Case Study of 15 Most Tragic Collision Incident in Maritime History

Greeting to All of my Respected seniors & juniors,I am Md Ahad Khan,Trainee Cadet from Bangladesh Marine Academy!

Recently Some eye catching Maritime Incident happed,It was all over the news,As a maritime professional my heart filled up with sorrow whenever i see these type of Tragic incident occour.i have already gone through Many Tragic News regarding to this Merchant Navy profession,Many dies,Some Lost at sea & most often various major incident took place due to many unknown reason.A huge respect & salute from the Core of my heart to all the maritime professional for the secrifice they have made.Yes! Their death & those tragic incident was so unpleasent but atleast we can learn lesson from them.

So As a Part of my Research,I have compiled 15 Most Tragic Collision Incident in Maritime History from various sources.I think These Case studies can be used as a Lesson learning tool to show the application of a theory or concept to real situations.Dependent on the goal they are meant to fulfill,These cases can be fact-driven and deductive where there is a correct answer, they can be context driven where multiple solutions are possible.

So Before you started please Noted that The majority of the information presented has been compiled from various sources Mosty from Press Release of nautinst.org either from the internet or through limited my knowledge.All of the information presented on is accurate to the best of my knowledge.Any discrepancies should be brought to my attention by emailing me.Please do not hesitate for any queries or ideas for improvement.Thanks in Advance.

1. Symphony Of Errors Lead To Collision
2. Chemical Tanker Collides With Fishing Vessel; 1 Dead & 2 Missing
3. Bulk Carrier ‘Gülnak’ Lost Control And Collided With Moored ‘Cape Mathilde’ – Report
4. Steering Failure Ends With A Bump
5. VLCC Makes Contact With Bulker
6. Lack of Communication Leads To Close Quarters Situation Between Two Vessels
7. Ship Hits Navigation Beacon While Disembarking Pilot
8. Flood Tide Breaks Mooring Lines, Vessel Strikes Bridge
9. Dense Fog Leads To Collision Of Ferry And Taxi Boat
10. Officer Of The Watch Ignores Lookout’s Warning, Ship Collides with Sailboat
11. Vessels Collide in Fog, Sustain Substantial Damage
12. Inexperience and Lack of Situational Awareness Lead To Collision Of Two Vessels
13. The Bigger Ship Gets The Right Of Way?
14. Small Defect Leads To A Large Collision Of Ships
15. High Speed Leads To Heavy Contact With Bridge Fendering

1.Real Life Incident: Symphony Of Errors Lead To Collision

In the early morning hours, a navy frigate was underway in darkness and good visibility at about 17 knots. Its navigation lights were on, but the AIS was in receive mode only and therefore was not transmitting own AIS information – as is sometimes the case with military vessels.

The bridge was manned with an OOW and another six crew including two lookouts and a helmsman. The OOW called the local VTS by mobile phone, informing them that the frigate would enter the VTS area from the north and giving its planned route through the VTS area. The VTS operator saw a radar echo on his overview screen, which was assumed to be the naval vessel. Because the frigate was not transmitting AIS signals, there was no information about the vessel’s identity, course and speed vectors.

The OOW’s attention was focused on three vessels that were approaching from ahead on the port side. He informed the bridge team of the three approaching vessels and asked them to notify him of any further observations. In addition, the bridge team could see a floodlit ‘object’ on the starboard side but they did not discuss it or examine it further on the radar or via AIS because they assumed it was an object on shore.

Meanwhile, a tanker was getting ready to depart a terminal some distance from the oncoming frigate. The bridge on the tanker was manned by the pilot, the Master, an OOW and a helmsman. The pilot called the VTS on the VHF to announce their imminent departure. The deck lights of the tanker were left on to ensure adequate visibility for the crew during departure and afterwards as they secured equipment in case of heavy weather. Soon, the tanker was moving away from the terminal.

The pilot called VTS to announce their departure and intentions. The pilot ordered a course of 350° with the tanker now at a SOG of about 3 knots. The pilot had seen two southbound vessels to the north, one of which was the frigate, and two northbound vessels to the south. About 12 minutes later the tanker’s speed had increased to about 6 knots. The frigate was by now about 1.5nm away and was approaching at an angle of 10–12° on the port bow.

The pilot saw only the vessel’s green light and realised that the vessel would cross the tanker’s course line. The pilot requested AIS data about the vessel from the tanker’s Master, but the Master replied that the vessel was not transmitting AIS data. The pilot then called VTS and requested information about the vessel, but VTS, having forgotten it was the frigate, replied that they had no information on the vessel.

