In the midst of tension between US-China Africa gets a golden chance to become developing countries

China-Africa Relations in Review

 INTRODUCTION

“China did this,” “the Chinese did that.” There is an essentialization of China and Chinese actors that stops our understanding of China-Africa relations – whether to praise or demonize them – as it lumps a multiplicity of approaches, as well as actors, into a fantasized strategy. Hence, the need to use the plural to talk about these Chinese presences in Africa.

 Chinese Actors in Africa

To begin with, there are institutional actors who may interact within the embassies themselves. There are divergences between officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who subordinate the commercial to the political, and those from the Ministry of Trade who, conversely, subordinate the political to the commercial. This disagreement was particularly sensitive after the institutional reform of 2003 which, in fact, granted a certain pre-eminence to the Ministry of Trade over that of Foreign Affairs. This rivalry between the commercial and the political is also reflected in the relationship between officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ExIm Bank of China, which is under the Ministry of Finance: the former encourages the granting of loans at subsidized rates, while the latter prefers to grant loans at commercial rates. These frictions in Africa can be expressed through political confrontation – and thus opposing strategies – at the central government level in China. These institutional disputes may become even more important as the National Development and Reform Commission depends on piecemeal information from institutional actors, or even the inevitably biased information provided by recipient companies.

Chinese companies and their strategies, which are as diverse as they are varied, depend as much on their status as on their search for markets, without us being able to reduce them to the observation of a big plan, except for a certain desire to internationalize (zhouchuqu) as encouraged by the Chinese government. It should be noted that this internationalization does not automatically make these companies multinationals or globalized companies insofar as the turnover they achieve abroad remains marginal in their total turnover. Among the large state-owned enterprises under the direct supervision of the central government, a distinction can be made between those that are effectively mandated by the Chinese government to guarantee the supply of raw materials and those that are market-seeking, such as the large construction companies that have no other objective than to make profits. Then there are the provincial state-owned enterprises whose primary loyalty is to local governments, which strengthen their power through the profits they make.

There are also large private or supposedly private companies such as Huawei which, in the early 2000s, opposed the Chinese government’s desire to impose purely Chinese telephone standards for the sale of telephone equipment abroad. Certainly, in the current situation, marked by the Sino-American economic war and the intransigent authoritarianism of the Chinese Communist Party, it is not certain that companies like Huawei can still enjoy such great decision-making autonomy, as shown by the recent setbacks of Jack Ma (former CEO and founder of Alibaba). Private SMEs are potentially free electrons. Think of the Haiti company, which had a project to set up a special economic zone in Tangiers, but which, despite the initial support of the Banque marocain du commerce extérieur (future Bank of Africa), failed to receive the support of Beijing. The Chinese authorities put the number of Chinese companies active in Africa at between three and four thousand. The difference with the number stated by the 2017 McKinsey report (10,000 Chinese companies in Africa) results from confusion. The companies mentioned above are Chinese companies (or their subsidiaries) under Chinese law – and therefore incorporated in China – whereas the McKinsey report also includes small private companies under local African law (and therefore legally and statistically non-Chinese) run by Chinese nationals whose allegiance to Beijing may be inversely proportional to the autonomy they enjoy. 

China-Africa Economic Relations in Review

Analysis of Chinese statistical data, as well as that of international institutions, clearly shows that Chinese companies in Africa do not act specifically as investors, contrary to the oft-repeated cliché. They act as service providers, customers, and suppliers of goods. The amount of these commercial activities (services and goods) is on average 80 times higher than the amount actually invested in Africa. For instance, in 2019, the amount of Chinese direct investment in Africa was $2.7 billion, which is roughly the value of Dong Feng’s stake in the French car manufacturer Peugeot (PSA): that is, the same amount for, on one side, a single Chinese company investing in a single foreign company, and on the other hand, a significant number of Chinese companies investing in the 54 African countries.

These figures reveal the classic confusion between investing, financing, and providing services. International bodies (IMF, OECD) have given a clear definition of what should be considered an investment. It is a definition that China adheres to and is recalled each year in MOFCOM’s statistical communiqué on Chinese direct investment abroad. In order to make the confusion more obvious and to give investment its correct role, it is useful to compare the amount of investment with the services provided (the indicator for which is the turnover of overseas construction contracts completed in the same year). According to the above observations, recently, the turnover of Chinese construction companies was more than ten to twenty times the amount invested by China in Africa. This reveals an inescapable fact: Chinese investment in Africa is an expense for China, not an income for the host African country. In contrast, payment for services is an expense (as well as an investment) for the African client country, but an income for China. Given these differences, these two activities each illustrate China’s presence in Africa in their own way. They clearly show that China is a service provider rather than an investor and that Africa is a client rather than a partner.

The consequence of China’s low investment in Africa is that China is only marginally involved in its industrialization. Globally, China’s in investments abroad represent only 19.6% of its foreign investments and are mostly in Western countries in search of both technology and profits. In Africa, Chinese industrial investments are made in labor-intensive activities, which are therefore hardly capital-intensive and consequently do not industrialize much and involve only very limited technology transfers. The 14th Five-Year Plan (published on 13 March 2021), referring to concerns over anticipated deindustrialization in China, therefore invites economic actors to consolidate the industrial sector. This is a reaffirmation of a principle stated in 2015: “let the manufacturing sector strengthen the nation” (zhizao qiang guo). This orientation is, moreover, consistent with a declared commitment to the rapid robotization of labor-intensive activities, leading in particular to the interruption of any re-importing delocalization. Cooperation with Germany on the fourth industrial revolution can also be explained by this concern for a “robotic revolution” (jiqiren gaming) made a priority by Xi Jinping in 2014, because not only will it raise the productivity of workers who would otherwise have been rendered uncompetitive by very high wages, but it will also make it possible to ignore the demographic challenge of a population that is aging too quickly because it has not given birth to a younger generation that is numerically large enough to justify a consumption-driven economy. So, it is not surprising that there is now little me=nation of exporting industrial production capacity and the subsequent creation of 85 million jobs outside China – which would require, according to MOFCOM’s 2018 figures, 1.3 million Chinese companies to internationalize given the small number of jobs they create. The trade war between China and the United States also reinforces a refocusing announced in July 2020 which goes in the same direction: this so-called “dual circulation” (shuang xunhuan) strategy can only increase China’s autonomy, thus giving the impression of an economic confinement, or even a withdrawal into itself in a political context which is relatively unfavorable for it.

