On Hegel's 'Science of Logic' : A Realm of Shadows - part five.

............. Hell,

Your dungeon, stretching far and wide beneath;

Now lately Heaven and Earth, another world

Hung o’er my realm, linked in a golden chain

To that side Heaven from whence your legions fell!

If that way be your walk, you have not far;

So much the nearer danger. Go, and speed;

Havoc, and spoil, and ruin, are my gain.”

    He ceased; and Satan stayed not to reply,

But, glad that now his sea should find a shore,

With fresh alacrity and force renewed

Springs upward, like a pyramid of fire,

Into the wild expanse, and through the shock

Of fighting elements, on all sides round

Environed, wins his way; harder beset

And more endangered than when Argo passed

Through Bosporus betwixt the justling rocks,

Or when Ulysses on the larboard shunned

Charybdis, and by th’ other whirlpool steered.

So he with difficulty and labour hard

Moved on, with difficulty and labour he; ...

- John Milton, (1608 – 1674), 'Paradise Lost'

Technology is a blessing and a curse. The ending of my last article needed editing but every time I tried saving the edits I get the message 'Oops.. An error occurred saving your article. Please try again later'. No kidding. So what is the error? And I don't appreciate that 'Oops' either, this is serious stuff I am engaged in, not something to make light of. I am not playing games here. 😠 Ah me, so I publish the updated ending of my previous article here before continuing. I hope this isn't a recurring problem and I have to make sure I get it right the first time before publishing.

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The negativity embedded within the positive entity enables the Logic to advance and its recovery is the very function of dialectics, and in Hegel’s philosophy dialectical Reason has a different connotation than in the ancient philosophies. Plato, (c. 429–347 B.C.), took dialectics to be mere conceit or a subjective itch for unsettling and destroying what is fixed and substantial:

‘Even the Platonic dialectic, in the Parmenides itself and elsewhere even more directly, on the one hand only has the aim of refuting limited assertions by internally dissolving them and, on the other hand, generally comes only to a negative result. Dialectic is commonly regarded as an external and negative activity which does not belong to the fact itself but is rooted in mere conceit, in a subjective obsession for subverting and bringing to naught everything firm and true, or at least as in resulting in nothing but the vanity of the subject matter subjected to dialectical treatment.

— ‘The Science of Logic’

Dialectic for Kant ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ becomes a necessary function of reason, nonetheless:

‘Kant had a higher regard for dialectic — and this is among his greatest merits — for he removed from it the semblance of arbitrariness which it has in ordinary thought and presented it as a necessary operation of reason. Because dialectic was held to be merely the art of practicing deceptions and producing illusions, it was straight away assumed that it plays a false game; that its whole power rests solely on hiding its deception; that its results are only deviously obtained, a subjective shine. True, Kant’s dialectical displays in the antinomies of pure reason, when examined more closely as will be done at length in the course of this work, do not deserve great praise; but the general idea to which he gave justification and credence is the objectivity of reflective shine and the necessity of the contradiction which belongs to the nature of thought determinations … ’

- ‘The Science of Logic’

In Hegel’s view where Kant found four antinomies in pure reason he should have seen that every concept has antinomy within it and there are infinite and not four antinomies. Hegel declares that he cannot pretend that the Logic is incapable of greater completeness but he knows that the method is the only true one.

Gadamer however views Hegel’s stance toward the Logic as one of modesty not a word usually associated with Hegel:

‘The ideal of a science of logic … does not imply that … perfection might ever be completely attained by any individual. Hegel himself fully acknowledges that his own logic is a first attempt which lacks ultimate perfection. What he means, obviously, is that by pursuing multiple paths of derivation, one could work out … the fine distinctions of what had only been given in outline form in the Logic. Indeed, one can discern, not only in the second printing of the first volume of the Logic as contrasted with the first, but also within one and the same text, that Hegel corrects himself even in his publications. He can say, for instance, that he wishes to present the same subject matter form another point of view, that one can arrive at the same result in another way, etc. Thus Hegel’s point is not only that in his Logic he did not complete the enormous task before him, but beyond that, in an absolute sense, that it cannot be completed’.

- ‘Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies’

Yes, as I was saying, the method being the only true one:

‘This is made obvious by the very fact that this method is not something distinct from its subject matter and content — for it is the content in itself, the dialectic which it possesses within itself, which moves the subject matter forward. It is clear that no expositions can be accepted as scientifically valid that do not follow the progression of this method and are not in tune with its simple rhythm, for it is the course of the fact itself’.

- ‘The Science of Logic’

And as I hope to bring to light in subsequent articles Absolute Knowing is method, the unity of the Understanding, dialectic and speculative Reason.

Coming up next:

Back to the beginning ...

Only kidding.

Coming up next:

Determinate Being.

'The Creation', c. 1896 and 1902, James Tissot

A principle aim of the Logic is to provide an account for determinateness, determinate Being, existence, Something, he will discuss Something as a special category, (see below). Why is there something rather than nothing? Nothing is certainly much simpler and easier than something as a wise man said. Or is it?

'So far I have spoken only of what goes on in the natural world; now I must move up to the metaphysical level, by making use of a great though not very widely used principle, which says that nothing comes about without a sufficient reason; i.e. that for any true proposition P, it is possible for someone who understands things well enough to give a sufficient reason why it the case that P rather than not-P. Given that principle, the first question we can fairly ask is: Why is there something rather than nothing? After all, nothing is simpler and easier than something. Also, given that things have to exist, we must be able to give a reason why they have to exist as they are and not otherwise'.

- Gottfried Wilhelm, (1646 – 1716), 'Principles of Nature and Grace Based on Reason'

COPLESTON: Why shouldn't one raise the question of the cause of the existence of all particular objects?

RUSSELL: Because I see no reason to think there is any. The whole concept of cause is one we derive from our observation of particular things; I see no reason whatsoever to suppose that the total has any cause whatsoever.

COPLESTON: Well, to say that there isn't any cause is not the same thing as saying that we shouldn't look for a cause. The statement that there isn't any cause should come, if it comes at all, at the end of the inquiry, not the beginning. In any case, if the total has no cause, then to my way of thinking it must be its own cause, which seems to me impossible. Moreover, the statement that the world is simply there if in answer to a question, presupposes that the question has meaning.

RUSSELL: No, it doesn't need to be its own cause, what I'm saying is that the concept of cause is not applicable to the total.

COPLESTON: Then you would agree with Sartre that the universe is what he calls 'gratuitous'?

RUSSELL: Well, the word 'gratuitous' suggests that it might be something else; I should say that the universe is just there, and that's all.

- from the transcript of the Bertrand Russell, (1872 – 1970) / Frederick Charles Copleston, (1907 – 1994), radio debate, 1948.