The pilot then asked the Master to use the Aldis lamp to signal the oncoming ship. Shortly after signalling with the Aldis lamp, the Master and the pilot observed both sidelights of the frigate so they assumed it was turning to starboard. Yet, shortly afterwards, they again saw only the green light, so they continued sending out light signals with the Aldis lamp. The pilot ordered a course change of 10° to starboard to indicate to the approaching vessel that they were making an evasive manoeuvre. At about the same time the OOW on the frigate ordered a course change to port of about 10 degrees, which was applied in small increments.

As the two vessels approached each other the VTS operator now remembered the frigate’s report some hours earlier and he immediately called the pilot on the tanker. By this time there was approximately 875 metres between the two vessels. The pilot broadcast over VHF: ‘Turn starboard if you are the one approaching.’ The OOW on the frigate understood the call to be from one of the three other northbound vessels that wanted the frigate to go further to starboard to increase the passing distance. The OOW still thought the ‘object’ on the starboard side was stationary and that they could not go further to starboard without getting too close to the ‘object’. Meanwhile, the tanker was still altering course to starboard and increasing speed, now at about 7 knots.

On the frigate, the team saw the lights on their starboard side were getting closer, but they believed that the OOW was in control of the situation. On the tanker, the Master, seeing that the situation was becoming critical ordered ‘stop engines’. The OOW on the frigate suddenly realised that the ‘object’ that was giving off light was moving and that they were on a direct collision course. Seconds later, the pilot on the tanker ordered full speed astern on the engines but the two vessels collided nonetheless. The tanker’s starboard anchor ploughed into the starboard side of the frigate causing extensive damage.

Lessons learned

• Small course changes are to be avoided if you want to signal to an oncoming vessel, via radar and visual aspect, that you are changing course.
• Darkness and/or poor visibility changes everything. Would this have happened in daylight? l Radar targets that are not emitting AIS signals should always be plotted.
• Never assume. Establish the facts. Note: an excellent Youtube video and simulation of the incident is available below

2.Chemical Tanker Collides With Fishing Vessel; 1 Dead & 2 Missing

The Coast Guard is searching for two fishermen from the 81-foot fishing vessel Pappy’s Pride that capsized after a collision near the Galveston jetties in Galveston, Texas, Tuesday.

At 3:35 p.m., Vessel Traffic Service Houston-Galveston watchstanders were notified of four people in the water after a collision between the fishing vessel and the 600-foot chemical tanker Bow Fortune near the Galveston jetties.

Sector Houston-Galveston watchstanders issued an urgent marine information broadcast and launched a Station Galveston 45-foot Response Boat-Medium boat crew and a 29-foot Response Boat-Small boat crew.

Two of the fishermen were pulled from the water by the crew of a good Samaritan vessel and the RB-M boat crew. Both were transferred to emergency medical services personnel.

The search for the remaining two fishermen is ongoing. The cause of the collision is under investigation.

Involved in the search are:

• A Station Galveston 45-foot Response Boat-Medium boat crew
• A Station Galveston 29-foot Response Boat-Small boat crew
• Multiple good Samaritan vessels
• Galveston Police Department

3.Bulk Carrier ‘Gülnak’ Lost Control And Collided With Moored ‘Cape Mathilde’ – Report

Turkey registered bulk carrier Gülnak collided at a speed of 6.7 knots with Panama registered bulk carrier Cape Mathilde, which was moored alongside the Redcar bulk terminal, Teesport, England. Both vessels were damaged but there were no injuries and there was no pollution.

Gülnak’s bridge team, which included a pilot, lost control of the vessel’s heading towards the end of an intended turn to port in the main navigation channel.

Despite the use of full starboard rudder and full speed ahead, the port turn was not fully arrested and subsequent application of full astern power was insufficient to avoid a collision with Cape Mathilde.

No direct cause was identified, in part, due to the omission of critical engine and rudder data in the vessel data recorder.

Actions taken

The harbour authority has reviewed the navigational risk assessment and reinforced current practices that are intended to prevent similar accidents.

Recommendations

Gülnak’s owner, Gülnak Shipping Transport & Trading Inc., has been recommended (2020/109) to highlight the accident to its masters and embarked pilots, closely monitor and validate the manoeuvring characteristics of the vessel, and ensure bridge equipment is operating correctly.