Thus, much ado about investment. Chinese companies invest only marginally in Africa. Instead, they trade and build infrastructure on behalf of African governments, which invest in infrastructure with Chinese funding.  This raises questions about the status of African countries in the New Silk Roads strategy.

Both the inland and maritime Silk Roads are a legacy of the traditional trade routes between Asia and Europe. The maritime route in its present form was born in the 19th century. It is the successor to the porcelain route used by Arab and Indian merchants. It was then extended to the Mediterranean, and then beyond, to Northern Europe, thanks to the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. One of the first promoters of the modern maritime route is the forerunner of today’s CMA-CGM, which was behind the creation of Djibouti (1888) and the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway (1897). Since the Asian crisis of 1998, and especially since the early 2000s, Chinese officials have tried, with very limited success, to reform the economic model inherited from Deng Xiaoping. They have tried to transform the engine of their economy, i.e., to substitute growth driven by the domestic market for growth driven by external markets. Hence Xi Jinping’s call in Davos in 2017 for liberal globalization, can almost be interpreted as a distress call. The New Silk Roads strategy is therefore an initiative to better penetrate European markets (mainly the European Union). Indeed, these are the first outlet for Chinese products, ahead of the countries of Southeast Asia and the United States.

Trade in containerized goods between China and Europe accounts for 15% of Chinese trade year on year (94% of which is by sea) while trade with Africa accounts for only 4%. In fact, in all modes of transport combined (sea, air, and land), Africa accounts for only 3% of world trade and 3% of Chinese trade in goods. Thus, from a micro-economic point of view (that of Chinese companies), this might offer some potentially large markets. However, from a macroeconomic point of view (that of the Chinese nation), this is far from the case. Even in terms of access to raw materials, Africa is very dependent on Chinese purchases. China, on the other hand, has built up a wide range of alternative suppliers for these same raw materials. So, it will never be really dependent on Africa. By looking at exports of ores and metals and fuels. Only South Africa and Angola could possibly claim to play a significant role, given China’s very relative dependence on them. Indeed, recent developments in Australia-                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           China relations show that China is not afraid to challenge its supposed dependence on Australia for iron supplies – which in this case could be to the benefit (in the short term at least) of some African countries such as Guinea. Here again, the 14th Five-Year Plan clearly reiterates the will to establish industrial chains that respect the principle of “China first” (Yi wu Wei zhu). In the context of an unequal international division of labor, this principle only strengthens Africa’s role as a supplier of raw materials alongside other “resource countries” (ziyuan guo). The lesson we can learn from this is there is a substantial asymmetry in the relationship between Africa as a continent and China as a nation. While China is economically important to Africa, Africa is not important to China. In contrast, African countries are politically important to China. 

Africa’s Political Significance for China

 As evidenced by the Short History of the Chinese Communist Party in a revised version published in 2021 to celebrate its CCP’s centenary. From then on, a dual narrative was gradually established: a fairly liberal economic message illustrated, for example, by Xi Jinping’s speech in Davos (see above); and a vehemently anti-Western political message that has been consolidated over time and has blossomed in recent years, as shown most recently by the rhetoric of certain Chinese diplomats now described as “war wolves.” Politically, this has been translated since the early 1990s into an instrumentalization of the old national humiliation theme and a revision of history textbooks, a reinvention of Confucianism, a reactivation of Third Worldism, and a deepening of ties with developing countries, starting with African countries. Africa has 54 countries with one vote each in the UN General Assembly (except for Eswatini, 53 countries currently recognize Beijing) – that is, almost a third of the votes that can pass decisions. This has led to a rewriting of history, as evidenced by the publication in 1999 of a book tracing fifty years of Chinese diplomacy in symbolic. The FAO and UNIDO directorates underline China’s involvement in development, industrialization, and aid to poor countries. The ICAO and ITU supervision also show China as a technically innovative country in sensitive areas, having successfully transformed itself from a backward to a technologically advanced country. If China’s presence at the head of the ITU makes sense in the race, no longer for 5G, but for 6G, which Huawei intends to be able to market as early as 2030, its presence at the head of the ICAO was even more significant with the launch of an air silk route, after the setbacks of the Boeing 737 Max and on the eve of the certification of the Comac C919. The Silk Air Route is a project initiated by the conglomerate AVIC (Aviation Industry Corporation of China) to promote the export of Chinese aeronautical equipment, infrastructure, and services to countries along the New Silk Roads. It is an industrial project that strongly needs the support of the Chinese state to obtain the various certificates that establish the airworthiness of the exported material and equipment and, to this end, is included in the 14th Five-Year Plan. Among the exportable equipment is the Comac C919, which is intended for the same markets as the Airbus A320 and the Boeing 737 Max. In other words, by economically and financially supporting African countries, China is building up a clientele of dependent countries that enable it to build its image and exercise definite political power: the instrumentalization of Africa contributes directly to the rebirth of powerful China that Chinese leaders are so keen to see. Inadvertently cynical (or so one assumes), Yao Guimei (director of the Center for South African Studies at the China-Africa Institute of the Chinese Academy                                                                                                                                                                                of Social Sciences) sums up the relationship with Africa as “resources, markets, and votes.”

This instrumental cynicism was stigmatized at a colloquium held on 27 May 2022 under the auspices of the Culture magazine and the Eurasian Society for System Science Research Association. To epitomize the panelists’ views, I would say they insisted that China is economically invaluable to Africa, while Africa’s economic significance to China is extremely modest. However, Africa is politically relevant to China. They agreed that Chinese economic cooperation in Africa is the “ballast stone” – in other words, what stabilizes Sino-African relations – and that Africa should no longer be instrumentalized for political purposes, but should become the fulcrum of a new Chinese international economic strategy to better counter the international order endorsed by “the West led by the United States.” However, this questioning is likely to be implemented only to a very limited extent, as the White Paper “China and Africa in the New Era” (December 2021) and the 15th Five Year Plan (2021-2025) assign a specific place for Africa in the international division of labor as conditioned by China’s want to establish industrial chains that respect the “China First” principle. In the context of such an unequal international division of labor, this principle only reinforces African countries’ role as suppliers of raw materials, or as “resource countries” as they are typified in the 15th Five Year Plan.

