Matthew Long’s Post

"Beijing has become a key supplier of industrial equipment for the Kremlin’s military needs after sanctions cut Russia off from the markets of the sanctions coalition countries," writes Denys Hutyk, Executive Director of the Economic Security Council of Ukraine, in his column. A critical component for producing Russian weapons—including Kalibr and Kinzhal missiles, drones, and armored vehicles—is CNC (computer numerical control) machines. According to the Economic Security Council of Ukraine, a communication partner of Truman, 80–90% of this equipment was imported to Russia from China in 2023–2024. How does Beijing help Moscow bypass sanctions, and what measures can stop the supply of CNC machines? Find out more in Denys Hutyk’s column on NV.ua: https://lnkd.in/e8Xu62HM

On a recent visit to #Ukraine, representatives from the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments // Riigi Kaitseinvesteeringute Keskus (ECDI) and the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF) looked into the chance of procuring arms from Ukraine. Ukrainian law bans the sale of weapons in wartime, but such transactions could be concluded via intragovernmental agreement. Ukrainian companies manufacture long-range missiles, drones as well as other weapons. As the Ukrainian government lacks sufficient funds to purchase arms from its own industry, the country's defense sector could potentially sell weapons abroad. Currently, however, Ukrainian law does not allow for this. "The sale of weapons and military equipment is simply prohibited," noted Mykhailo Samus, director of the New Geopolitics Research Network (NGRN). "Besides, we need all of it on the front lines. So it's hard to imagine that any surplus ammunition would go to Estonia or some other country instead of the front. It's not reasonable." Estonia has been exploring options for purchasing ammo from Ukraine. The Верховна Рада України Rada, Ukraine's parliament, meanwhile, is currently discussing amending the law in question. According to Estonian Minister of Defense Hanno Pevkur (Reform), it may be possible to purchase the necessary arms by way of intergovernmental agreement. "If the Ukrainians have something that may interest us, then we could conclude a government-to-government agreement in which the Ukrainians would start producing for us, receive advance payments, gain some sort of buffer that would allow them to further increase their production capacity," Pevkur explained. "Of course they'd produce more ammunition for their own armed forces too, but with a bit of a delay for us – whether that's six months or 10-12 months," he continued. "But it's not like we'd be able to get anything much faster from elsewhere on the global market anyway." The minister didn't specify exactly what Estonia is interested in, but there is also focus on products the public has never heard of. The expectation is also that any equipment has been battle-tested. "My visit to #Kyiv is coming up," he noted. "This is a normal decision-making process. But the final decision is primarily up to the commander of the EDF, who has to say whether the products the ECDI and EDF representatives saw in Ukraine – including missiles and various systems – are suitable for Estonia's defense model." Sten Reimann, a reserve major who has spent nine years on the supervisory board of the Estonian Defence and Aerospace Industry Association(EKTL), said that Ukraine's defense industry is operating under wartime conditions, which has taken its toll. "Oftentimes, development budgets are very small," Reimann said. "Deadlines are very tight. A lot of cheaper and Chinese components are also used that would be out of the question for the West. https://lnkd.in/g2PR_HtS

Two thoughts on this report: 1) The chess match between Iran and Israel continue as Iran unveils this new(er) defensive weapon at the perfect time. As debates continue on whether Iran exercised restraint on using its - or even if it has - advanced offensive weaponry on Israel, both governments still aim to showcase the extent of their military capabilities in order to deter the other from attacking. The timing of unveiling the Bavar-373 was no coincidence. 2) This domestically produced weapon is a perfect example that sanctions on Iran needs to be more specific and targeted. While Iran and Russia are benefting from sanctions by working together (and modern history has shown us that sanctions in general do not work: i.e., Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Russia), the next round of sanctions on Iran (and Russia) should focus more on their banking systems.

OFAC has designated numerous individuals and entities in Iran and other jurisdictions on the SDN List, pursuant to several Executive orders, which are involved in Iran’s UAV program and its steel and automotive sectors. BIS has also expanded its export controls under the EAR to expand the scope of items that require a license for export and reexport to Iran, as well as expand its Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule in relation to Russia/ Belarus, the occupied regions of Ukraine, and Iran. These actions are in response to the Islamic Republic’s recent attacks on Israel and its military support of Russia. #ofac #bis #sanctionscompliance #iransanctions #iran #russiasanctions #exportcompliance #exportcontrols #sanctionsscreening https://lnkd.in/gjFgMxPG

Another bloom joining my "#sanctions work, just not as intended" bouquet... ☺️ Intel Corporation components which happen to be "compatible with Su-35S and Su-34 fighter jets, Korsar drones, and Kalibr missiles" along with a variety of other #microchips find their way to fix #Russia's "#military hardware" says the new report by Belarusian Investigative Center. ... But I was told that the "#Russian military is taking #chips from dishwashers and refrigerators to fix their military #hardware because there are no #semiconductors anymore" -> https://lnkd.in/eZEsZ56s I am confused...🥹 #cocorico #DivinaCommedia 🤭😉 __ #semiconductormanufacturing #semiconductorindustry #geotech #geopoliticalrisk #internationalrelations #techwar #policy #policymaking #internationalrelations #internationalaffairs #businessintelligence