4.Real Life Incident: Steering Failure Ends With A Bump

A small multi-purpose vessel crewed by a Master, an officer, and two ratings was up-bound in a river system. The OOW was alone on the bridge and the duty rating was making a safety inspection of the ship.

The Master had just been woken so that he could take over the navigational watch as planned. The OOW switched from autopilot to manual (FFU tiller).

About one minute later, he tried to make a course alteration to starboard and noticed that the rudder was not responding normally. He then switched to the second steering pump, but the rudder did not respond.

Next, the OOW set the engine control lever to STOP but the vessel was already very near two moored vessels on the port side. The vessel slid along the first moored vessel and then collided with the pier, between the first and second moored vessels, at about seven knots.

The OOW had neither sounded the general alarm nor attempted to have the rating let go the anchor before the collision. The Master arrived on the bridge at the moment of the collision with the pier. The starboard side of the vessel was severely dented and a small crack had formed level with the waterline. The Master sounded the general alarm and issued instructions for the two ratings to check inside the ship for damage.

Realising that it was not possible to control the rudder from the bridge, he went to the steering gear compartment where he switched to the backup rudder system, carried out a test, and found that the rudder now responded.

He then started the main engine and began to manoeuvre the ship astern and away from the pier. After the accident, a service company discovered that the contacts of the steering switch were loose and corroded. Accordingly, in addition to the primary means of steering, the backup means of steering also failed.

Lessons learned

• When the steering fails in restricted waters, time is of the essence and the stress on watchkeepers can be intense. Practice drills involving scenarios of this kind should be undertaken to help crew prepare for such eventualities.
• With only four crew on this vessel it is hard to imagine how a full and effective response to the steering failure could have been undertaken in time.

5.Real Life Incident: VLCC Makes Contact With Bulker

A loaded VLCC was making way eastbound in good visibility in the deepwater route of a busy traffic separation scheme (TSS) (VLCC track shown in yellow on illustration below). The vessel entered the TSS at 2035 hours with the Master, OOW and helmsman on bridge and two lookouts forward. A few minutes later, a westbound capesize bulker was noticed on the VLCC’s radar entering the eastbound lane (bulker’s track shown in red below).

Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) made several calls to the bulker warning that there was a deep laden VLCC tanker in the eastbound lane and they needed to give it a wide berth. Although the bulker acknowledged the warning, there was no change of course. Soon after, the VLCC also called the bulker but received no reply. The VTS intervened and responded that the bulker would keep clear of the VLCC.

Credits: nautisnt.org

At 2046 the VTS again called the bulker to check if she was altering course. The OOW on the bulker responded confusingly, asking what the intention of the VLCC was and where she was bound. VTS reiterated that the VLCC was eastbound in the deep water lane, and to keep well clear of the vessel. At 2048, when the vessels were about six cables apart, the bulker made a sudden bold alteration to port, bringing it in direct conflict with the VLCC.

The bridge team on the VLCC altered to starboard to bring their vessel parallel to the bulker and reduce the impact. One minute later the bow of the VLCC made contact with bulker’s starboard side in way of the forward cargo holds. Two crew members on the VLCC who were keeping lookout on the bow received serious injury to their legs. The company investigation on the part of the VLCC did not have access to the other side of the story, but nonetheless the following was posited:

• It would appear that poor judgment and less than adequate communications, as well as an almost total lack of situational awareness on the part of the bulker’s OOW led to this collision.
•  Neither vessel used engines to reduce speed.

Lessons learned

• In less than 10 minutes, the situation went from commonplace to critical. This is a good example of why active and attentive navigation is always necessary, especially in a busy TSS.
• Using all available means to attract the attention of the other vessel’s bridge team (sound and light signal) to give warning of the situation may have helped.
• When confronted with an imminent collision, lookouts on the bow should clear the area.

6.Real Life Incident: Lack of Communication Leads To Close Quarters Situation Between Two Vessels

A ro-ro passenger ferry departed berth and, as usual, made a securité broadcast on VHF radio. Once underway and in the midst of a turn at about 15 knots, an inbound fishing vessel was observed. The bridge team on the ferry deemed the fishing vessel to be on the wrong side of the fairway.Hence, the starboard turn was slowed and the ferry continued on the south side of the fairway to give some room for the fishing vessel; ostensibly dictating a green to green passing.

The fishing vessel’s operator, who had heard the ferry’s securité call, saw the ferry and instinctively turned to starboard, towards the south side of the fairway. The vessels were involved in a very close quarters situation but last minute manoeuvres avoided a collision.

