat and the challenges faced by Iran. However, he emphasized that the Syrians possess the ability to alter this situation. The United States and the Zionists recognize this potential and fear the rise of a strong Islamic force in the region. The Israeli attack on Syria following the fall of the Assad regime is indicative of this apprehension. Tufaili argued that the new Syrian leadership must demonstrate the courage to follow the example set by Sinwar, who is viewed as a model leader. They should not be intimidated by the enemy's efforts to instigate a civil war in Syria, as was seen in Libya and Sudan. For instance, the United States justifies its ongoing presence in Syria by claiming it is protecting the country from the threat of ISIS, despite ISIS being a product of the US, Iran, the Assad regime, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, aimed at tarnishing the image of Islam and legitimizing conflict against Muslims. According to Tufaili, Syria should serve as a guiding force for the entire Muslim world, standing firmly and bravely against all adversaries and working to remove US forces from both Syria and Iraq. If the new Syrian leadership displays courageous governance, it could lead to the collapse of corrupt regimes and the revitalization of Muslim communities, ultimately contributing to the liberation of Palestine. Al-Tufaili also highlighted the necessity for reconciliation between the Shiite community in Lebanon and the Syrian people. He suggested that Hezbollah made a significant error by aligning itself with Iran and committing acts against the Syrian population. He stressed that the Shiite community should mend its relations with the Syrian people and that Hezbollah ought to seek forgiveness for its past actions. Building connections with the Syrian people is essential for facilitating the liberation of Palestine and establishing a new order in the region upon the foundations of the existing Muslim regimes. Hezbollah has incurred substantial losses, including its leadership, community, and credibility, as a result of its attempts to support Gaza. Moreover, it experienced a significant defeat when it assisted the Assad regime in suppressing the Syrian populace. Thus, Tufaili posited that the key to the liberation of Palestine lies in collaboration between the Shiite community in Lebanon and Syria.

What’s next for Syria after Assad? In his latest Op-Ed on Polistratics, Nawaf Al-Thani analyzes the opportunities and challenges Syria faces in its critical transition. From preserving national unity to fostering reconciliation and rebuilding its economy, Syria’s future rests on its people’s resilience and vision. This thought-provoking piece offers insights not just for Syrians, but for regional and global stakeholders. ➡️ Read the full article: https://lnkd.in/dJyxf4MZ via Polistratics (@Polistratics) #MiddleEastPolicy #Syria #OpEd #Leadership

https://lnkd.in/eHpuiq8y Syria Statement The Islamic Human Rights Commission affirms the fundamental right of both the Syrian and Palestinian people to resist oppression and tyranny and live a dignified existence. Justice and moral consistency demand that we cannot trade one people’s rights away to secure another’s. Yet once more we are being asked to choose between the two by an imperialist/Zionist hegemon that seeks to expand its nefarious influence in Muslim lands. Just as the US and its allies sought to destabilise Syria and destroy the integrity the state in 2011 by hijacking the uprising there, the same forces are using the opportunities presented by the genocide in Gaza to do so again. It is no coincidence that regime change has happened in Damascus while Gaza and its people are being pounded into oblivion in a genocide in which Syria serves as an important conduit for weapons to the resistance groups fighting Israel. The US-Zionist aim is to sever that supply line, switch fronts away from Israel and keep Muslims fighting each other to weaken resistance to the Zionist project. No one should be under any illusion that good ever comes out of regime change that arrives on the back of US-funded troop carriers. We need only look at the recent examples of Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq and Libya to see that this kind of “revolution” brings neither liberation nor peace and security. We hope and pray that the latest upheavals do not fall prey to Western/Zionist designs and lead to the genuine empowerment of the Syrian people.

🚨 Why Arab Governments Should Pay Very Close Attention to El Sharaa 🚨 The fall of the Assad regime and the rise of El Sharaa—a reformed ISIS and Al Qaeda militant—are rewriting the rules of geopolitics in the Middle East. But what does this mean for Arab governments? In my latest piece, I explore: ✅ How El Sharaa’s pragmatic approach has won him international recognition. ✅ How this poses a direct challenge to Arab governments. ✅ The lessons learned from the Taliban’s failures—and how El Sharaa is avoiding them. ✅ The broader implications for Islamist movements and global powers. This isn’t just about Syria. It’s about a fundamental shift in how the world engages with Islamist governments—and what it means for the future of the Middle East. 📖 Read the full analysis here: https://lnkd.in/effr5B94 I’d love to hear your thoughts: 👉 Is El Sharaa’s rise a temporary anomaly or a sign of things to come? 👉 How should Arab governments respond to this new reality? Let’s discuss! #Geopolitics #MiddleEast #Syria #Leadership #PoliticalStrategy #ElSharaa