'... thinking of the truth of be[ing] as getting to the bottom of metaphysics has with the first step it takes already abandoned the sphere of all ontology. By comparison, all philosophy that turns on a straightforward or indirect formulating of 'transcendence' necessarily remains ontology in an essential sense, whether it wants to effect a laying of the foundation of metaphysics or to assure us that it rejects ontology as a conceptual freezing of living [Erleben]. Indeed, if thinking that now attempts to think the truth of be[ing] gets caught up in formulating because of a long habit of formulating be-ing, then as a first consideration as well as occasion for the transition from formulating to recollective [andenkende] thinking, probably nothing is more necessary than the question, 'What is metaphysics?' For its own part, the unfolding of this question in the following lecture concludes with a question. It is called the basic question of metaphysics and goes: Why be-ing, after all, and not rather no-thing? Since then, much has been said back and forth about the dread and no-thing which are spoken about in the lecture. But it has not yet occurred to people to think over [überliegen] why a lecture that attempts to think from thinking of the truth of be[ing] to [thinking] of no-thing, and from there to the essence of metaphysics, claims that the question just given is the basic question of metaphysics. For the attentive listener, isn't there really something to be voiced that must be weightier than all the enthusiasm about dread and no-thing? The final question confronts us with the consideration that reflection which attempts to think of a way beyond no-thing to be[ing] in the end returns once again to a question about be-ing. Inasmuch as this question, in being introduced with Why?, asks causally in the conventional way of metaphysics, thinking of be[ing] is completely disavowed in favor of formulating knowledge about be-ing from [aus] be-ing. To top it all off, the final question is obviously the question that the metaphysician Leibniz put in his Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce (Fondé en Raison) [Principles of Nature and Grace (Based on Reason)]: 'Pourquoi il y a plûtot quelque chose que rien?'

- Martin Heidegger, (1889 – 1976), 'What is Metaphysics?'

Note: 'Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce (Fondé en Raison)'. Heidegger omitted the phrase 'based on reason' in Leibniz's title. Shall we read anything into that?

Further note: 'Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?' Alternatively, Why is there any kind of be-ing and not no-thing instead?

The basic question of metaphysics?

Let us set about answering it then.

Determinateness denotes a unity of Being and Nothing, a presence and an absence.'Without referring to any other properties, determinacy seems to be defined simply by what it is and what it is not', elaborates Richard Dien Winfield, (1950 - ). Determinateness emerges in virtue of dialectical Reason invoking history against the Understanding, a history that was present but is present no longer, and the sublated past is the determinate Nothing to which present Being refers. Becoming was a determinateness, a two-sided entity in a condition of contradiction, determinateness contradicts the idea of immediacy, and yet the Understanding sees immediacy before it and so wreaks havoc on the principle of determinateness. In the diagram below you can see the Understanding represented as making a one-sided Being of determinate Becoming and accordingly determinate Being or Quality is depicted as an immediate entity, a, the same as pure Being, but a cautious approach to the matter of interpretation is recommended here for due to the law of sublation it is known that determinate Being contains all past steps, it has a history and is covertly a determinateness. Determinate Being is a determinateness with the stress upon Being (although just to confuse matters the translation I am using by George di Giovanni, (1935 - ), translates Dasein, determinate Being, as existence, I will take some time out at some point to explain his reasoning behind that decision):

'Existence corresponds to being in the preceding sphere. But being is the indeterminate; there are no determinations that therefore transpire in it. But existence is determinate being, something concrete; consequently, several determinations, several distinct relations of its moments, immediately emerge in it'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Quality is both alterable and finite. Wherefore alterable? All will be cleared up later but the point is that Being is in a state of Becoming a movement that is present on the logic of sublation. But wherefore finite? Quality is a one-sided view of determinateness and is henceforth limited by its other as the diagram displays and Hegel divides this second chapter of the Logic in a threefold manner, determinate Being as such, Something and its Other or Finitude and qualitative infinity, whereby determinate Being is generally speaking the move of the Understanding, Something and its Other implicates the modulating duality of dialectical Reason, and qualitative infinity is speculative Reason's endeavour to attain conciliation. For this article i will focus on the first of those, determinate Being as such.

Yes, determinate Being as such, for determinate Being in general there is a transition from g to a (remember that determinate Being is translated here as existence):

'Existence [a] proceeds from becoming [g]. It is the simple oneness of being and nothing. On account of this simplicity, it has the form of an immediate. Its mediation, the becoming, lies behind it; it has sublated itself, and existence therefore appears as a first from which the forward move is made. It is at first in the one-sided determination of being; the other determination which it contains, nothing, will likewise come up in it, in contrast to the first'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

From becoming there issues determinate being, a, which is the simple oneness of Being and Nothing and in virtue of this oneness it has the form of immediacy. Its mediation, Becoming, lies behind it, for it has sublated itself and Becoming is a oneness by virtue of g and the whole of Becoming, d - g, is most assuredly not a oneness, only from g does determinate Being spring forth and in this form it is immediacy and its mediated history is suppressed.

The German word for Being is Sein and the word for determinate Being is Dasein, being there. John Burbidge prefers a being: 'The indefinite article suggests that it is not absolutely indeterminate but is in some way limited by a nothing out of which it comes and to which it may return' he explains. Determinate Being is being in a certain place but Hegel alerts us to the fact that space is a step too far forward for chapter two albeit Dasein does hint at negation. If a thing is there, it is not here. Clark Butler suggests that the significance of Something, more advanced than determinate Being, is that a determination is this as opposed to that. But determinate Being already incorporates this notion of this, not that, as Butler also explains the significance of determinate Being is that things become determinable. That which is present, a this, is distinguishable from what is absent, a that.

'It is not mere being but existence, or Dasein [in German]; according to its [German] etymology, it is being (Sein) in a certain place (da). But the representation of space does not belong here. As it follows upon becoming, existence is in general being with a non-being, so that this non-being is taken up into simple unity with being. Non-being thus taken up into being with the result that the concrete whole is in the form of being, of immediacy, constitutes determinateness as such'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Determinate Being as a consequence of its Becoming is in general Being with a non-Being such that this non-Being is taken up into simple unity with Being. Determinate Being inherits the being portion of Becoming, g, and is to be seen as a sublated, negatively determined Being which is to say a in the diagram is the negation of the earlier history of Becoming and g is simply what d, e, f and g are not, the static moment of the unity. But if Being is negatively determined it is only so for us, for itself the negative nature of this activity is not yet posited.

In a subsection concerning what may be deemed the silent fourth (see below) Hegel puts forward a suggestion concerning the Understanding:

'The whole is likewise in the form or determinateness of being, since in becoming being has likewise shown itself to be only a moment - something sublated, negatively determined. It is such, however, for us, in our reflection; not yet as posited in it. What is posited, however, is the determinateness as such of existence, as is also expressed by the da (or 'there') of the Dasein. - The two are always to be clearly distinguished. Only that which is posited in a concept belongs in the course of the elaboration of the latter to its content. Any determinateness not yet posited in the concept itself belongs instead to our reflection, whether this reflection is directed to the nature of the concept itself or is a matter of external comparison. To remark on a determinateness of this last kind can only be for the clarification or anticipation of the whole that will transpire in the course of the development itself. That the whole, the unity of being and nothing, is in the one-sided determinateness of being is an external reflection; but in negation, in something and other, and so forth, it will become posited'.

That the whole, the unity of Being and Nothing, is in the one-sided determinateness of Being, a, is an external reflection but in the negation, in something and other and so on it will come to be posited. The move of Understanding, abstracting g and making it a, is an external reflection not strictly necessitated as a matter of logic. It comes from the outside. The 1812 edition of the Logic began the chapter 'Determinate Being' (or 'Existence' as it is in the translation I am using), with: 'A being as such determines itself', but in the 1831 edition a passive beginning is substituted: 'From becoming [g] there issues determinate being'. Stephen Houlgate, (1954 - ), would vehemently oppose the conclusion of the text and endeavours to account for logical development without any intervention of external reflection in the progress of Being. For instance Houlgate takes determinate Being to be a speculative unity in which the purity and difference of Being and Nothing have vanished and if this is the case then determinate Being is not the position of the Understanding toward Becoming. Such a point should be comprehended thus, the Logic is a circle, we can go forward or backward, if we go forward through the move of Understanding this is our choice and we do this because we have an interest in watching the Logic unfold in that particular direction. And yet what follows automatically is dialectical and speculative Reason and these at least are immanent to the Logic itself, so in brief Logic needs the Understanding to move forward for in the absence of this Logic remains undeveloped and unproductive and so the abstracting move of the Understanding represents a necessary contingent moment in the Logic, yet once the Understanding makes its move dialectical and speculative Reason follow necessarily.