The investigation found, among others, that the situation was caused by:

• Inadequate positioning of both vessels.
• Lack of communication resulting in misunderstanding of intentions.

Lessons learned

• If you intend a green to green encounter, best communicate with the other vessel to confirm their understanding of the situation.

7.Real Life Accident: Ship Hits Navigation Beacon While Disembarking Pilot

After leaving the port under pilotage, the outward transit of about three and a half hours was without incident. The Master and the pilot were on the bridge throughout but without a helmsman. The vessel was, for the most part, on autopilot. As the vessel approached the pilot disembarkation area, the pilot requested to reduce speed to seven knots for his transfer to the pilot vessel. He indicated he would disembark north of the nearby beacon, which is sometimes a local practice, rather than at the official pilot disembarkation spot south of this same beacon. The Master was somewhat surprised but agreed to the pilot’s request.

The pilot left the bridge, leaving the Master alone. The pilot boat was having difficulty coming alongside in the waves so the pilot, now on deck, requested the Master change course to 180° and then to 160° to make a lee. Once the vessel was on a course of 160°, and as the pilot transfer took place, the Master went out to the bridge wing to better view the transfer. Once the pilot was on the pilot boat, and while the Master still on the bridge wing, he was called by both the pilot boat and crew and informed that the vessel was very close to the beacon.

Representation Image – Photograph by Sergio Ferrazzano

The Master returned to the wheelhouse but was unable to manoeuvre the loaded vessel quickly enough to avoid a collision with the beacon. The vessel made contact with the structure at a speed of about five knots. Two tanks were ruptured on the port side and the vessel took a list. The vessel then proceeded back to port.

Lessons learned

• The Master allowed himself to be alone on the bridge during a critical time and at a critical place. He unwittingly placed himself in a situation that was prone to single point failure.
• By concentrating on one task (pilot disembarkation) to the detriment of another (navigation), the Master lost his situational awareness.
• A complete pilotage plan should be discussed and approved – in this case the Master was surprised that the pilot was to disembark north of the beacon.

8.Real Life Accident: Flood Tide Breaks Mooring Lines, Vessel Strikes Bridge

A small products tanker docked at terminal to load a cargo of tallow. The pilot had given the Master the local pilot information card that warned of three to five knot tidal currents in the river waterway. The card also warned of the importance of skilled line tending when moored in the river, stating: “equal tension or equal weight on all ropes at all times; mooring winch brakes shall have a holding near the strength of the line”.

The next day after loading, and in order to refuel, the vessel was shifted about three miles downriver during slack water. This was accomplished by the same pilot from the previous day and the transit was uneventful. At the new berth, ten mooring lines were used as illustrated. Because of draught considerations, the vessel was docked such that the ship’s bow extended 30 feet beyond the east end of the wharf.

Credits: nautisnt.org

After docking, a crew member conducting a patrol noticed dust and smoke coming from the brakes of the mooring line drums on the bow. The alert was given and the bridge team tried using the ship’s bow thrusters to push the vessel toward the dock but to no avail.

As the vessel’s bow was pushed into the river, the three mooring lines that were on bitts parted (both forward springs and one aft spring). The remaining mooring lines were on winches; the winch brakes began slipping and the lines quickly ran free off the drums and fell into the water. Within about 10 minutes of the initial warning, the ship was adrift in the river. Anchors were dropped but they only slowed the drift. A few minutes later the vessel struck a bridge, which sustained approximately $2.5 million in damage, while damages to the vessel were estimated at $1 million.

Lessons learned

• All mooring lines should be equally tensioned so as to share the load.
• Never underestimate the force a current can exert on the vessel and carefully evaluate the vessel’s mooring situation with respect to possible current interactions.
• Mooring winch brakes should always be in top condition and properly adjusted.
• Given the vessel’s bow was exposed to the flood tide current, several bow lines should have been on bitts as opposed to on mooring winches.

9.Real Life Accident: Dense Fog Leads To Collision Of Ferry And Taxi Boat

A small taxi boat with two passengers on board was crossing a navigation channel in dense fog. During the journey the Master had to rely on his electronic aids to navigation, including a newly purchased navigation system with radar and chart plotter. As they made way in the fog at approximately 15 knots, the Master pointed out to the passengers an echo on the radar screen; a small target that he explained was another boat that would pass close to them. Shortly thereafter, out of the fog, they saw the other boat pass by their port side. No other targets were seen on the taxi boat’s radar.