Last week, OFAC announced designations targeting the Iranian UAV program. These designations are the latest in the US government's effort to address Iran's development of its UAV program and provision of support to Russia. What does this mean? From an academic perspective, it will be interesting to see how OFAC (and the US government on a broader scale) will mix and match its tools to craft creative solutions. Almost one year ago (last June!), a quad-seal guidance was published on Iran's UAV-related activities and included a reference to the KleptoCapture Task Force. As the Russia-related sanctions programs continue to evolve, I think we will see more of these cross-program moves. From a business perspective, this is a reminder that companies should be carefully examining their sanctions compliance processes and procedures. This space is very active and a compliance program that is not able to adapt could result in under or over-compliance. #internationaltrade #sanctions #exportcontrols #IranSanctions #RussiaSanctions #UAVs

🇨🇦 🇫🇷 🇩🇪 🇮🇹 🇯🇵 🇬🇧 🇺🇸 🇪🇺 #G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement Condemning #Iran’s Export And #Russia’s Procurement of Iranian Ballistic Missiles 👇 We, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the EU, condemn in the strongest possible terms Iran’s export and Russia’s procurement of Iranian #ballistic missiles. Evidence that Iran has continued to transfer weaponry to Russia despite repeated international calls to stop represents a further escalation of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia has used Iranian weaponry such as UAVs to kill #Ukrainian civilians and strike their critical infrastructure. Russia’s aggression constitutes a flagrant violation of international law including the United Nations Charter. Iran must immediately cease all support to Russia’s illegal and unjustifiable war against Ukraine and halt such transfers of ballistic missiles, UAVs and related technology, which constitute a direct threat to the Ukrainian people as well as European and international security more broadly. We remain steadfast in our commitment to hold Iran to account for its unacceptable support for Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine that further undermines global security. In line with our previous statements on the matter, we are already responding with new and significant measures.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 20, 2024 #ISW Press 👁️Institute for the Study of War https://lnkd.in/gp3DJGaP Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against the Lipetsk-2 Air Base near Lipetsk City and Russian state-owned defense enterprise Sverdlov in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast on the night of October 19 to 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that forces from Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck the Lipetsk-2 Air Base and caused a fire and secondary explosions.[1] Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces targeted ammunition depots, fuel storage, and aircraft and noted that the Russian military bases Su-34 fighter-bomber, Su-35 fighter, and MiG-31 interceptor/fighter fixed-wing aircraft at the base. Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed that Russian forces intercepted drones over Lipetsk City and Oblast and that a crashed drone caused a fire in an unspecified area.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that forces from Ukraine's SBU, GUR, and SSO also struck the Sverdlov Plant, causing secondary explosions.[3] The Sverdlov plant produces chemicals for artillery ammunition and stores and produces glide bombs, and sources in Ukrainian intelligence told Western and Ukrainian news outlets that the plant is one of Russia's largest explosives factories.[4] Geolocated footage published on October 20 shows an explosion near the Sverdlov Plant.[5] The US imposed sanctions on the Sverdlov Plant in July 2023 for its support of Russia's war effort in Ukraine.[6] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike on the Dzerzhinsk industrial zone and that several plant employees received minor injuries.[7]

Great Power Competition (#GPC) is topic that must be front and center of United States strategy. This is possibly more dangerous to America's and the West's way of life than the Cold War. Read #UnrestrictedWarfare, a Chinese People's Liberation Army (#PLA) book published in 1999 by two PLA colonels (Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui). They suggest that future conflicts will involve economic, financial, cyber, and psychological tactics, among others, to achieve strategic objectives. This involves the use of non-military tactics such as hacking, targeting financial institutions, terrorism, media manipulation, and urban warfare. Another enlightening book published in 1985 was titled "Information Warfare." The author is Shen Weiguang. He pioneered the information warfare concept in China and provided one of the earliest definitions focused on controlling information flows and systems to gain advantage over the adversary. We are seeing all of this thinking playing out via a holistic approach to national security that integrates military, economic, and informational strategies. Pay attention America.

Last week, the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (#BIS) announced implementation of an expansion of controls on the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of certain foreign-produced items located in or destined to Iran, to address ongoing concerns regarding Iran’s potential use of U.S. technology in weapons systems. This rule implements the requirements of the No Technology for Terror Act (the Act), which was passed in April as part of emergency supplemental appropriations for the current fiscal year. As required by the Act, the BIS rule expands the scope of the Export Administration Regulations’ (EAR) Iran Foreign Direct Product rule (FDPR). The expansion, effective July 23, 2024, is designed to further impede Iran’s ability to procure technology and components critical for military systems, including advanced drones that pose threats to U.S. forces and allies. https://lnkd.in/edhUz44G