Slavoj Žižek, (1949 - ), suggests that there is always a fourth in addition to the triad of Understanding, dialectic, and speculative Reason which he likens to the dummy in a game of bridge (not a game I play or know the rules to but I will follow him here), the silent spectator that actually controls the game, a Master Signifier or vanishing mediator that makes sense of all the other signifiers. Hegel's comment equating the Understanding with external reflection supports Žižek's observation, the silent fourth is in charge of the game at this point and the Understanding's intervention is a contingent event that is necessary if the Logic is to progress yet it is not necessary that Logic progress for us unless an external reflection, not yet part of the logical system, gives it a nudge to get it into action for Logic is when all said and done still only in the primitive stage of Being and we have yet to arrive at subjectivity that moves under its own steam so to speak.

Burbidge likewise suggests that the progress of the Logic is infected with contingency: 'Transitions are essential, and comprehensive wholes are essential. But this can be acknowledged only because understanding can isolate and fix each of them, and hold them together in a disjunction ... In other words, dialectical transitions will introduce contingencies; reflection will integrate this new subject matter into a comprehensive perspective; understanding will fix its terms and relations'.

The point about subjectivity is important in refuting the charge such as that propounded by Karl Popper, (1902 – 1994), that Hegel is kind of totalitarian. As Popper characterises it:

'Heraclitus had maintained that there is a hidden reason in history. For Hegel, history becomes an open book. The book is pure apologetics. By its appeal to the wisdom of Providence it offers an apology for the excellence of Prussian monarchism; by its appeal to the excellence of Prussian monarchism it offers an apology for the wisdom of Providence. History is the development of something real. According to the philosophy of identity, it must therefore be something rational. The evolution of the real world, of which history is the most important part, is taken by Hegel to be ‘identical’ with a kind of logical operation, or with a process of reasoning. History, as he sees it, is the thought process of the ‘Absolute Spirit’ or ‘World Spirit’. It is the manifestation of this Spirit. It is a kind of huge dialectical syllogism; reasoned out, as it were, by Providence. The syllogism is the plan which Providence follows; and the logical conclusion arrived at is the end which Providence pursues—the perfection of the world. ‘The only thought’, Hegel writes in his Philosophy of History, ‘with which Philosophy approaches History, is the simple conception of Reason; it is the doctrine that Reason is the Sovereign of the World, and that the History of the World, therefore, presents us with a rational process. This conviction and intuition is .. no hypothesis in the domain of Philosophy. It is there proven .. that Reason .. is Substance; as well as Infinite Power; .. Infinite Matter ..; Infinite Form ..; Infinite Energy ... That this “Idea” or “Reason” is the True, the Eternal, the absolutely Powerful Essence; that it reveals itself in the World, and that in that World nothing else is revealed but this and its honour and glory—this is a thesis which, as we have said, has been proved in Philosophy, and is here regarded as demonstrated.’ This gush does not carry us far. But if we look up the passage in ‘Philosophy’ (i.e., in his Encyclopedia) to which Hegel refers, then we see a little more of his apologetic purpose. For here we read: ‘That History, and above all Universal History, is founded on an essential and actual aim, which actually is, and will be, realized in it—the Plan of Providence; that, in short, there is Reason in History, must be decided on strictly philosophical grounds, and thus shown to be essential and in fact necessary.’ Now since the aim of Providence ‘actually is realized’ in the results of history, it might be suspected that this realization has taken place in the actual Prussia. And so it has; we are even shown how this aim is reached, in three dialectical steps of the historical development of reason, or, as Hegel says, of ‘Spirit’, whose ‘life .. is a cycle of progressive embodiments’. The first of these steps is Oriental despotism, the second is formed by the Greek and Roman democracies and aristocracies, and the third, and highest, is the Germanic Monarchy, which of course is an absolute monarchy. And Hegel makes it quite clear that he does not mean a Utopian monarchy of the future: ‘Spirit .. has no past, no future,’ he writes, ‘but is essentially now; this necessarily implies that the present form of the Spirit contains and surpasses all earlier steps'.'

- 'The Open Society and its Enemies'

But contingency is a necessity within the system and this unity of contingency and necessity will prove the key to the last part of the 'Doctrine of Essence'.

'Bau der Teufelsbrücke', ('Construction of the Devil's Bridge'), 1833, Carl Blechen 

Which brings us to the matter of Quality. In the diagram above determinate Being is isolated, in a, as the immediacy of the oneness of Being and Nothing, at this stage Being and Nothing do not extend beyond each other for as yet no differentiation is posited:

'On account of the immediacy with which being and nothing are one in existence, neither oversteps the other; to the extent that existence is existent, to that extent it is non-being; it is determined. Being is not the universal, determinateness not the particular. Determinateness has yet to detach itself from being; nor will it ever detach itself from it, since the now underlying truth is the unity of non-being with being; all further determinations will transpire on this basis. But the connection which determinateness now has with being is one of the immediate unity of the two, so that as yet no differentiation between the two is posited'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

[Note: 'Being is not the universal, determinateness not the particular': This will occur in the 'Subjective Logic' when the logical object assumes the form of Concept].

And we know from its history that determinate Being is a determinateness and in transforming g into a the Understanding suppressed active mediation, d, e, f, but mediation now resurfaces as b and Quality is immediate, it appears only when b, the negative voice of a, is suppressed. What is the difference between determinate Being and Quality? Both occupy the space of a but there is a change of name. For what reason? Hegel suggests that Quality more evidently implies its opposite while determinate Being declines to make any such reference, determinate Being, however in which nothing no less than Being is contained, a, is itself the criterion for the one-sidedness of quality which is only immediate or only in the form of Being:

'Existence, [determinate Being], however, in which nothing and being are equally contained, is itself the measure of the one-sidedness of quality as an only immediate or existent determinateness. Quality is equally to be posited in the determination of nothing, and the result is that the immediate or existent determinateness is posited as distinct, reflected, and the nothing, as thus the determinate element of determinateness, will equally be something reflected, a negation. Quality, in the distinct value of existent, is reality; when affected by a negating, it is negation in general, still a quality but one that counts as a lack and is further determined as limit, restriction'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

In Quality there is distinction of reality and negation:

'Negation stands immediately over against reality; further on, in the sphere proper to reflected determinations, it will be opposed to the positive, which is reality reflecting upon negation – the reality in which the negative, still hiding in reality as such, shines forth'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Quality as compared to determinate Being emphasizes a dialectical relation between Quality and Negation. Burbidge however analyzes this step somewhat differently for he sees a as determinate Being which he calls a being and c as Quality but as this omits Negation completely that cannot be right. And yet dialectical Reason brings to the fore b and designates it Negation, and Negation, b, is internal to a, b, and the isolation of b always implicates c, an immediacy for c is just as much a one-sided determinate Being as a. Determinate Being is equally to be posited in the determination of Nothing, c, when it will be posited as a differentiated reflected determinateness, no longer as immediate or in the form of Being:

'Existence, however, in which nothing and being are equally contained, is itself the measure of the one-sidedness of quality as an only immediate or existent determinateness. Quality is equally to be posited in the determination of nothing, and the result is that the immediate or existent determinateness is posited as distinct, reflected, and the nothing, as thus the determinate element of determinateness, will equally be something reflected, a negation.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Both are an existence but in reality, as quality with the accent on Being and Negation was supposed to be different from determinate Being but in the end it is same, hence it is a reflected determinateness. Reflection involves the statement I am not that and it entails the casting off of inessential Being so that Essence can disclose itself, hence b is a reflective voice because it distinguishes itself from a thereby becoming b, c, and yet b, c is just another determinate Being. In distinguishing itself from a then b, c proves to be the same as a. And so Negation is a determinate element of a determinateness. Reality for Hegel is quality with the accent on Being and this same reality is negation when burdened with a negative.