Meanwhile, a ferry was en route in the main channel making way at about 14 knots. On the bridge, the team were unaware that the taxi boat was heading on a collision course with their vessel. Seconds before the collision occurred, the bridge team saw the taxi boat coming out of the fog on their port side and crossing their bow. The bow of the ferry hit the taxi boat’s starboard side; the taxi boat was pressed down into the water and pushed along ferry’s side and then came over on the ferry’s starboard side. Persons on a nearby island were able to rescue the three persons from the taxi boat who had ended up in the water and were without flotation devices.

Credits: nautinst.org

The official investigation notes that neither vessel took evasive action to avoid the collision as none of the vessel operators realised the other vessel was present. Although the official report is silent on why the operators of both vessels were ignorant of the other vessel, the absence of sound signalling from both ships is mentioned as a contributing factor to the collision. Also, the report mentions that had the taxi boat been equipped with AIS, there may have been a better chance of that vessel being detected by the ferry.

Lessons learned

• When in thick fog, use your sound signals as prescribed by the Collision Regulations
• When in thick fog, slow down.

10.Real Life Accident: Officer Of The Watch Ignores Lookout’s Warning, Ship Collides with Sailboat

While underway on a general cargo vessel, the OOW was listening to music on a personal computer and, from time to time, he hummed or sang along with the music and chatted with the lookout. The visibility remained good and they could not see any ships or other traffic nearby. The S-band radar, AIS unit and both very high frequency (VHF) radios were switched on.

Shortly after 21:00, the lookout reported a white light fine on the vessel’s port bow. The OOW told the lookout that the light was a distant lighthouse some 30 miles away. About 18 minutes later, the lookout reported that the white light he had seen earlier was flashing.

The OOW could see no radar targets in the general direction of the light and told the lookout that it was the distant lighthouse that he had previously mentioned. At 21:42, the lookout reported a green light fine on the port bow. The third mate thought the green light was from an expected isolated danger beacon and he responded to the lookout that the light was a distant ‘light buoy’. In fact, the green light was the starboard sidelight of a sailboat underway, about 4 miles ahead and on a collision course with the vessel.

At about 2149, the sailboat’s AIS unit ‘target alarm’ sounded. Alerted, the skipper’s wife called the skipper to come inside the cabin and have a look at the AIS display. Together, they noted from the AIS data that the approaching ship was making good a course of 122 degrees (T) at 11.5 knots. The skipper then went back on deck to look for the ship. Within a minute, he saw its green sidelight fine on his starboard bow. The skipper decided to alter course to port to a heading of about 280 degrees, with the aim of passing well clear of the ship.

Just after 2153, the cargo vessel’s lookout reported that the green light he had been observing seemed very close. The sailboat was in fact now less than one mile ahead of the ship and the two vessels were closing at a combined speed of nearly 18 knots. In response to the lookout’s report, the OOW checked the radar and the AIS unit but saw no target in the direction of the green light. About two minutes later, the sailboat called the vessel on VHF channel 16 and identified themselves. The yacht was now about 200 m from the ship’s bow.

Alerted by the unexpected radio call to his ship, the OOW stopped humming. A few seconds later, he broadcast on VHF channel 16 that the ship’s course was being altered to starboard. He then ordered the lookout to engage hand steering. He could no longer see the yacht’s green light when he ordered the rudder hard-to-starboard. At 2156, with the vessel’s heading at about 130º, it collided with the sailboat, the yacht scraping along the ship’s starboard side.

When the Master came to the bridge after the collision, one of his first actions was to adjust the radar gain and clutter controls. The yacht (as a target) was then easily identified on the radar display. Had the OOW correctly adjusted the controls on the ship’s radar, he may have determined that the green light the lookout had identified was a vessel. As a result, he would have been in a better position to make a full appraisal of the situation, the risk of collision and to take early and appropriate action.

Lessons learned

• While the cargo vessel’s lookout sighted the sailboat’s starboard sidelight, the OOW was not keeping a proper lookout. He made a series of assumptions based on limited information instead of following a systematic approach to confirm what had been observed. As a result, he did not conclude early enough that the lookout had identified a sailboat and that the yacht posed a risk of collision
• Had the OOW correctly adjusted the controls on the ship’s radar he would have been in a better position to make a full appraisal of the risk of collision allowing for early and appropriate action. It is possible that the OOW was distracted from his primary task, the safe navigation of the ship, by his conversations with the lookout and the music that he was engaging with through his constant humming and singing.
• The sailboat’s watchkeeper was not keeping a proper lookout. He did not visually identify the cargo vessel’s navigation lights in time to make an effective appraisal of the situation, did not set the yacht’s AIS unit on a range scale that provided adequate warning of approaching vessels and, when alerted by the AIS of the approaching ship, misinterpreted that information.