CHINA: DISMAL TRADE DATA HINTS AT DOWNTURN

China’s trade data surprised on the downside in November, recording an 8.7% year-on-year drop. the number represents a steep acceleration from the 0.3% contraction in October, and altogether marks the worse performance on the trade front since February 2020, when the national economy was being wracked by the first waves of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The numbers are notable in that they reflect a sharp downturn on the demand side, and particularly in some of China’s most important markets. The United States is the case in point; exports there dropped by just over a quarter year-on-year in November. Exports to the European Union also dipped by 10%. Unsurprisingly, container rates have fallen in tow, plummeting over 90% from last year – a much faster rate than many had been predicting. In fact, logistics managers are now expecting 2023 to bring bottom-of-the-barrel container prices as newly-created shipping capacity runs aground on collapsing global demand.

FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION DAKAR ACTION PLAN (2022-2024)

The 8th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held in Dakar, Senegal, from November 29th to 30th 2021. The Conference adopted Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Dakar Action Plan (2022-2024) on 30th 2021.

The salient features of the above action plan as below excerpt from action plan:

Broader area and specific

The 8th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held in Dakar from November 29th to 30th 2021. The Heads of Delegation of China and the Heads of Delegation of 53 African countries and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the two sides”) attended the Conference. The two sides commend the development of relations between China and Africa and believe that over the past 21 years since its inception, the Forum has strongly promoted the development of relations between China and Africa, and become an important benchmark for international cooperation with Africa. The two sides are satisfied with the effective implementation of the eight major initiatives launched during the 2018 Beijing Summit and will continue to pursue the vision of innovative, coordinated, green, and open development for all, promote high-quality China-Africa cooperation, and work in concert to defeat COVID-19 and advance post-pandemic economic recovery. The two sides acknowledge that China, the largest developing country, has achieved the goal of building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects and is striving to realize its second centenary goal and the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation and that African countries are endeavoring to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful continent. China and Africa are committed to further enhancing their comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership and building an even stronger China-Africa community with a shared future.

 The purpose of China-Africa Cooperation Vision 2035

The two sides undertake to create synergy between the China-Africa Cooperation Vision 2035, the Long-Range Goals for 2035 of China, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the United Nations, and the agenda 2063 of the African Union, thus drawing a long-term blueprint for China-Africa practical cooperation. China and Africa will make joint efforts to turn the vision into reality. Africa supports the Global Development Initiative proposed by China. African countries will favorably consider joining the initiative and make joint efforts to accelerate the global implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. China welcomes African countries to join the big family of Belt and Road cooperation. China and Africa will continue to uphold the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits, follow the philosophy of open, green, and clean cooperation, and advance high-standard, people-centered and sustainable Belt and Road cooperation. China and Africa will work closely to further upgrade and improve the quality of China-Africa cooperation by implementing, the nine programs, namely the medical and health program, the poverty reduction and agricultural development program, the trade promotion program, the investment promotion program, the digital innovation program, the green development program, the capacity building program, the cultural and people-to-people exchange program, and the peace and security program

 Political sharing agreement

The two sides will maintain close high-level exchanges to deepen traditional friendship, enhance political mutual trust, strengthen strategic coordination and cement the political foundation of China-Africa relations. China appreciates African leaders’ warm congratulations on the centenary of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and commends. The two sides will further strengthen high-level exchanges between Chinese and African political parties, and improve bilateral and multilateral political dialogues such as the China-Africa Political. The two sides will strengthen exchanges and cooperation between the leadership, special committees, and bilateral friendship groups of the National People’s Congress of China and parliaments of African countries to enhance mutual understanding and friendship and promote exchanges and mutual learning in such areas as legislation. The two sides will encourage the National People’s Congress of China and the parliaments of African countries to jointly hold bilateral and multilateral seminars, strengthen human resources cooperation, and promote capacity building of legislative bodies. The National People’s Congress of China will strengthen friendly engagements with African regional parliament organizations, including the Pan-African Parliament and the African Parliamentary Union, and work closer with African parliaments in the Inter-Parliamentary Union and other multilateral institutions, so as to safeguard common interests and international fairness and justice. he two sides will deepen exchanges between the China Economic and Social Council and the AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSCOCC), economic and social councils of African countries, and other relevant institutions. The two sides recognize the important role of the African Union in safeguarding peace and stability and promoting the integration of Africa. China commends the new progress made by Africa in seeking strength through unity and notes the important results achieved in the institutional reform of the African Union. The African side appreciates China’s efforts and contributions to promoting peace, stability, and development in Africa. The two sides agree to consolidate and strengthen China’s cooperation with the African Union and its affiliated institutions and Africa’s sub-regional organizations, to continue holding the China-African Union Strategic Dialogue, and to strengthen communication and coordination between China and Africa’s sub-regional organizations so that China-Africa transnational and trans-regional cooperation will deliver more outcomes.

After Covid -19 pandemic, safeguarding the common interests of the Chinese and African people.

China and Africa are of the view that the world is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century and has entered a period of turbulence and transformation, while the COVID-19 pandemic accelerates the evolution of the international landscape. At the same time, peace, development and win-win cooperation remain the trend of our times, and countries are increasingly interconnected and interdependent. The two sides are committed to building a community with a shared future for mankind, to building an open, inclusive, clean and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security and common prosperity, to fostering a new type of international relations featuring mutual respect, fairness, justice and win-win cooperation, and to safeguarding the common interests of the Chinese and African people.

STEPS TO BE TAKEN

The two sides are committed to strengthening cooperation in the field of human rights, to jointly oppose politicization of human rights issues or interfering in others’ internal affairs as prescribed in the UN Charter, and to promoting the healthy development of the international cause of human rights. The two sides emphasize that tracing the origins of COVID-19 is a serious scientific issue that should be carried out cooperatively by scientists across the world. The two sides firmly oppose politicizing origins-tracing or using the issue as a tool to stigmatize others. The African side commends China’s active participation in global origins-tracing research, especially its close cooperation with the WHO, and welcomes the Joint Report of the WHO-convened Global Study of Origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part released by the WHO in March 2021.

Cooperation Olympic and Paralympic Winter                                                                                                                                          

The two sides are committed to promoting the sustained and sound development of the Olympic Movement, and oppose the politicization of sports. The African side supports China in hosting the Beijing 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games and is ready to strengthen cooperation and exchanges with China in the field of sports. China actively supports African countries in implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and is prepared to use the China-UN Peace and Development Trust Fund and the South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund to support African countries in pursuing sustainable development. China will stay in close communication with African countries under the frameworks of the Group of 77 plus China, the United Nations Economic and Social Council as well as the Second Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, and maintain coordination and cooperation in areas such as poverty reduction, food security, COVID response and vaccines, climate change and green development, connectivity, digital economy, industrialization, and financing for development, so as to safeguard the common interests of developing countries. Hold the multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core and foster an open world economy. They support necessary reform of the WTO and greater liberalization and facilitation of international trade and investment to better safeguard the development rights and interests of developing countries and their space for development. They call for an early resumption of normal functioning of WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and efforts to increase the authority and effectiveness of the multilateral trading system.