Quality, in the distinct value of existent, is reality; when affected by a negating, it is negation in general, still a quality but one that counts as a lack and is further determined as limit, restriction'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Terry Pinkard, (1947 - ), rejects the notion that Negation is produced by Quality's reflective voice and believes the move from determinate Being to Negation is not necessary. 'To speak of a conception as a negation of another conception would require ... that the two conceptions be determinate. That is, it might be argued that negation is no less external than a number of other relations. Indeed, a negation is always a negation of something, hence, negation must assume the prior determinateness of that of which it is the negation. Therefore, Hegel's use of negation would be just as arbitrary as the use of any other means'. But that cannot be right. Negation is not external to Quality, Negation represents the recovery of something internal to the constitution of determinate Being that the Understanding suppressed, and further, at this early stage there are no other means to use except that which is negative to the positive determinate Being.

Which is to say, Negation is just as real as reality, Negation is a quality but one which counts as a lack or a deficiency. Charles Taylor, (1931 - ), calls Dasein a 'marriage ... of reality and negation'. But is not Reality already the unity of Being and Negation with the stress upon Being? Reality is married to a negation that is just as much a reality as the reality it negates. Hegel compares this definition to common usage whereby ordinary speakers claim realities are perfections and containing no negation. In the ontological proof of God, God was defined as the sum total of all realities and in this totality no contradiction exists, no reality cancels any other and in the absence of negation realities do not oppose one another but exist perfectly indifferent to each other, a view that Hegel describes view as pantheism.

'Ex nihilo, nihil fit – is one of the propositions to which great significance was attributed in metaphysics. The proposition is either to be viewed as just a barren tautology, nothing is nothing, or, if becoming is supposed to have real meaning in it, then, since only nothing comes from nothing, there is in fact none in it, for the nothing remains nothing in it. Becoming entails that nothing not remain nothing, but that it pass over into its other, being. Later metaphysics, especially the Christian, rejected the proposition that out of nothing comes nothing, thus asserting a transition from nothing into being; no matter how synthetically or merely imaginatively it took this proposition, there is yet even in the most incomplete unification of being and nothing a point at which they meet, and their distinguishedness vanishes. – The proposition, nothing comes from nothing, nothing is just nothing, owes its particular importance to its opposition to becoming in general and hence also to the creation of the world out of nothing. Those who zealously hold firm to the proposition, nothing is just nothing, are unaware that in so doing they are subscribing to the abstract pantheism of the Eleatics and essentially also to that of Spinoza. The philosophical view that accepts as principle that being is only being, nothing only nothing, deserves the name of 'system of identity'; this abstract identity is the essence of pantheism'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Such realities abolish determinateness itself and Reality regresses to pure Being whereby it is expanded into indeterminateness and loses its meaning.

'On this concept of reality, the assumption is that the latter still remains after all negation has been thought away; however, to do this is to remove all determinateness from reality. Reality is quality, existence; it therefore contains the moment of the negative and is the determinate being that it is only through it. Taken in the so-called eminent sense, or as infinite in the ordinary meaning of the word – as we are said we should – reality is expanded into indeterminateness and loses its meaning'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Hegel warns against making Negation that is to say the mirror view of reality into an abstract Nothing as Baruch Spinoza, (1632 – 1677), did. Nothing can stand before pure Nothing, which obliterates everything, rather we must always take Nothing as determinate Negation. Spinozist substance is abstract nothingness, it is supposed to be the unity of thought and being, that is to say, extension, but substance's abstractness reduces thought and extension to mere moments or rather since substance in its own self lacks any determination whatever they are for him not even moments.

'The unity of Spinoza’s substance, or that there is only one substance, is the necessary consequence of this proposition, that determinateness is negation. Spinoza had of necessity to posit thought and being or extension, the two determinations, namely, which he had before him, as one in this unity, for as determinate realities the two are negations whose infinity is their unity; according to Spinoza’s definition, about which more later on, the infinity of something is its affirmation. He therefore conceived them as attributes, that is, such as do not have a particular subsistence, a being-in-and-for-itself, but only are as sublated as moments; or rather, since substance is the total void of internal determinateness, they are not even moments... '

- 'The Science of Logic'

Individuals cannot persist in the face of Spinoza's'substance for everything is obliterated. Suppose reality is a determinateness, then the sum total of all realities is also the sum total of all negations and hence of all contradictions and because contradiction is power and force, such a view makes of God absolute power in which everything determinate is absorbed.

'If, on the contrary, reality is taken in its determinateness, then, since it essentially contains the moment of the negative, the sum-total of all realities becomes just as much a sum-total of all negations, the sum-total of all contradictions, a sort of first absolute power in which everything determinate is absorbed. However, since reality only exists in so far as it still has over against it something which it has not sublated, by being thought expanded in this way into an accomplished power void of restrictions, it becomes the abstract nothing. The said reality in everything real, the being in all existence that should express the concept of God, is nothing else than abstract being, the same as nothing'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

This absolute power destroys reality once again reducing God to nothing and reality itself is only in so far as it is still confronted by a being which it has not sublated, and as a consequence when it is thought as expanded into realized limitless power it becomes the abstract Nothing. The subsistence of a force requires the presence of a counterforce against which it can act.

Which brings us to the matter of property. Hegel also compares Quality to the property of a thing. Quality is property when it manifests itself immanently to another in an external relation.

'Quality specifically is a property only when, in an external connection, it manifests itself as an immanent determination. By properties of herbs, for instance, we understand determinations which are not just proper to a something but are such that, in virtue of them, the something holds its own while referring to others and will not give in to the alien influences posited in it by them; on the contrary, it imposes its own determinations in the other – though it does not keep it at a distance. On the other hand, more stable determinacies such as figure or shape are not called properties, nor even qualities, for they are thought of as alterable and therefore as not identical with being'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

And by this Hegel is indicating somewhat enigmatically that we speak of properties only when things have great resilience, a thing potentially remains the same thing even if it loses one or more of its properties, a thing exists as a negative unity of all its properties and this resiliency Hegel will call Existence but such resilience is far too advanced for chapter two for Quality has no resilience. Hegel offers an example of property in the passage quoted above, the properties of herbs by which we understand determinations which are not only proper to something but are the means whereby this something in its relations with other somethings maintains itself in its own peculiar way, counteracting the alien influences posited in it and making its own determinations effective in the other although it does not keep this at a distance, and so to employ a term that Hegel has yet to introduce a thing's properties partake of being-for-self. The observer is capable of imposing its own view upon the herb, introducing alien influences and property counteracts such influences that the observer posits into the herb, properties are, in brief, the authentic statements of the thing to the outside world and hence Hegel concurs with Friar Lawrence oh mickle is the powerful grace that lies in herbs, plants, stones and their true qualities:

FRIAR LAWRENCE:

The gray-eyed morn smiles on the frowning night,

Checkering the eastern clouds with streaks of light,

And fleckled darkness like a drunkard reels

From forth day’s path and Titan’s fiery wheels.