11.Real Life Accident: Vessels Collide in Fog, Sustain Substantial Damage

Two vessels were about to meet at the end of a buoyed channel. Visibility was reduced by fog to about 100 metres. Vessel A had a pilot on board and the pilot boat was secured on the port side ready to board the relief pilot. The vessel was making way at near nine knots in order to match the speed of the pilot boat and was sounding the prescribed fog signal.

Vessel B was approaching from the south and had to enter the channel obliquely due to a lighthouse on its port side. The speed was between 11 and 12 knots and the plan was to swing to starboard after passing the red buoy and to keep the speed in order to counter the two knot northeasterly current. Vessel B was not sounding the prescribed fog signal for reduced visibility.

Credits: nautinst.org

The bridge teams on both ships were aware of the other ship and both had planned to meet in the channel, which was 300 metres wide, near the buoys. The bridge team members on vessel A were under the impression they were close to the western side of the channel, but in reality they were near the middle. The bridge team members on vessel B were under the impression they were turning as planned and were near the eastern side of the channel. In reality, the turn brought them to the middle of the channel, which was not the plan. Within 45 seconds the situation went from one which both bridge teams perceived as normal to one that was far from being normal. The vessels collided near the middle of the channel and sustained substantial damage.

Credits: nautinst.org

Lessons learned

• Both bridge teams lacked adequate situational awareness. Each thought their position was appropriate for the meeting but in fact, neither was.
• Meeting in a narrow channel can be a challenge for bridge teams, especially when visibility is reduced. In this instance, factors such as a closing speed of nearly 20 knots, a pilot boat tied onto one ship and the other vessel making a turn all combined to make an unacceptably small margin for error.

12.Real Life Accident: Inexperience and Lack of Situational Awareness Lead To Collision Of Two Vessels

A general cargo vessel was making way in a busy traffic separation scheme (TSS). A bulk carrier was abaft the vessel’s starboard beam at a distance of 1.7nm and slowly overtaking.

The OOW of the general cargo saw another vessel forward, 20 degrees off his starboard bow at 3.9nm and with a CPA of 0.1nm. He did not acquire the vessel on the ARPA or use the AIS data to determine the vessel’s name or status. However, he assessed that the vessel was crossing their bow from starboard to port so he judged his vessel was the give way vessel.

Image Credits: nautinst.org

As it turned out, this was a fishing vessel engaged in fishing, not a crossing vessel. The fishing vessel began to manoeuvre to port to stay away from the commercial traffic but the OOW on the general cargo vessel did not immediately notice this. When he did notice the change of course, he was confused as this did not match his mental picture of a vessel crossing the traffic lane. His response was to continue to alter to starboard, putting the fishing vessel about 30 degrees off his port bow. By now he was becoming unsure of what to do – and in the following two minutes he made several alterations of course to both port and starboard. He was still unaware that this vessel was a fishing vessel that was manoeuvring out of his way.

Image Credits: nautinst.org

The coast guard TSS services, seeing the movements on radar, became aware that an ambiguous situation was developing and called the OOW of the general cargo vessel. A short conversation ensued and the TSS services inquired if the general cargo vessel was executing a 360 degree turn. Although this was not the OOW’s plan, he replied in the affirmative to TSS services; immediately after this conversation, the OOW selected hand steering and applied 35 degree starboard helm. Since the vessel was equipped with a high lift rudder the rate of turn increased rapidly. He did not realise that the bulk carrier was now about 500m off his starboard beam.

Meanwhile, the bulk carrier’s OOW had also been contacted by the TSS services and after a short conversation this OOW ordered hard port helm. Although he had been monitoring and was now aware that the general cargo was to do a 360degree turn, he did not think this manoeuvre was already underway. He assumed that the general cargo would pass ahead before starting the 360 degree turn. But within seconds he noticed that the cargo vessel was turning quickly towards him so he immediately ordered hard starboard helm. Nonetheless, soon afterwards the two vessels collided.