Economic Cooperation: Agriculture, Food Security, and Food Safety

The two sides will give full play to the China-Africa agricultural cooperation mechanism, and strengthen food security. Hold the second Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Agriculture, and convene the first meeting of the China-AU Joint Committee on Agricultural Cooperation, to innovate cooperation methods, enrich the content of cooperation, and ensure the effective implementation of agricultural cooperation in fields of shared interest. Both sides will support leveraging the various economic and trade cooperation zones in Africa to advance cooperation across the whole industrial chain of agro-products, covering planting, processing, and selling, so as to jointly enhance Africa’s capacity for localized processing of agro-products and increase the added value of agro-products. The two sides will work to improve the conditions of roads linking urban and rural areas, small water management and irrigation facilities in villages and townships, food storage and basic processing facilities, renewable energy power facilities, and small agricultural mechanization equipment in African countries.

China will actively expand the import of quality specialty agri-food products from Africa and open “green lanes” for African agricultural exports to China, speeding up the inspection and quarantine procedures. The two sides will continue to step up collaboration in building a China-Africa Incubation Center for E-commerce in Agricultural Products. The two sides will better facilitate connections between Chinese and African agricultural enterprises and smooth out the channels for agricultural trade and investment, further expand bilateral trade of quality agricultural products as well as the types and scale of investment and support the efforts of Chinese businesses to invest in and build agricultural industrial parks in Africa. The two sides will conduct cooperation on the development and utilization of Junco, hybrid rice, hybrid millet, and other technologies.

 China will send 500 agricultural experts to African countries to carry out plan-making, policy consultation, technical demonstration, on-site teaching, and capacity training. China will support the development of peasants’ schools and hold thematic skill training sessions for African rural development leaders in China, in order to support Africa to train local leaders of rural development and foster a talent pool for Africa’s agricultural and rural development. China will continue to implement the plan for cultivating African young pioneers in agricultural scientific research and set up a number of China-Africa joint centers for modern agrotechnology exchange, demonstration, and training in China.

The two sides will strengthen science and technology cooperation in areas such as sustainable agriculture, water-saving irrigation, grain loss reduction, and climate response in agriculture, and establish a China-Africa seed technology research and innovation platform and a joint research center for digital agriculture. China will invite African experts and scientific research personnel to China to receive education with academic degrees or engage in cooperative research programs and support African countries to build up capacity in agricultural production technology and quarantine inspection of agro-products, in order to support Africa to improve its composite agricultural production capacity and better manage food security challenges in the post-pandemic era. China will support market-based investment in Africa’s agricultural industry, support African countries in enhancing their capacity for independent agricultural development, and invest in grain and cash crop production projects in such forms as greenfield investment, equity participation, mergers and acquisitions, and leasing, in order to extend the scope of Chinese agricultural investment in Africa from planting to warehousing, logistics, processing, and international trade. The African side commends China for providing emergency food aid and assistance to some African countries affected by the locust plague, which reduced the food security pressure and alleviated the humanitarian crisis in these countries. China will continue to provide emergency humanitarian food assistance to African countries.

 In the area of Infrastructure Development

he persistent infrastructural gap in Africa and pledge to resolve the problem by encouraging and promoting innovative and favorable Chinese financial support in infrastructural projects in Africa over the next three years. The two sides, where applicable, will prioritize creating synergy between China-Africa infrastructural cooperation with the second Priority Action Plan of the program in Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA-PAPII) and the Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative (PICI). The two sides will step up mutually beneficial cooperation in the planning, design, construction, operation, maintenance, and good governance of infrastructure projects, in order to support African countries to continuously improve infrastructure. China will continue to contribute to Africa’s infrastructure development following the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution, shared benefits, no-harm, and harmony, and support Chinese enterprises in contributing to the improvement and development of Africa’s infrastructure with advanced equipment, technologies, standards, and services, promoting connectivity and providing innovative financing. China will undertake 10 connectivity assistance projects for Africa. The two sides will support each other in realizing the targets set for aviation market access, actively study the feasibility of concluding an agreement, and enhance cooperation in aviation market access.

Industrial Partnership and Production Capacity Cooperation

Building on the industrial promotion initiative launched in 2018, and the China-Africa industrial plan and agricultural modernization plans launched in 2015, as well as from the African side the newly launched AfCFTA, the African Union's continental ten-year plan frameworks in particular the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), Africa Mining Vision (AMV) and Accelerated industrial Development for Africa (AIDA), China reiterates its commitment to seeing inclusive growth in Africa to achieve its aspiration to become the world's third-largest economy by 2063. The two sides will take into account African countries’ disparity in natural endowments and industrial development levels, enhance production capacity cooperation in light of local realities in such fields of resource-intensive sectors (e.g., food, drink, tobacco, timber, building materials), labor-intensive sectors (e.g., textile, garment, leather, metal), technology- or capital-intensive sectors (e.g., pharmaceutical, chemical, automobile, machinery, equipment manufacturing, electronic, science, and technology), and encourage enterprises to explore extending to emerging areas such as modern services, new energy development, green manufacturing, and information and communication sectors.

Investment and Economic Cooperation

China will continue to encourage and support two-way investment. Both sides will continue to improve investment and cooperation mechanisms, strive to reduce investment barriers, and work together for the conclusion and upgrading of bilateral investment protection treaties, to deliver a more favorable investment environment for both sides. China will encourage its businesses to invest no less than 10 billion US dollars in Africa in the next three years and, in particular, expand investment in areas including manufacturing, agriculture, green economy, and digital economy. China will establish a platform for China-Africa private investment promotion and encourage Chinese businesses to invest in Africa, in the logistics and manufacturing sectors of existing and new free trade zones, industrial parks, and green industrial parks in particular, so as to help increase trade within Africa and Africa’s external trade including exports to the Chinese market and to create a large number of jobs for African youths, including women.

Trade

China supports African countries in promoting African products at such events as the China International Import Expo and the China Import and Export Fair and will provide preferential and facilitating measures where necessary. China will provide 10 billion US dollars of trade finance to support African export, and build in China a pioneering zone for in-depth China-Africa trade and economic cooperation and a China-Africa industrial park for Belt and Road cooperation. China and Africa agree to improve the competitiveness of African agricultural products and will facilitate and expedite the entry of small-scale agricultural producers into formal processing, marketing, and distribution networks.