Now, ere the sun advance his burning eye,

The day to cheer and night’s dank dew to dry,

I must upfill this osier cage of ours

With baleful weeds and precious-juicèd flowers.

The earth, that’s natu re’s mother, is her tomb.

What is her burying, grave that is her womb.

And from her womb children of divers kind

We sucking on her natural bosom find,

Many for many virtues excellent,

None but for some and yet all different.

Oh, mickle is the powerful grace that lies

In herbs, plants, stones, and their true qualities.

For naught so vile that on the earth doth live

But to the earth some special good doth give.

Nor aught so good but, strained from that fair use

Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse.

Virtue itself turns vice, being misapplied,

And vice sometime by action dignified.

- William Shakespeare, (1564 - 1616), 'Romeo and Juliet', Act 2, Scene 3

Such comments concerning properties that look forward to what is coming later may provoke misunderstandings with regard to the status of determinate Being for in chapter two the Understanding endeavours to describe the totality of all existence in terms of determinate Being and presented before us is one single, indivisible thing and not yet is the universe an aggregate of discrete things. Following G.R.G. Mure, (1893 – 1979), we must acknowledge that, throughout the first two chapters we have before us quale only, quality lacking any quantitative determination (quale not quail, quality or property as perceived or experienced by a person): '[W]e are in a world prior to the thought of a thing, and the dialectic will be a sort of fluent instability, an impotent shifting rather than an active self-determining of spirit', explains Mure. 'Hegel does not apply Becoming to the world of objects; for Hegel, this concept is applicable to the behavior of categories', further explains Justus Hartnack.

There is but one thing before us, determinate Being as such and somewhat ironically in describing this one totality dialectical Reason demonstrates that there are in fact two totalities, one that is and one that is not, and these two totalities are two sides of the same totality. 'Being has the fundamental character of being 'split' into two: it is in being other\ as equality-with-self in transformation. It carries its negativity within itself, and is negativity in its innermost essence', explains Herbert Marcuse, (1898 – 1979). There is no reference in chapter two to some other thing that is diverse from the one double-sided totality of Being.

Michael Kosok elaborates:

'That which is initially given can be referred to positively as that which is present . . . and negatively as that which is lacking (called 'negative presence,' since the given makes itself evident as a lack). The concept of negation viewed dialectically as a type of 'negative presence' is therefore qualitatively different from the standard notion of logical negation. Given a term A, its negation not-A is usually interpreted to be a positive presence of something other than A, '-A,' called, e.g., 'B,' such that A and B are not only distinct but separable 'truth values.' However the form 'other than' is actually a referral to A since no content different from A has been posited: to simply deny A is not to assert anything else in its place'.

- 'The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic: Its Formal Structure, Logical Interpretation and Intuitive Foundation'

Several commentators have not paid attention to this significant feature of determinate Being. Walter Kaufmann, (1921 – 1980) misreads chapter two in the course of contending that Hegel did not intend a triune logical progression in the Logic and one piece of evidence he presents is that chapter two is not the antithesis of chapter one: 'finitude is certainly not the antithesis of existence [i.e., Dasein] as such, and infinity cannot well be construed as their synthesis'. But it is a mistake to focus upon Nothing as the only permissable antithesis of Being, for if chapter one is seen as standing for immediacy then chapter two stands for mediatedness and thereby is the antithesis of chapter one, and further, chapter three which takes up the status of the 'True Infinite' is indeed the synthesis of the first two chapters.

Under the impression that Hegel is concerned with self-identical properties Taylor gripes about a disjunction between the contrast of properties and negation as the substance of determinate Being. 'What may worry us is that Hegel seems to move from this unexceptionable point that all reality must be characterized contrastively ... to the notion of determinate beings in a kind of struggle to maintain themselves in face of others, and hence, as 'negating' each other in an active sense', he says. Indeed there is a disjunction, Errol Harris, (1908 – 2009), sees a conjunction anyway. Alteration always involves contrast. Suppose A becomes B. Before this change, A is contrasted with B. Change occurs. A, altered, is now B. B is to be contrasted from what it was - A. Hence, alteration and contrast go hand in hand. But more to the point, the contrast of A and B is not yet admissible. At this early point, we can speak only of A and not-A. But Hegel does not, at this stage, concern himself with properties. Taylor takes Hegel as making the common sense point that the property of some thing can be discerned only in contrast to some other property, We cannot have the shape square without the shape round. Taylor concludes: 'Although the quality by which we can characterize a given Dasein may be defined in contrast to imaginary properties, that is, properties which are not instantiated, some of the contrasts on which we base our descriptions must be instantiated. In these cases, the contrast between Dasein as qualities is a contrast between distinct things: Hegel uses the word 'something' here (Etwas)'.

Something will emerge later as the unity of Quality and Negation.

This interpretation of determinate Being rather neglects the real issue for Hegel would certainly say that such comparisons presuppose the self-identity of the property perceived. 'Commentators are apt to attribute to Hegel, as the position he is advocating, the 'false' abstractions that he is in fact criticizing', explains Harris. In chapter one Hegel expresses a low opinion of comparison and later Hegel will analyze Negative Judgments like 'the rose is not red' taking a Negative Judgment as not only negating a specific universal of the rose ('red') but in addition implying that the subject ('rose') has universality (a colour which, however, happens not to be red). Hegel warns against the point that a given property is simply not all the other properties because this presupposes that a property is self-identical.

'If we stop at white, red, as representations of the senses, then we call concept what is only a determination of pictorial representation. This is common practice. But then, surely, the not-white, the not-red, will be nothing positive, just as the not-triangular will be something totally indeterminate, for a determination based as such on number and quantum is essentially something indifferent, void of concept. Yet, like non-being itself, such a sensuous content ought to be conceptualized; ought to shed that indifference and abstract immediacy with which it is affected in the blind immobility of pictorial representation'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

If we stop at white and red as sensuous images we are giving as is commonly done the name of Notion to what is only a determination of pictorial thinking but this kind of sensuous content like not-Being itself must be conceptually grasped and must lose that indifference and abstract immediacy which it has in blind, static, pictorial thinking, and here Hegel indicates a disagreement with Taylor that not-square means round or triangular, and so on, or that this proposition is at all relevant to the second chapter of the Logic. Such equations, Hegel would contend, are merely subjective and uncritical, rather, what is at stake at the beginning of the Logic is the fact that non-Being in general is in a state of Becoming, a simple proposition compared to the world of things and their properties.