Image Credits: nautinst.org

Lessons learned

• Although the fishing vessel had started to alter course in order to clear the traffic lane and avoid impeding the safe passage of the two larger vessels, this alteration was not seen by the general cargo vessel’s OOW for over five minutes. This implies that the general cargo vessel’s OOW was neither keeping a proper visual lookout, nor effectively using the electronic aids available.
• The intervention on VHF radio by the coast watch officer was timely, appropriate and well-intended. However, because of the language used, it unintentionally influenced the decision-making of the general cargo vessel’s OOW and prompted him to improvise a 360 degree turn, unwittingly turning towards the bulk carrier.
• The general cargo vessel’s OOW suffered a complete loss of situational awareness. He was unaware of the proximity of the bulk carrier until the vessels collided.
• The general cargo vessel’s OOW was very inexperienced, as shown by his inability to make sense of the fishing vessel’s actions and his total loss (or lack) of situational awareness. He had not yet developed sufficient competency to keep a bridge watch in a busy TSS at night by himself.
• As it turned out, the general cargo vessel’s OOW had been in charge of only 10 bridge watches before the accident and the Master had only known him for about two weeks. It is not known why the Master was sufficiently confident of the OOW’s abilities to entrust him with the bridge watch in such a congested area at night.

13.Real Life Incident: The Bigger Ship Gets The Right Of Way?

In the open ocean and in darkness, a large private vessel (49m) was making way at about 11.5 knots on a heading of 099 degrees. The proper lights were lit and the AIS was correctly programmed. A cargo vessel was noted on radar about 60 degrees off the port bow and was acquired as an ARPA target. The vessel was observed to be heading roughly SSW, at approximately 202 degrees, at about 13 knots. When the vessels were approximately 10 nm from each other, and now in sight, the private vessel received a VHF radio call from the cargo vessel requesting that the former alter course so that the cargo vessel could stand on.

The Master of the private vessel took the call, politely declining and suggesting the cargo vessel alter course to starboard, as per the collision regs; the radar was showing a CPA of less than one nm. They were in open seas with no other conflicting traffic.

Image Credits: nautinst.org

About five minutes later, with other vessel at five nm, the Master of the private vessel called the cargo vessel to warn that the CPA was still less than one nm. The OOW of the cargo vessel replied that he ‘was watching’. At about two and one-half nm the cargo vessel made a significant alteration to starboard and passed about one nm astern of the private vessel.

Lessons learned

• A game of ‘chicken’ on the open seas is never a good idea and, if pushed to the limit, the smaller vessel will always lose. The unprofessional attitude of the cargo vessel’s OOW is evident here; at 10 nm he was aware of the crossing situation with a small CPA but he apparently assumed that since he was on the larger vessel he could ‘bully’ the smaller vessel into changing course instead of assuming his responsibilities under the collision regulations. This unprofessional attitude is again evident by the lack of proper communication.
• The OOW of the cargo vessel never confirmed his actions, saying vaguely he was ‘watching’; and only within minutes of the CPA did he abruptly alter course to starboard without warning. At 10 nm, an alteration of course of 30 degrees to starboard for a relatively brief period by the cargo vessel would have cleared the situation with minimal consequences to their schedule.
• Editor’s note: In any encounter where the behaviour of one vessel appears ambiguous or counter to the Colregs, it is most important that clear, unambiguous communication be used and a mutually acceptable agreement be reached in a timely manner in accordance with the Colregs.

14.Real Life Accident: Small Defect Leads To A Large Collision Of Ships

A small container vessel was making way in a restricted waterway under pilotage. Earlier that day there had been intermittent main engine problems due to a drop in lubricating oil pressure, but the exact cause of the reduced oil pressure was not yet known.

The vessel decided to overtake a much larger container vessel. As it was overtaking, the lubricating oil problem occurred again, and main propulsion on the small container vessel automatically shut down. Hard starboard rudder was quickly applied, but the vessel became unmanoeuvrable and was drawn to port towards the larger vessel due to hydrodynamic interactions.

The forecastle of the smaller ship rammed into the starboard side of the larger vessel’s aft section at an angle of about 60°. The force of the collision caused 15 containers on the smaller vessel to fall overboard. Due to the ebb current and the loss of manoeuvrability, the smaller vessel then ran aground outside the fairway. Both ships sustained material damage above the waterline and the fairway had to be temporarily closed to transiting shipping.