 Both sides support developing marine-rail-combined transportation such as the “Sichuan-Europe-Africa Service”, to create new trade corridors for China-Africa international land and maritime logistics and trade, and level up two-way trade and logistics cooperation.

Customs and Market Supervision

China will strengthen communication and cooperation with African countries and the AU on competition policy, antitrust, and preventing unfair competition, and set up bilateral and multilateral dialogue mechanisms on antitrust and prevention of unfair competition, to create an open, fair, just and non-discriminatory business environment for the high-quality common develop cocoa, and wine.

Digital Economy

 and mobile internet. China is ready to share experiences with African countries on the building of smart cities. China will undertake 10 digital economy assistance projects for Africa, support the development of African digital infrastructure, and continue to hold the China-Africa Digital Cooperation Forum and the China-Africa BDS Cooperation Forum. China is ready to enhance communication and exchanges with governments of African countries and organizations like “Smart Africa”, to boost the innovative development of digital technology in Africa and China-Africa digital cooperation. The two sides will enhance cooperation in the ITU, WRC, and other international organizations, and promote coordination on personnel training, internet connectivity, and innovation center building, among others. The two sides will carry out strategic consultation on ICT policies and development, to make joint efforts to narrow down the digital gap in Africa and promote the building of an information society in Africa.

Finance explored, to support Africa’s infrastructure development, energy and resources development, agriculture, manufacturing, and the comprehensive development of the whole industrial chain of Africa.

On the basis of observing multilateral rules and procedures, China will support African countries in making even better use of resources from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, the Silk Road Fund the China-Africa special fund for development financing, and the special Loan for the Development of African SMEs, further broaden and optimize financing channels for Africa, and support the development of African SMEs through accessible and affordable loans. China will provide 10 billion US dollars in credit lines to African financial institutions and support the development of small and medium-sized African enterprises on a priority basis. The two sides acknowledge the role of the China-Africa Financial Cooperation Consortium in promoting trade, production capacity cooperation, and infrastructure development. The two sides encourage deeper cooperation between financial institutions, investment funds and multilateral financial institutions from bot and investment.

Social Development Cooperation

China for its long-standing commitment to development cooperation with Africa in the spirit of equality, mutual trust, mutual benefits, solidarity and mutual support, and provision of assistance to African countries and people to the best of its abilities without any political strings attached. Guided by the vision of a community with a shared future for mankind, China will continue to uphold justice while pursuing shared interests, increase assistance to African countries, LDCs in particular, and support African countries in achieving development benefiting their peoples with sustainable prosperity abt incurred in the form of interest-free government loans due by the end of 2021 for the least developed countries.

Medical Care and Public Health

China appreciates Africa’s support in various forms for China’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The African side commends China for taking the lead to provide Africa with anti-COVID-19 supplies and vaccines, starting ahead of schedule the construction of the Africa CDC headquarters, and sending medical expert teams to share experience in fighting the disease.

The two sides will continue to strengthen health exchanges at various levels, and carry out regular policy dialogues and technological exchanges on health, so as to build a China-Africa community of health for all. Both sides will continue to hold the Ministerial Forum on China-Africa Health Cooperation through bilateral and multilateral channels, including the Africa Vaccine Acquisition Task Team (AVATT) over the next three years and support African countries to improve their vaccine production, storage, and delivery capacities. China will provide another one billion doses of vaccines to Africa, including 600 million doses as donations and 400 million doses to be provided through completing the construction of the Africa CDC headquarters, undertaking 10 medical and health assistance projects for African countries, and speeding up the building of China-Africa Friendship Hospitals. China supports African hospitals in developing specialized departments, cultivating more health professionals, improving hospital facilities, and carrying out all-around academic and technical exchanges and cooperation in the areas of medical teaching and research. China supports African countries in improving health services and hospilateral collaboration, sharing best practices, and support to identified priority programs. China will help Africa reduce the maternal and infant mortality rates, improve the survival and health of pregnant and postnatal women and newborns, and support African countries in meeting the UN SDGs at an early date.

China will use the Belt and Road Demonstration and Training Platform on Health Cooperation to share its best practices and appropriate technologies in such areas as maternal and infant health, public health, hospital management, and screening exams through online and offline exchanges and training, so as to support African countries to enhance the service capacity of their health systems, make basic health services more accessible, and promote the realization of full health coverage of the African people.4.2.9 The two sides will enhance cooperation on drug supervision, support Africa’s efforts to improve its public health testing capabilities, and encourage Chinese enterprises to cooperate with African countries in such areas as COVID-19 testing and setting up testing centers.    

The African side highly commends Luban Workshops and other vocational training programs launched by China in Africa and appreciates China’s support in such areas as materials and equipment, technical guidance, teaching workforce, and personnel training. The two sides will expand cooperation in such areas as employment, vocational training, and social security, implement the “Future of Africa” China-Africa Vocational Education Cooperation Plan, start an “Employment Through Train” scheme for African students in China, and hold a China-Africa Education Ministers’ Forum. China will continue to provide short-term seminars and training opportunities to African countries, continue to work with African countries to set up “Luban Workshops”, and encourage and support the efforts of Chinese enterprises to carry out vocational training in African countries. China will encourage Chinese companies in Africa to offer at least 800, setting up a China-Africa joint R&D center or lab for road engineering. China and Africa will foster new projects on capacity building in poverty reduction, rural revitalization, lCT, fintech, digital economy, e-commerce, cloud computing, big data, and cyberspace security in order to leverage relevant impact on the high potential growth of these sectors in Africa, with a special emphasis on women’s participation. Phase III of the UNESCO-China Funds-in-Trust has been successfully launched and made notable achievements. The two sides will continue to implement the project and will consider extending it for another 4 years (2023-2026).

Cooperation and Exchanges on Poverty Reduction and Rural Development

The African side highly commends China’s historic achievements in eliminating absolute poverty. China will work with Africa to actively build a poverty reduction and development partner alliance and rally the extensive participation of Chinese and African businesses, social organizations, research institutes, and other parties in China-Africa cooperation on poverty reduction and rural development. The two sides will work to gradually establish multi-tiered dialogue mechanisms for poverty reduction and rural development between the two governments and societies. China will continue to support the poverty reduction and rural development efforts of Africa to help deliver a better and happier life to African people. China will undertake 10 poverty reduction and agricultural assistance projects for Africa, encourage Chinese institutions and companies to build in Africa demonstration villages for China-Africa cooperation on agricultural development and poverty reduction, support the Alliance of Chinese Companies in Africa for Corporate Social Responsibilities in launching the initiative of “a Hundred Companies in a Thousand Villages” and actively carry out poverty alleviation cooperation for public benefit. China will continue to organize activities such as the China-Africa Poverty Reduction and Development Conference and the China-Africa Youth Exchange Program on Poverty Reduction and Development and will continue to organize workshops on policies on poverty reduction and rural development tailored to the needs of African countries.