Indeed, self-identity of realities is precisely the position Hegel attacks. In brief Taylor criticizes Hegel for making properties into things when this is the very position that Hegel is criticizing. Most assuredly Hegel discusses the properties of herbs but this discussion is strictly for us. Property is too advanced for the realm of determinate Being, which concerns only quale. Taylor is not the only one to misread Hegel's second chapter. Marcuse writes: 'Moreover, every quality is what it is only in relation to other qualities, and these relations determine the very nature of a quality'. Such a view reduces qualities into metonymic things much too advanced for this early stage, in point of fact Quality is determinable by virtue of the Negation it implies without any reference to multiple qualities.

Taylor goes on to complain that the properties of a thing causally maintain the thing in its integrity as Hegel recognized in his analysis of herbs. His assessment of Hegel's argument is that it is a bit loose and embarrassing as cause and effect are relations developed only in the 'Doctrine of Essence', but such objections vanish if Mure's observation concerning quale is taken account of for contrary to Taylor's point it is much too early for the doctrine of the thing which appears only in the 'Doctrine of Essence'. As Hegel explains elsewhere:

'Whenever something concrete is sneaked into being and nothing, it is just business as usual for the unthinking [mind] (die Gedankenlosigkeit):- something else altogether appears before it and it speaks about that as if it were what is at issue, whereas at the moment only abstract being and nothing are at issue'.

- 'The Encyclopedia Logic'

And always when a concrete existence is disguised under the name of Being and not-Being, empty headedness makes its usual mistake of speaking about, and having in mind an image of, something else than what is in question. How, Taylor asks, does the common sense notion of comparison lead to 'the notion of Determinate Beings in a kind of struggle to maintain themselves in the face of others, and hence as 'negating' each other in an active sense?'. The question is poorly articulated for determinate Being is not derived from the comparison of things. Nonetheless there is an important point there: How does it follow that Being struggles to be in the face of negativity? The answer is that external reflection intervenes into the realm of determinate Being to insist on affirmativity and with this assistance Being is in motion, it is in the process of Becoming. The act of Becoming as opposed to ceasing-to-be is the act of the Understanding that accents Being at the expense of Nothing, and of course it falls to dialectical Reason to do the opposite and to emphasize the negative.

'Construction of a Large Road', 1774, Claude-Joseph Vernet

'Everlasting Mercy' (excerpt)

by John Masefield (1878 – 1967)

The social states of human kinds

Are made by multitudes of minds,

And after multitudes of years

A little human growth appears

Worth having, even to the soul

Who sees most plain it's not the whole.

'A Royal Milestone', detail of 'Construction of a Large Road', 1774, Claude-Joseph Vernet

Which brings us to Something.

Dialectical Reason charged the Understanding of neglecting its own negative voice, and yet dialectical Reason, c, is equally culpable of neglecting its own positive voice, b, the same deleterious egregious transgression for which the Understanding was scolded and according to speculative Reason negation is determinate Being and not the supposedly abstract Nothing but posited here as most affirmatively present:

'In existence its determinateness has been distinguished as quality; in this quality as something existing, the distinction exists – the distinction of reality and negation. Now though these distinctions are present in existence, they are just as much null and sublated. Reality itself contains negation; it is existence, not indeterminate or abstract being. Negation is for its part equally existence, not the supposed abstract nothing but posited here as it is in itself, as existent, as belonging to existence. Thus quality is in general unseparated from existence, and the latter is only determinate, qualitative being'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

And so a is equal to c and the distinction between Quality and Negation is now sublated but this sublating is more than a mere taking back and external omission of it again:

'This sublating of the distinction is more than the mere retraction and external re-omission of it, or a simple return to the simple beginning, to existence as such. The distinction cannot be left out, for it is. Therefore, what de facto is at hand is this: existence in general, distinction in it, and the sublation of this distinction; the existence, not void of distinctions as at the beginning, but as again self-equal through the sublation of the distinction; the simplicity of existence mediated through this sublation. This state of sublation of the distinction is existence’s own determinateness; existence is thus being-in-itself; it is existent, something'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Withdrawal to a prior state is out of the question for the distinction between a and c cannot be omitted, for it just is, and hence we have determinate Being, a, the distinction from determinate Being, b, c, and sublation of the distinction, g. This return into self of the determinate Beings, the return of a and b into c, represents an enhancement g. Speculative Reason is a synthesis and it always creates an excess and now we have not determinate Being in general but a determinate being, a Something. But we are still in a world prior to the thought of a thing as Mure points out, the universe and all in it is here just an undifferentiated somewhat. Mure invokes William Wallace's,(1844 – 1897), translation of Etwas the somewhat, which better captures the world prior to the thing.

'Determinate Being is Being with a character or mode—which simply is ; and such un-mediated character is Quality. And as reflected into itself in this its character or mode. Determinate Being is a somewhat, an existent.—'

- 'The Encyclopedia Logic'

Something names the stage at which determinate Being and determinate Nothing are recognized as the same thing and the Something stresses how ephemeral Being is and this was certainly evident from chapter one where pure Being always already was pure Nothing. It is still so in chapter two and the resilience of things does not appear until midway through the 'Doctrine of Essence' when things have but are distinguishable from their properties. Einmal ist keinmal as they say in Germany, on the fleeting transitoriness of being Hegel has this to say:

'In common representation, something rightly carries the connotation of a real thing. Yet it still is a very superficial determination, just as reality and negation, existence and its determinateness, though no longer the empty being and nothing, still are quite abstract determinations. For this reason they also are the most common expressions, and a reflection that is still philosophically unschooled uses them the most; it casts its distinctions in them, fancying that in them it has something really well and firmly determined'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Pinkard perceives the function of Something as designed 'to introduce the conception of a plurality of individual entities. Without this conception of plurality, Hegel would not really have escaped Parmenides [i.e., Pure Being] after all'. Pinkard finds this introduction of plural things unnecessary. Why individual entities? Why not a plurality of Qualities where qualities would count for less than entity? In fact the Something does not introduce a world of things but rather it simply stands for the proposition that Negation is as much determinate Being as determinate Being is and vice versa. In the Something negativity is in the process of smuggling itself over from the right side to the left side in the diagram.

Which brings us to Reflection-into-self of Something. Hegel explains that we must take Quality in the one determination of determinate Being as in the other as Reality and Negation but in these determinatenesses determinate Being is equally reflected into itself and posited as such it is something, a determinate Being:

'In existence (a) as such, its determinateness is first (b) to be distinguished as quality. The latter, however, is to be taken in both the two determinations of existence as reality and negation. In these determinacies, however, existence is equally reflected into itself, and, as so reflected, it is posited as (c) something, an existent'.

- The Science of Logic'

Which is to say that first we have Quality, a determinateness with the accent on Being and then we have the same determinateness with the accent on Negation and each of these is reflected into self. A significant Hegelian theme emerges here, namely, what does it mean to be reflected into self? Reflection-within-itself is the name Hegel gives to the first three chapters on Essence, the mid-section of the Logic, and the phrase denotes immanence, reflection is an immanent determining:

'Thus there are two distinct sides to the determination of reflection. First, reflection is positedness, negation as such; second, it is immanent reflection. According to the side of positedness, it is negation as negation, and this already is its unity with itself. But it is this unity at first only implicitly or in itself, an immediate which sublates itself within, is the other of itself. – To this extent, reflection is a determining that abides in itself. In it essence does not exit from itself; the distinctions are solely posited, taken back into essence. But, from the other side, they are not posited but are rather reflected into themselves; negation as negation is equality with itself, not in its other, not reflected into its non-being'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Something

It also denotes tunneling down to greater and great depths to see what may be unearthed, for upon reflecting we are excavating so to speak beneath the appearances in order to arrive at a more profound truth. And this we accomplish by casting off what is not essential. And what we cast off are the appearances, mere Being, and we reveal the deeper non-Being behind the facade and hence Reflection-into-self is the very negative business of casting off one-sided Being to discover negative Essence and so whatever Quality and its Negation become they become it through their own negative force, they negate their superficial appearance and disclose their deeper character. In terms of the Borromean knot, see part three of this series, a and c shed d, which turns out to be the essence of both a, b and b, c. Difference from b is what a and c have in common and b is then lifted above its usual standing to d - g the middle term.

