A Murky Crossroads for Syria, Defined Only by the Long-Term Erosion of Russian and Iranian Influence

Many intricate battles are being fought over influence in Syria, with a major focus on exhausting and diminishing the roles of Russia and Iran benefiting from the rare moment of weakness for both countries and the constraints on their military capabilities, due to Russia’s war in Ukraine on one hand and the Israeli-American campaign against the Iranian axis on the other. Turkey is now presenting new credentials to the United States, building on a deterioration in its relationship with Russia, particularly between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Ankara is seeking to capitalize on this opportunity to assert control over Syrian territory, and its influence through Islamist militant factions, which it claims to be able to control and curb. The fate of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remains uncertain, and depends on the accelerating developments, but the survival of the regime in Damascus—albeit in a modified form—seems desirable to the actors, in order to prevent the collapse of the Syrian state. Increasingly, there is talk of the military establishment taking on partial control to preserve the state, though not the presidency.

Where does the United States stand in all this? President Joe Biden's administration is closely coordinating with President-elect Donald Trump's team, and their relationship has been more constructive than expected. President Biden has demonstrated that he is not akin to former President Barack Obama, particularly in terms of Obama’s appeasement of Iran, which allowed it the chance to dominate the Middle East. Indeed, the Biden administration has, in fact, provided Israel with all the military and intelligence resources necessary to neutralize Iran's most significant asset—Hezbollah in Lebanon—and to deal crushing blows to Iran's strategic capabilities.

Trump's approach aligns more closely with Biden's than Biden's does with Obama's concerning the new American policy for the Middle East. He does not oppose undermining Russian influence in Syria, as it aligns with the United States' grand strategic interests. Moreover, Syria serves as a vital link for Iranian militias, and its geography was crucial to the Persian Crescent project. Trump therefore aligns with Biden on containing Iran, dismantling Hezbollah, and transforming the so-called Resistance Axis into an axis of disarray, thus undermining the Persian Crescent project.

However, what both Biden's and Trump's teams want to avoid is Syria transitioning from a sphere of Russian-Iranian influence to a breeding ground for terrorism or a platform for the Muslim Brotherhood's rise to power. According to a senior American decision-maker on the Middle East, no one—including Israel—wants a catastrophic collapse of the Syrian state, even if that means ensuring Bashar al-Assad's regime does not fall apart.

The recent military developments, though startling, have not yet alarmed the United States, as American interests remain centered on maintaining a strategic presence in eastern Syria at minimal cost. Furthermore, Turkey is leading these developments, thereby absolving the United States of direct responsibility—and shielding it from retaliation. Indeed, the current American strategy is one of delegation—delegating Israel to weaken Iranian assets and contain Iran, and delegating Turkey to push out Russian and Iranian influence from Syria, which will also have repercussions for Iranian influence in Iraq.

It is becoming increasingly clear that Russia will not be able to intervene on the ground to save its ally Bashar al-Assad or its influence. Its only option now is to hope that the Syrian military establishment can maintain order to prevent Syria from falling into the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood, potentially turning Syria into a platform for Sunni extremism that would threaten Russia and its surroundings.

The loss of Syria would be a major blow for Russia on multiple levels—from losing its military bases to ending its presence in the Mediterranean and witnessing the decline of Russian influence throughout the Middle East, alongside the rise of Turkish and Israeli influence. Similarly, Iran losing Syria would be catastrophic for Russia, not just for Tehran.

Russia’s only hope lies in the Syrian military establishment regaining control or at least preventing a collapse in the face of radical Islamist factions. This scenario would be the worst possible outcome, not just for Russia and Iran, but also for the United States.

Turkey has promised the United States that it can control the extremist factions and ensure Syria does not fall into the hands of terrorists. However, these promises are not guarantees nor reassuring, especially since Turkey, along with Israel, seeks to destroy Syria, each for their own reasons. Syria without Assad and under the control of factions loyal to Ankara is a strategic objective for Turkey, as this would expel both Russia and Iran from Syria.

