Israel and Turkey’s Golden Moment and Donald Trump’s Ticking Clock
This golden moment for both Israel and Turkey may appear to be an opportunity to forge a durable bond between the two powers in the coming years, but more likely is that it is going to be a temporary, tactical alliance rather than a strategic partnership given the conflicting nature of national interests and personalities of their leaders. What is common between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is that both are betting on U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, with a combination of confidence and anxiety. Indeed, Trump, while mercurial, is decisive when it comes to American interests, which he prioritizes above all else. As a result, he is keeping everyone around him on edge with his unpredictable surprises and fondness for deal-making. Trump disdains complacency, whether in personal relationships with world leaders or in assumptions about his broader policies and future actions. Trump’s influence is already shaping international and regional power dynamics even before entering the White House, redefining the positions of Turkey and Israel in the new map of the Middle East.
The outlines of a new “Pax Americana”—or American-led peace—is reassuring to some but is triggering panic in others, who fear it signals unchecked American hegemony at the expense of a multipolar world. Yet the traditional concept of "Pax Americana" is not the objective for Donald Trump, who does not want the United States to bear the costs of maintaining such peace like before. Indeed, he does not believe in paying for the defence of others, as evident in his stance towards NATO member states.
Trump does not want America to fund state-building in any other country. Rather, he envisions a Pax Americana that brings benefits, profits, and wealth to the United States, rather than the opposite, one centred on investment in America, requiring favourable environments and the removal of obstacles and barriers to this vision.
The Middle East is undergoing seismic transformations that have, so far, resulted in pushing Russia out of its Syrian bases and ejecting it from the Mediterranean. Regardless of Russian President Vladimir Putin's claim that withdrawing from Syria was a ‘mission accomplished’ victory against terrorism, his statements about the future of Russian bases are striking and peculiar. He said Russia did not know to what extent it needs the bases in Syria and what they might offer, adding that Moscow is reassessing the future of its presence in Syria based on the actions of the new Syrian authorities.
But despite Putin's claims, losing the Hmeimim and Tartus bases on the Mediterranean will erode Russia's capabilities and curtail its ambitions in the Middle East and Africa. The loss in Syria will be costly for Russia in Libya and its African deployments, as Turkey, victorious in Syria, will likely extend its triumph to Libya. Ankara may also block Russia's path in Egypt by attempting to strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood project there.
What Turkish President Erdogan could offer to Trump and other NATO leaders, as well as to Israel, is a new Syria in which Turkey will oversee upcoming elections and play a role in drafting a new constitution, applying Turkey's governance model. Erdogan may promise, though not guarantee, that Syria will not turn into a hub for Islamic extremism. From Erdogan's perspective, the Muslim Brotherhood project is not a project for Islamic extremism because he views it as part of his aspirations to revive the Ottoman Empire pursuant to Erdogan’s vision.
Donald Trump has expressed admiration for Erdogan’s ambitions and personality, calling their relationship "great" and Erdogan a "very strong and smart man” worthy of the greatness of the Ottoman Empire which previously dominated Syria for hundreds of years. Trump described Erdogan's actions in Syria as an "unfriendly takeover" through opposition factions but stated, "I think Turkey is very smart," adding, "Turkey wanted control of Syria 'for thousands of years' and now they have it” in reference to the Ottoman history of Syria.
Turkey’s foreign minister objected to Trump’s description of Ankara’s actions as a "takeover," but behind the scenes, Trump’s team assured Erdogan’s government that Trump would not stand in Turkey’s way as long as it respects America’s red lines vis-à-vis the Kurds. Furthermore, the U.S. could drop opposition to Turkey's acquisition of F-35 aircraft, and to its imposition of its governance model in Syria and expansion of influence in North Africa from Libya to Egypt. Indeed, U.S. interests currently align with Turkey’s readiness to act on behalf of Washington and NATO capitals.
The Egyptian leadership is alarmed by the potential revival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after Syria, which aligns with current U.S. interests in clipping Russia’s wings. A Muslim Brotherhood-led Egypt weakens Russia, which fears the group’s influence not just in the Arab region but also in Muslim-majority republics in its backyard. Meanwhile, Turkey would double its regional influence should it succeed in imposing its model in Syria first, followed by Egypt and other Arab nations.
Iranian leaders are also concerned, as the Trump administration could be pushing for Turkey to become a military and political ally if the U.S. decides to launch strikes against Iran. Speculation suggests this could happen by 2025 if Tehran continues to reject Trump’s conditions to open a new chapter with the U.S. and end its international isolation.
These conditions, in simple terms, are first: Iran’s complete cessation of any projects or ambitions related to acquiring nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. Second, the dismantling of Tehran’s doctrine based on extending its influence and exporting its revolution through loyal proxies and militias. As it appears now, Tehran is not prepared at this juncture to play by these rules, perhaps due to its internal disputes. However, Donald Trump does not want to wait for Iran to complete its nuclear program. He wants to seize the favourable opportunity presented by Iran’s current strategic weakness—otherwise, he would shift from incentives to threats and destroy Iran economically along with its nuclear program.
It can be said that the most significant relationship for Donald Trump in the Middle East is the U.S.-Israeli alliance, which the elected president wants to be the strongest. Israel today is at its strongest regionally and it wants Turkey's cooperation with its policies towards Iran, particularly in relation of striking Iran's nuclear capabilities.
The regional balance of power has shifted dramatically following the decline of Iran’s influence and the rise of Turkey and Israel to prominence. Arab countries are trying to play their cards quietly and cautiously, aware that their weight is not substantial now but could become more significant if they use their leverage effectively. What Gulf countries are trying to avoid is ideological alignment, rushing to gloat over Iran, or entangling themselves in Turkish-Israeli relations, especially given the arrogance and condescension of both Erdogan and Netanyahu.
The strongest leverage Gulf countries have is their openness to the "Deal of the Century," which Donald Trump wants to implement, particularly between Saudi Arabia and Israel, while maintaining their positions on a Palestinian state and the two-state solution. Additionally, there are tools for influencing the reconstruction of Lebanon and Syria—not only practically on the ground but also by shaping the reconstruction of both countries to ensure they remain in the Arab fold, despite Turkish and Israeli projects aiming to impose changes in them aligned with their interests.
The United States would be mistaken if it gave Turkey or Israel unchecked authority to meddle in Arab countries. This is because the new "Pax Americana" carries significant opportunities that could serve American interests through the Arab gateway, but this cannot be done by turning the Middle East into a Turkish-Israeli feast dancing to the tunes of an American carte blanche.