Lessons learned

1. The loss of main propulsion on the smaller container vessel caused a reduction in speed, among other things, and made the vessel unmanoeuvrable. Hydrodynamic effects then took over and caused the smaller vessel to move unavoidably towards the larger.
2. Even after extensive investigations it was not possible to conclude, with absolute certainty, the cause of the oil pressure drop of the main engine. However, seizure marks were found on the discharge piston of the pressure control valve of the lubricating oil system. The most probable theory is that this valve became blocked in the fully open condition from time to time enabling a disproportionately large amount of lubricating oil to flow back into the retention tank.
3. Considering the vessel had several episodes of main engine problem during the day, it would appear that insufficient attention was given to the risk of an accident due to this anomaly during the time the vessel was in the restricted waterway.
4. VDR data for the time of the accident on the small container vessel was not available for the investigation. No technical faults were found on the VDR; it is likely that the data backup button was not depressed as per the manufacturer’s specifications. It may have been held down for either less than the two seconds specified by the manufacturer, or longer than the maximum five seconds.

Editor’s note: Since the introduction of VDRs, accident investigation and hence root cause analysis has made great strides. However, a lack of VDR data subsequent to an accident, as in this case, is still all too common. Owners and operators that value safety should consider regular testing of this equipment and ensure clear, vessel-specific procedures on how to operate the VDR. Test procedures can even include the use of the VDR ‘test data’ for navigational audit purposes, thus accomplishing two important tasks at once.

15.Real Life Incident: High Speed Leads To Heavy Contact With Bridge Fendering

A small dry cargo carrier was en route in a vessel traffic services (VTS) controlled restricted waterway and, because of her size, was without a pilot. This was the first time the Master had navigated this section of the waterway.

At 05:20 the vessel reported to VTS at a calling-in point at which time the VTS gave information on expected traffic. The Master started his watch at 06:00. At about noon, with both the Master and chief officer on the bridge, the vessel arrived at a bridge where extensive maintenance work was in progress on the fendering.

As the vessel approached the bridge, she was conned towards the port side of the channel to line up the passage under the bridge. The speed was about nine knots, despite a speed limit of five knots that should have been observed at this point.

The Master stated that something appeared to happen to the steering and that they lost control over the vessel. At that point the engine was put to full astern and the vessel naturally veered to starboard (right hand propeller), colliding with the fendering. The speed of the vessel at the time of the collision was just over four knots.

Image Credits: nautinst.org

On both fenders alongside the bridge there were many people carrying out various repair work. They had seen the vessel and, from the unusual approach movements, realised that the vessel was about to collide with the repair site. While trying to avoid being hit by the vessel one person fell into the water, but managed to climb out of the water himself without being hurt. After the collision the vessel did not stop but continued on its journey.

The official report found, among other things, that:

• VTS did not provide the vessel with any information about the construction works when the vessel reported her position at the various reporting points along the way.
• The bridge repairs were reported in Swedish notices to mariners (in Swedish and English). However, the charts and publications carried by the vessel were British Admiralty, and the UK Hydrographic Office did not publish this particular information on the bridge repair works.
• The fact that the vessel personnel were unaware of the ongoing repair work on the bridge probably affected the Master’s actions and contributed in part to the accident.

No anomalies were found with the steering system, so inadequate shiphandling was probably a factor. A substantial decrease in engine power was applied immediately before the turn to starboard in order to reduce speed. This in turn led to an impaired steering effect since the propeller wash had by then decreased or stopped altogether. This, in turn, could have been experienced as though there was something wrong with the steering.

Editor’s note: Good ship handling is anticipation, not reaction. By arriving close to the bridge at too high a speed, the Master reduced his options and unwittingly set in motion a series of events that led to the heavy contact with the bridge fendering. Of course, as in many accidents, there are several contributing factors. In this case the facts that the Master was new to this part of the waterway and that he was unaware of the repair works and the required speed reduction were also contributory.

Leave a Reply

CATEGORIES

• Bangladesh Maritime News (24)
• life at sea (22)
• Marine industry (42)
• Mariners Story (38)
• Mariners Vlog (5)
• Maritime News (34)
• Maritime Research (40)
• Merchant Navy (40)
• Ship operation (64)
• Travel Vlog (1)
• World Maritime News (33)

OVERVIEW OF AHADS JOURNAL

• Home
• Life Journal
• Maritime Research
• Life at sea
• Marine Industry
• Ship operation
• Photography
• Maritime News
• Bangladesh Maritime News
• World Maritime News
• Mariners Story
• Contract

READ RECENT ARTICALS

• Case Study of 15 Most Tragic Collision Incident in Maritime History
• Case Study of 20 Most Tragic Real Life Incident in Maritime History
• 22 Facts About The Sinking Of The Titanic

AlSO FIND ME AT YOUTUBE