Israel, meanwhile, is cooperating with Turkey by providing the necessary intelligence for Turkish-backed factions. Its primary aim is to cut off Iranian military supplies to Lebanon via Syria. Nevertheless, Israel does not entirely trust Turkey, bearing in mind that their relationship has often fluctuated in the past. Israel also worries about the unknown forces fighting in Syria seeking to overthrow Assad. Bashar al-Assad has stayed out of Israel's war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, refraining from intervening or activating the Syrian front, which means that if there is a decision to topple Assad it is not coming from Israel—but undoubtedly from Turkey, regardless of Ankara's denials.

With the fall of Hama, it became evident that Assad's security belt was beginning to crumble. With the leader of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, adopting his real name—Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa—efforts have begun to rehabilitate him as a leading Syrian national figure, distancing him from jihadism. In an interview with CNN, al-Jolani stated that what follows Hama will not resemble what came before, and that his organization may dissolve at any time after achieving its objectives.

However, al-Jolani remains on the United States' terrorism list, and adopting his real name is not necessarily a ticket into Syrian state institutions. Indeed, he was the leader of the Nusra Front—the al-Qaeda branch during the Syrian civil war—fought in Iraq, spent five years in an American prison, and was sent by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to overthrow the Syrian government. Therefore, his rebrand in appearance and rhetoric may not necessarily succeed in rehabilitating him.

Maintaining Syrian state institutions is a common goal among many actors, including the rival Americans and Russians. The Biden administration wants to avoid their collapse, and the Russian government hopes for their survival. Both saw Bashar al-Assad as a safety valve at different times, but today the situation is different.

Moscow seems prepared to facilitate Assad's departure as long as it ensures the survival of the regime in a new form. Russia appears willing to play a role that allows it to maintain ties with the military establishment, even if those ties differ from the past. There is even talk of Russia's willingness to host Assad and his family if he wishes to leave safely.

The priority now seems to be the survival of the regime in Damascus, not Assad himself. Hence, maintaining the morale of the military establishment and preventing its complete demoralization is crucial for its backers. Russia's interest lies in avoiding a complete moral defeat and preserving tactical relations with the Syrian military establishment after losing the strategic relationship with Assad.

If the armed factions prevail and Turkey reaps what it has sown in Syria, it is likely that Turkey will not want a cohesive military establishment in Damascus that maintains ties with Russia and Iran. However, if the United States insists that Turkey supports keeping the modified Syrian military establishment in a regime that is not tied to Russia and Iran as before, Turkey may yield and begin to descend from its current high ground.

Washington may wish to mandate Turkey to eliminate Russian and Iranian influence in Syria, but it will not endorse support for extremist factions to overthrow the Damascus regime. Therefore, there is a common interest between the United States and Russia: the collapse of the Syrian military establishment before radical Islamist factions would be terrifying for all parties and beneficial to none.

Syria today is not the same as Syria last month, as Russia and Iran have proven incapable of stopping the rapid collapse on the ground. Neither can send their ground forces to rescue the regime or preserve their influence in Syria.

America may not be in the driver's seat of this speeding train, but Turkey is. However, Washington can impose rail guards on Turkish leadership to prevent recklessness in its intoxication with victories. It can also temper Israel's enthusiasm in tearing Iran and its arms apart, ensuring Israel does not rush into partnering with Turkey to establish a foothold for the Muslim Brotherhood to rule Syria.

Bashar al-Assad's serious mistakes, and his outright refusal to involve the Syrian civil opposition in governance, contributed to Syria’s current situation. Even after Arab states moved to rehabilitate him, Assad did not invest in serious reforms to move Syria from civil war to a partnership in governance.

Syria today is at a murky crossroads, with no clarity other than the decline and long-term erosion of Iranian, Hezbollah, and Russian influence.