Science and Technology Cooperation and Knowledge Sharing

The two sides will enhance synergy between strategies and policies on scientific and technological innovation, jointly implement the Belt and Road Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation Action Plan and the China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership Program 2.0, promote cooperation on technology-supported poverty reduction, and fully leverage scientific and technological innovation to underpin and guide the sustainable economic and social development of China and Africa. The two sides will jointly build a multi-tiered system for scientific, technological, and people-to-people exchanges. China welcomes the participation of African scientific professionals in the “International Outstanding Young Scientists Exchange Program” and the “Innovative Talent Exchange Project”. China will carry out the “Africa Young Scientists in China” Program and provide African countries with training on readily applicable technology and science management. The two sides acknowledge that nuclear technologies play an important role in economic and social development. China will continue to leverage the Chinese Government Atomic Energy Scholarship Program and existing cooperation platforms between the two sides to continue to deepen mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Africa in such areas as nuclear science research, nuclear personnel training, nuclear technology application, and nuclear power project development, and jointly tackle challenges including climate change, energy supply, food security, health, and protection of water resources.

 Cyber Security Cooperation

The African side shares the vision of a community with a shared future in cyberspace put forward by China and supports the Initiative on Jointly Building a Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace. Africa takes due note of and will further positively consider the Global Initiative on Data Security launched by China. We stand ready to build on this Initiative to advance the formulation of global digital governance rules and call on the international community to jointly build a peaceful, secure, open, cooperative, and orderly cyberspace and a community with a shared future in cyberspace. The two sides are fully aware of the strategic impact of data as a key factor in economic and social development, and encourage businesses to cooperate in such areas as the development and utilization of data security products, data governance, and personal privacy protection. Businesses are required to respect local laws and not use their products or services to illegally obtain user data. Both sides oppose using information technology to carry out large-scale surveillance against other countries. China will work with African countries in the spirit of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits to promote data security.

Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges

China will continue to advance tourism cooperation with Africa and will support making all African countries having diplomatic ties with China as approved destinations for Chinese tourist groups to contribute to the revitalization of Africa’s tourism industry. Africa supports China’s participation in the international tourism exhibitions organized by Africa. China welcomes more African countries to participate in large international tourism exhibitions such as the China International Travel Mart and will hold seminars on China-Africa tourism cooperation, with a view to building platforms for experience sharing, product promotion, and business negotiations. China will increasingly spotlight Africa in Chinese media. China will carry out the China-African Culture and Tourism Training Cooperation Plan in both online and offline formats, continue to advance human resources training for Africa, and assist Africa in. The two sides are committed to advancing China-Africa cultural exchanges and mutual learning, with a view to contributing to equal-footed dialogue among civilizations, cultural diversity in the world, and peace and development of mankind. Both sides encourage and support dialogues on culture and thinking between the two sides and will promote exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and African research institutes.

The two sides will actively promote exchanges and cooperation in the field of press and publication, and continue to strengthen publication cooperation in the areas of education, agriculture, culture, ecology, health care, children’s books, and on other related themes. Through the co-production of programs and mutual visits of media personnel, both sides will actively introduce development and changes in the economic, cultural, social, and other fields in China and Africa, so as to promote mutual understanding and enhance the bond between the people. China will continue to strengthen exchanges of film and TV programs, hold African film festivals in China and Chinese film festivals in Africa, and support introducing more African film and TV programs into China. The two sides believe that the upgraded China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Plan has effectively strengthened cooperation and exchanges between Chinese and African scholars and think tanks, and provided strong academic support to China-Africa cooperation. China will further increase support to help African universities and think tanks hold seminars and carry out research projects, continue to implement the China-Africa University 20+20 Cooperation Plan and the China-Africa Think Tank 10+10 Partnership Plan, and strengthen joint research and exchanges between Chinese and African think tanks.

  Sub-national and People-to-People Exchanges

China will encourage sub-national and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to utilize existing resources and strengths, taking into account the circumstances of different fields, countries, and projects, actively participate in practical cooperation with Africa, gradually achieve the diversification of cooperation models, and further enhance the comprehensive effect of practical cooperation with Africa. The two sides value the positive role of the China-Africa People’s Forum in enhancing people-to-people exchanges, the friendship between the two peoples, and cooperation concerning people’s livelihood, and encourage and support more practical exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and African NGOs on people’s well-being. China welcomes African Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to join the Silk Road NGO Cooperation Network and the Silk Road Community Building Initiative, step up people-to-people exchanges and livelihood cooperation, and contribute to stronger people-to-people connectivity between China and Africa under the Belt and Road Initiative. The two sides will strengthen exchanges and cooperation in gender equality and women empowerment, and encourage and support high-level woman’s dialogue, seminars, capacity building, and exchanges among women entrepreneurs. The two sides will continue to deepen practical cooperation in women-related issues between China and Africa, carry out a batch of small-sized material assistance and skills training programs in this field, support women to emerge from the impact of COVID-19, and jointly promote the well-rounded development of women and girls. China will continue to enhance exchanges and cooperation with Africa in the area of people with disabilities, and jointly conduct practical cooperation programs in such areas as rehabilitation, education, and employment.

6. Peace and Security Cooperation

China and Africa underscore that peace and security in Africa remain an important part of their cooperation, and the two sides will continue to strengthen the implementation of the China-Africa peace and security plan; support the building of the African Peace and Security Architecture, the African Standby Force as well as bolster Africa's capacity to rapidly respond to crises. The two sides will lay emphasis on defense military capabilities, actively conduct exchanges and cooperation in such fields as military education, military training, military medicine, logistics support, and maritime security, and hold exchanges and dialogues on military medicine. ln the spirit of the outcomes of the "China-Africa Dialogue on Peace and Security" held in Addis-Ababa in February 2019, both sides will continue to hold the "China Africa Forum on Peace and Security" to strengthen exchanges in Peace and security issues. While continuing the training of African defense officers in China, the two sides will discuss the possibility of designing training sessions in Africa. The two sides will enhance communication and coordination at the UN Security Council, and step-up mutual support for the implementation of the "Silencing the Guns " to eradicate conflict in Africa and support the Africa Peace and Security Framework.