In truth, reflection is too advanced for the 'Doctrine of Being' which is 'the sphere of the immediate, the unreflective ... the simply presented', according to Harris. Nonetheless, as everything in Logic is implied from the beginning it comes as no surprise that we discover activity which for us is reflective.

Posited and in itself, in addition we have in the above-quoted sentence an early use of the important word posit. When you posit a proposition you put it forth into existence, positing, 'the appeal to ground' as Richard Dien Winfield (1950 - ) put it, is the task that you perform, therefore positive law is the law put forth by human beings as opposed to natural law which is produced by God or nature, and we take natural law to consist just in this, that nothing happens without a cause sufficiently determined a priori which cause therefore must contain an absolute spontaneity within itself:

'Thus to prove the thesis we should first assume that there is no other causality than that according to the laws of nature, that is, according to the necessity of mechanism in general, chemism being included. This proposition contradicts itself, because the law of nature consists just in this, that nothing happens without a cause sufficiently determined a priori, a cause that would have to contain an absolute spontaneity within it, that is, the assumption opposed to the thesis is contradictory, for the reason that it contradicts the thesis'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Positing is the activity that is shown in the above diagram where Becoming, g, is posited as determinate Being. It casts off d, e, f, and becomes a. In this activity, a reflects into itself, a says I am not d, e, f. The opposite of posited is to be merely in itself and for us. The 'in itself can also be viewed as that which is 'for us',' Žižek explains. 'For the uncomprehended object is mere in-itselfness'. We the audience may intuit some truths in advance of their derivation, but Logic's responsibility is to make express, to posit, what is merely implicit and in positing, the in itself becomes for itself. Only that which is posited in a Notion belongs in the dialectical development of that Notion to its content whereas the determinateness that is not yet posited in the Notion itself belongs to our reflection:

'The whole is likewise in the form or determinateness of being, since in becoming being has likewise shown itself to be only a moment – something sublated, negatively determined. It is such, however, for us, in our reflection; not yet as posited in it. What is posited, however, is the determinateness as such of existence, as is also expressed by the da (or 'there') of the Dasein. – The two are always to be clearly distinguished. Only that which is posited in a concept belongs in the course of the elaboration of the latter to its content. Any determinateness not yet posited in the concept itself belongs instead to our reflection, whether this reflection is directed to the nature of the concept itself or is a matter of external comparison. To remark on a determinateness of this last kind can only be for the clarification or anticipation of the whole that will transpire in the course of the development itself. That the whole, the unity of being and nothing, is in the one-sided determinateness of being is an external reflection; but in negation, in something and other, and so forth, it will become posited'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

To start with positing occurs by situating the stress upon Being and each move by the Understanding happens by shifting g or some other part of the middle term over into a and yet in the middle part of the Logic, the 'Doctrine of Essence', positing changes character. In Essence the paradigmatic shift of the Understanding constitutes a shift to the right in the diagram as Essence posits what it is by announcing what it is not, and this is the quintessential move of human freedom in the negative sense, and so at the end of Essence subjectivity is derived. The subject is simply not an object and nothing more than this. And at the end in the 'Subjective Logic' positing happens simultaneously on the left, the right and the middle, of the diagram, or to be more precise, the Notion is beyond positing, which implies a reference to otherness. In the Notion there is no other as such but only an otherness encompassed within a totality and both subject on the negative right and object on the positive left posit what they are and what they eventually posit is their unity with the middle term of Notion or Idea.

'A study for the fresco painted in the Jusélius Mausoleum, Pori', 1903, Akseli Gallen-Kallela

In his discussion of Something Hegel for the first time overtly refers to the in-itself. By definition a thing cannot perceive what it is in-itself and this mediation with itself which Something is in itself taken only as negation of the negation has no concrete determinations for its sides and it thereby collapses into the simple oneness which is Being.

'This mediation with itself which something is in itself, when taken only as the negation of negation, has no concrete determinations for its sides; thus it collapses into the simple unity which is being. Something is, and is therefore also an existent. Further, it is in itself also becoming, but a becoming that no longer has only being and nothing for its moments. One of these moments, being, is now existence and further an existent. The other moment is equally an existent, but determined as the negative of something – an other. As becoming, something is a transition, the moments of which are themselves something, and for that reason it is an alteration – a becoming that has already become concrete. – At first, however, something alters only in its concept; it is not yet posited in this way, as mediated and mediating, but at first only as maintaining itself simply in its reference to itself; and its negative is posited as equally qualitative, as only an other in general'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Self-mediation of Something is only for us, not yet for itself, in fact self-mediation is the very hallmark of Essence and far too advanced for our present position. 'An sich, always rendered 'in itself', does not mean in German that a feature is hidden from view and literally inside, but rather that the feature is 'on' the thing, visible 'for us' (für uns) though not 'for it' (fur sich)', explains Kaufmann. And et Hegel also says in Something mediation with self is posited in so far as Something is determined as a simple identity.

'Something is an existent as the negation of negation, for such a negation is the restoration of the simple reference to itself – but the something is thereby equally the mediation of itself with itself. Present in the simplicity of something, and then with greater determinateness in being-for-itself, in the subject, and so forth, this mediation of itself with itself is also already present in becoming, but only as totally abstract mediation; mediation with itself is posited in the something in so far as the latter is determined as a simple identity'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

In other words, if, within Something, we focus upon g, we have Something's simple identity. Given g, mediation is supposedly posited but posited means made manifest and how can self-mediation be simultaneously posited and in itself? The answer lies in the ephemerality of Being for at this stage the move of the Understanding is to wrench g from the middle term and shift it over to the left so that it becomes a and when this happens the middle term collapses into the simple oneness which is Being. The Understanding gets away with this distortion because g has no concrete determinations for its sides.