Anti-corruption, Consular Affairs, Immigration, and Judiciary

The two sides will step up anti-corruption cooperation, make full use of the UN Convention against Corruption and other existing international legal instruments for cooperation on a case-by-case basis in fugitive’s repatriation and asset recovery, and will be more flexible in such cooperation within the extent of domestic laws. The two sides will continue to exchange high-level visits between competent anti-corruption authorities, strengthen exchanges and cooperation in judicial, law enforcement, and legislative areas, improve cooperation mechanisms for extradition, legal assistance, and asset recovery, and accelerate the signing of extradition treaties, treaties on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and other relevant agreements. The two sides will continue to improve the mechanism of the FOCAC Law-based Governance Forum and increase its influence and efficacy. China will strengthen legal exchanges and coordination with regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa. The two sides will hold the Conference on Legal Risks and Countermeasures of International Investment and Trade, promote the establishment of a legal research platform for African laws, and increase support for the exchange program of legal personnel between China and Africa. The two sides will continue to improve the China-Africa joint arbitration mechanism, and promote the development of the China-Africa Joint Arbitration Center and enhance its international influence.

 Green Development

The two sides are both committed to establishing and improving an economic system for green, low-carbon, and circular development, actively participating in global environmental governance, and jointly tackling climate change. The two sides will continue to strengthen exchanges and cooperation on ecological protection, maritime cooperation, desertification prevention and treatment, and the protection of wildlife. The two sides will support tapping into the role of the China-Africa Environmental Cooperation Center, and advance environmental cooperation through, among others, more policy exchanges and dialogue, closer exchanges and cooperation on environmental industry and technological information, and joint research on environmental issues. China will establish a China-Africa marine science and blue economy cooperation center. China will undertake 10 green development, environmental protection and climate action assistance projects for Africa, and support the development of the Great Green Wall.

Maritime Cooperation

The two sides recognize the enormous potential of maritime economic cooperation and will continue to jointly promote mutually beneficial cooperation in this field. China will continue to provide funding and technical support under the framework of technical cooperation of the International Maritime Organization, and support African countries to train shipping professionals and strengthen capacity-building to promote the sustainable development of maritime shipping. 

Cooperation on Energy and Natural Resources

China will work with Africa to enhance practical cooperation in the energy sector under the framework of the China-African Union Energy Partnership, jointly improve the level of electrification in Africa, increase the share of clean energy, address step by step the issue of energy access, and promote sustainable energy development of both sides. China has announced that it will not build new coal-fired power projects abroad, will step up support for other developing countries including African countries in developing green and low-carbon energy, and encourage Chinese businesses to conduct cooperation with African countries in the areas of clean energy and renewable energy.

China will support Africa in improving the structure of its energy and resources industrial chain, improving its capacity to process energy and resources products, increasing the added value of products, and upgrading its energy and resources industrial chain toward greener development. The two sides will closely align their development plans in such fields as sustainable use of energy and resources, improving land and space spanning, and innovation in geoscience, and improving their ability to develop and manage their own energy and resources systems.

Experience Sharing on State Governance

Political parties in China and Africa will share with each other party-building experience through exchanges and dialogue in various forms and at various levels. The National People’s Congress of China and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference will enhance experience sharing on state governance with, among others, parliaments of African countries, the Pan-African Parliament, and the African Parliamentary Union.

FOCAC Institutional Development

The two sides are satisfied to see the efficient and smooth operation of the Coordinator’s Meeting on the Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the 2018 FOCAC Beijing Summit, the Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs), and consultations between the Chinese Follow-up Committee of FOCAC and the African diplomatic corps in China since the FOCAC Beijing Summit. In accordance with the procedures of the FOCAC follow-up mechanism, the two sides decide to hold the 9th Ministerial Conference in the People’s Republic of China in 2024 and, before that, the 16th and 17th SOMs respectively in 2023 and 2024.

THE RESPONSE TO DEBT DISTRESS IN AFRICA AND THE ROLE OF CHINA

The economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have undermined the ability of many African nations to service their sovereign debts. At present, 22 low-income African countries are either already in debt distress or at high risk of debt distress. Chinese lenders account for 12 percent of Africa’s private and public external debt, which increased more than fivefold to $696 billion from 2000 to 2020. China is a major creditor of many African nations, but its lending has fallen in recent years and is set to remain at lower levels. This situation is likely to worsen over 2023, limiting the ability of African nations to raise the necessary finance to deliver broader social improvements for their populations and respond to climate change. China did not cause African debt distress in most cases, but it is key to finding a solution. Despite growing political and economic tensions, China and the West have a strong mutual interest in cooperating with each other, and with African nations and institutions, to tackle the challenge of debt distress. 

China became a major creditor of many African nations from the start of the century to 2016. But since then, the scale of its lending has decreased – with the volume of new Chinese loans to African governments dropping from a peak of $28.4 billion in 2016 to $8.2 billion in 2019, and falling again to just $1.9 billion in 2020 (although the latter reflects the exceptional circumstances of the pandemic). While China’s future state-backed lending is set to remain at lower levels, it is likely to be better coordinated among Chinese lending institutions and has a greater emphasis on debt sustainability. The nature and purpose of China’s past lending to African nations have varied considerably, both between countries and over time, including oil-backed lending, more conventional infrastructure loans, and financing linked to strategic political relationships. China’s domestic economic needs, rather than foreign policy or military objectives, were for the most part the driver of this activity. African actors have also played, and continue to play, an important role in shaping the nature of this financing.

The economic fallout, including a sharp rise in interest rates, from the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, has undermined the ability of many African nations, such as Djibouti, to service their sovereign debts. Twenty-two low-income African countries are either already in debt distress or at high risk of debt distress. The overall situation is likely to worsen over 2023 and limit the ability of many African nations to raise the necessary finance both to deliver broader social improvements for their populations and respond to climate change.

Africa’s total external debt increased more than fivefold between 2000 and 2020 to $696 billion – of which Chinese lenders accounted for 12 percent. China did not cause African debt distress in most cases, but it is key to finding a solution. While China remains wary of the Western dominance of international financial institutions (IFIs), it has cautiously come to see some benefits of multilateral cooperation with Western governments and IFIs in handling debt distress. Despite growing political and economic tensions, China and the West have a strong mutual interest in cooperating with each other and with African nations and institutions, such as the African Union, to tackle the challenge of African debt distress. Attempts to tackle debt distress in Africa urgently need to be separated from the broader geostrategic competition. This paper recommends a three-part plan to be taken forward initially by the G7 under the Japanese presidency in 2023, but which ultimately needs to be embedded in the G20. The aim should be to establish a dialogue on Africa’s long-term investment needs, formulate an understanding between the West and China, and end the blockages in the current multilateral framework for dealing with debt distress.

China-US Competition Seems to be Working for Africa 

 If the tension and broadening gap, is the best golden chance for the African Government enables to proactively leverage for their own benefit, African leaders will need to keep working to reap the full benefits. The historic U.S.-Africa Summit Leaders Session on partnering on the African Union’s Agenda 2063 in Washington, D.C., on December 15, 2022. U.S. President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken participate in the summit. As expected, the above U.S.-Africa Summit instructed all officials directed not to mention one word: China. In response to journalists’ questions about U.S. plans to counter the influence of China in the African continent, officials quickly rebuffed these ideas and – in our view rightly – emphasized Africa’s own importance in the world as driving Washington’s Africa+1 Summit. Indeed, after an eight-year-wide gap, the Biden administration’s U.S.-Africa Summit marked a drift point in the US foreign policy regarding Africa.  Three areas stand out: clear and significant financial commitments; the promise to support African diplomatic interests at the United Nations and G-20; and the references and MOUs signed related to African development frameworks and flagship projects such as the African Continental Free Trade Area. These were all major new achievements compared to Barack Obama’s 2014 U.S.-Africa Summit.

Furthermore, although stopping short of a clear timetable for future summits, the 2022 Summit included some follow-up plans. President Joe Biden announced that his first multi-country visit to Africa will occur in 2023, and Johnnie Carson – former U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs in Obama’s administration – will be appointed as a special representative to implement ideas discussed at the Summit. 

 In the period of geopolitical competition with China – and to some degree Russia exerted forced the US to pay more attention to Africa’s developmental needs, this Summit can certainly be categorized as a boon for African people. But, the intricate fragmentation of the U.S. governance system – where presidential pronouncements can often have little sway in actual policymaking and foreign investment decisions – its true impact will not be known for several years. Empirically the experience in supporting African engagement with China – there was still a great deal left unsaid, which needs to be unpicked by African leaders and policymakers to ensure a real, positive impact. The three areas of achievement all suffer from this challenge.

First, the U.S. commitment of $55 billion over the next three years to Africa surpasses China’s $40 billion commitment to Africa during the 2021 FOCAC 8 Conference and Russia’s $12.5 billion promise in deals in the first Russia-Africa Summit in 2019. Possibly, to be included different types of finance, and this is where the nuance matters. For example, unlike China and Russia, the US is likely to have included its contributions to the World Bank and IMF as a major shareholder within this $55 billion – yet many African countries retain concerns about the effectiveness of these institutions, especially their track record of delivering and enabling key African needs such as infrastructure and industrialization. The U.S. commitment is also likely to be at least 50 percent FDI – China’s FDI was just a quarter of its total commitment – with most of the rest (an announced $20 billion) going to health and food programs through so-called “global funds” the U.S. either administers itself or has a major shareholding in, not necessarily African institutions such as the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Yet, there is evidence that global funds need reform, for example, to avoid undercutting the local production of medicines. On the other hand, China included in its $40 billion commitment to channel $10 billion of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to the African continent as well as another $10 billion directly to African financial institutions. It is unclear whether the US pledged $55 billion including a projected SDR reallocation. Without an explicit mention, it seems improbable that most African organizations will benefit from U.S. finance.

Second, diplomatically, the United States agreed to support the African Union’s permanent inclusion in the G-20 and to have one permanent seat for Africa at the U.N. Security Council for the first time. The change was welcome but also had lacks fully effective. In fact, China had already announced its support for a “G-21” in August 2022. As Development Reimagined’s CEO has argued, AU membership in the G-20, analogous to EU membership, should not be framed as an act of benevolence. It recognizes Africa’s current and future economic sway, and unique perspectives that can help the rest of the G-20 do better. Furthermore, the African Union’s Ezulwini Consensus clearly highlights what “full representation” of Africa in the Security Council means: Two permanent seats with veto power, in addition to five non-permanent seats. Commitments to half-hearted reform may well create more problems than solutions. Third, the United States MoU with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat – and statements by the U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai that her agency will help Africa modify IP waiver regulations at the WTO and assist the continent to produce its own vaccines – were certainly positive examples for other G-7 members to follow. However, in reality, the commitments may be too one-sided.

For instance, the MOU doesn’t include any reference to making progress on increasing Africa’s access to U.S. markets through alignment with the United States’ existing trade program, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Only 1.3 percent of the United States imports in 2021 came from Africa. Indeed, as mentioned in Development Reimagined’s U.S.-Africa policy brief, an ideal outcome of the summit would have been a commitment from the U.S. to review AGOA and all bilateral free trade areas (FTAs) between the U.S. and African countries under discussion to be aligned with AfCFTA and Agenda 2063.

Similarly, the MOU does not include references to IP protection for African products in the U.S. – an area that has caused challenges in the past, between large American firms and countries such as Ethiopia. And while the MOU centers on “doing business” and the latest buzzword, “de-risking” reforms, to create enabling environments for American businesses to profit across the African continent, there is no reference to other critical African frameworks such as the Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA) plan and the African Mining Vision (AMV).

A large proportion of U.S. FDI into Africa is still focusing on 30 percent between 2016 and 2020. U.S. FDI in African manufacturing was only 9 percent in 2020. The fact is, as, with China and other development partners, the type and quality of U.S. finance need to improve. It’s not just a question of dollars spent. In sum, despite the groundbreaking announcements and statements that the United States is committed to a “modernized partnership” with Africa, partly as a result of geopolitical competition with China, there are still some major gaps that Africans should be aware of and seek to address. Indeed, for Africa, China is certainly a partner that has to date deftly used Africa+1 summits to prove itself significantly more willing to listen to Africa’s developmental needs compared to the United States and other G-7 countries. Yet the African experience with China also demonstrates that every relationship takes work. Having heard nice words from Washington, African leaders cannot now sit on their hands and hope for magic.

Conclusion

During the period of Covid 19 pandemic, and near on the verge of food due to Russia bellicose against Ukraine created a total disturbance of mobility and threat to get food from Ukraine as usual, they panicked. this tension between US and China is a good chance to benefit the country.

We pray to give some hope to their citizens as no one wishes them to remain hungry and abject poverty.