'This mediation with itself which something is in itself, when taken only as the negation of negation, has no concrete determinations for its sides; thus it collapses into the simple unity which is being. Something is, and is therefore also an existent. Further, it is in itself also becoming, but a becoming that no longer has only being and nothing for its moments. One of these moments, being, is now existence and further an existent. The other moment is equally an existent, but determined as the negative of something – an other. As becoming, something is a transition, the moments of which are themselves something, and for that reason it is an alteration – a becoming that has already become concrete. – At first, however, something alters only in its concept; it is not yet posited in this way, as mediated and mediating, but at first only as maintaining itself simply in its reference to itself; and its negative is posited as equally qualitative, as only an other in general'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Concrete determinations will build themselves up later and when that happens the Understanding cannot do such violence to the middle term. For now, the middle term collapses into mere Being and the self-mediation posited in Something, d, e, f, g, is merely in itself once the Understanding has its way, g - a . After this operation is achieved Being does not manifestly recognize its self-mediation, self-mediation is merely in itself and will not be for itself until being becomes self-consciousness at the end of Essence. So, Being-within-self. You may have heard of Eskimos having a hundred words for snow in virtue of snow is so important to their way of life but apparently this is untrue, what they do have is a series of simple expressions which can be translated into wet snow, or powdered snow, and presumably yellow snow which is to be avoided and English has more or less the same phrases. Being we may fancifully say is to Hegel what snow is to the Eskimos in that Hegel has many different compound expressions for it and accordingly we have in Something the first appearance of the expression being-within-self (Insichsein). Hegel says of Something this sublatedness of the distinction is determinate Being's own determinateness, it is thereby Being-within-self, determinate Being is a determinate Being, a Something:

'This sublating of the distinction is more than the mere retraction and external re-omission of it, or a simple return to the simple beginning, to existence as such. The distinction cannot be left out, for it is. Therefore, what de facto is at hand is this: existence in general, distinction in it, and the sublation of this distinction; the existence, not void of distinctions as at the beginning, but as again self-equal through the sublation of the distinction; the simplicity of existence mediated through this sublation. This state of sublation of the distinction is existence’s own determinateness; existence is thus being-in-itself; it is existent, something'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

In this passage Being-within-self is sublatedness and sublatedness designates negative immanent activity and it is in the nature of Being to turn into Nothing and then into Something and this development represents Being within the self and Nothing external is needed. Though, earlier in the chapter, Hegel warned that the Understanding entails an external reflection which does indicate something from the outside is required. Being is therefore never entirely within self and we can also say preliminarily that Being-within-self, d, is the silent fourth. In the 'Objective Logic' d represents the alien substrate that is not part of Being, it is the subject which is needed to complete the object. Later in the 'Subjective Logic' the silent fourth d becomes the sublated object that the subject cannot digest and in the finalt chapter, d is the empty hole in Absolute Knowing that guarantees the Logic is never complete. Such a disconcerting absence is the reason for the Logic not concluding the system, for why Logic is a never-ending circle forever replaying its own sequence, for why Logic needs nature to supplement its lack. The claim is an intricate one requiring a great deal by way of explication. Negation of the negation. Negation of the negation is the step of speculative Reason in producing the middle term. It is the production of Something, g, out of a double negative. Hegel now informs us that Something is the first negation of negation. The above diagram bears the form of the negation of the negation. But did we not see the same configuration in previous diagrams? Why was not Becoming in the second diagram the first negation of the negation? The answer is that negation is a determinate Nothing. Previously Negation canceled Quality and Something in turn canceled Negation and it was not a negation of the negation pure Nothing was an indeterminate nothing. To speak precisely pure Nothing did not emanate from Pure Being in the same way that Negation emanated from Quality and Becoming has not yet opposed and developed its moments:

'The immediate identity of form as has been posited here, still without the rich content of the movement of the fact itself, merits close attention. It occurs in the fact as the latter is at its beginning. Thus pure being is immediately nothing. Quite in general, everything real is at its beginning only an immediate identity of this sort, for at this stage it has not yet opposed and developed its moments: on the one hand, it has not yet inwardly recollected itself from externality; on the other, it has not yet relinquished its inwardness, not yet produced itself out of it'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

For that reason in the previous stage pure Nothing was non-dialectic but subsequently Quality's own voice, b, demanded that Negation posit itself and b was inherently within determinate Being under the law of sublation and this internal voice is the birth of dialectical Reason, and for this reason, Quality confesses its Being-within-self for the first time and Hegel can correctly assert that Something is the first negation of the negation.

'Being and nothing are at first only supposed to be distinguished, i. e., the distinction between them is initially only in-itself, but not yet posited. Whenever we speak about a distinction we have in mind two items, each of which possesses a determination that the other does not have. But being is precisely what strictly lacks determination, and nothing is this same lack of determination also. So the distinction between these two [terms) is only meant to be such, a completely abstract distinction, one that is at the same time no distinction. In all other cases of distinguishing we are always dealing also with something common, which embraces the things that are distinguished. For example, if we speak of two diverse kinds, then being a kind is what is common to both. Similarly, we say that there are natural and spiritual essences. Here, being an essence is what they have in common. By contrast, in the case of being and nothing, distinction has no basis, and, precisely because of this, it is no distinction, since neither determination has any basis. Someone might want to say that being and nothing are still both thoughts, and so to be a thought is what is common to them both. But this would be overlooking the fact that being is not a particular, determinate thought, but is the still quite undetermined thought which, precisely for this reason, cannot be distinguished from nothing'.

- 'The Encyclopdia Logic'

The distinction between Being and Nothing is only implicit and not yet actually made, they only ought to be distinguished and a distinction of course implies two things, and that one of them possesses an attribute which is not found in the other. Being however is an absolute absence of attributes, and so is Nought hence the distinction between the two is only meant to be. In all other cases of difference there is some common point, b, which comprehends both things. Suppose for instance that we speak of two different species, the genus, b, forms a common ground for both. But in the case of mere Being and Nothing distinction is without a bottom to stand upon and hence there can be no distinction, both determinations being the same bottomlessness. If it be replied that Being and Nothing are both of them thoughts so that thought may be reckoned common ground the objector is forgetting that Being is not a particular or definite thought, and hence being quite indeterminate is a thought not to be distinguished from Nothing. In effect when species are compared, genus is the being-within-self of the species, b, but, because the prior stage lacked any common ground between pure Being and pure Nothing then Becoming does not qualify as a negation of the negation.

Hegel stresses the distinction between the first negation in the prior stage and the negation of the negation in the subsequent stage, the first negation is abstract while subsequently the overlap between Quality and Negation is designated by b only and in contrast the negation of the negation is concrete. Which is to say, the overlap between Something and its constituent parts is described by d, e, f. And furthermore, b, in the previous stage, is an abstraction and itself becomes a concreteness b, d, in the subsequent stage. Which brings us to alteration. Hegel in chapter two alerts us to the fact that Quality was alterable and in his discussion of Something Hegel makes good on this claim, invoking the law of sublation Something is a more complex form of Becoming:

'As becoming, something is a transition, the moments of which are themselves something, and for that reason it is an alteration – a becoming that has already become concrete. – At first, however, something alters only in its concept; it is not yet posited in this way, as mediated and mediating, but at first only as maintaining itself simply in its reference to itself; and its negative is posited as equally qualitative, as only an other in general'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Something as a Becoming is a transition, the moments of which are themselves somethings, so that the transition is alteration, a becoming which has already become concrete. Quality is on the move, it is alterable thanks to its its own Being-within-self which is sublation itself. Something alters only in its Notion. Can we affirm that the moments of Something are themselves Somethings? Hegel stretches his terminology here to make a point. Quality and Negation, the moments of Something, are too crude to warrant the honourable name of Something. But Hegel wishes to emphasize that Quality and Negation are both Qualities. Yet since the Understanding recognizes only g at this early stage, Something, which alters only in its Notion, nonetheless is not yet posited as mediating and mediated but at first only as simply maintaining itself in its self-relation. Thus, because the Understanding in the prior stage merely apprehended g, not d, e, f, it does not yet apprehend the double nature of middle terms which is still in itself.

'Römische Bauleute' ('Roman Builders'), 1879, Christian Rohlfs

'Materiam superabat opus'

'The workmanship excelled the materials'.

- Ovid, (43 BC - 17 AD), 'Metamorphoseon'

Coming up next:

Finitude.

To be continued ...