A Moment of Reckoning for South Africa Arrives

Framing any analysis of South Africa currently is tough.

The events of the past few weeks require constant review and evaluation since the crisis gripping the country remains a moving target. 

The fires still rage, the bodies are still being found and the shortages, prejudices and misery cased linger menacingly over the country

Indeed, it is a crisis – and don’t let any eternal optimist tell you otherwise.

By now, we have all witnessed in graphic real-time the physical destruction in key economic nodes and the ever-increasing and accompanying body-count. 

It is not inconceivable that the eventual economic loss to the country from this last week of both criminal and politically-inspired looting could be well in excess of R70 billion, according to Economist Mike Schussler.

Add to this well over 100 deaths and counting, tens of thousands of job losses and the misery of possible food and critical supply shortages. And, these figures do not take into account a further drop in GDP as a result of social unrest triggering investor flight and fright.

Today’s looting simply results in tomorrow’s recession.

This is simply devastating for a country already in a deep financial and health (Covid) crisis alongside a dismal political performance from the governing party, many of its leaders and an incapable state. 

Getting to this sad juncture in our recent history should come as no surprise. Analysts, academics, social commentators and political leaders (in Opposition) have been sounding the alarm bells for years. 

For many in both government and the business sector – the depressing mantra of poor policy formulation and implementation resulting in rising poverty, inequality, unemployment and sheer hopelessness is perhaps too negative to deal with. It gets in the way of securing contracts or personal and patronage-fuelled self-enrichment. It’s filed in a mental out-tray while the statistical evidence mounts in each successive quarter decorating our financial press but doing little else to address a mushrooming crisis. 

But equally, our collective failure to act against a political leadership so compromised in both integrity and efficiency has left us all exposed to a near-future of rising insecurity – both physically and financially. 

A weak State has been unable to exercise authority or provide a moral compass over many years. It has coalesced with and legitimised malfeasance to large swathes of the populace. And from a leadership perspective, the Executive (Cabinet) faced virtually no renewal as party loyalties and the appeasement of factions held in place a Ministerial core often deficient in their roles.

For years, the conflation of Party and State in South Africa have made us all prisoners to the internal state of the ANC. And, the failure to cement a truly competitive democracy in South Africa has resulted in many of us vilifying the Opposition rather than strengthening the electoral options that can threaten and hold to account an ill-performing incumbent government. 

We have allowed our political elites to damage the State with appeasement and blind loyalty. We have rewarded those that repeatedly hurt us.

The old Afrikaans adage alles sal regkom (everything will be alright) seems to be the antidote. But, alles sal nie regkom (everything will not be alright) unless the citizenry does something about it.

If you don’t heed the signs in front of you, it comes home to haunt you.

The seriousness of the crisis state we now find ourselves in is a crisis of the ANC’s making. Bearing the brunt of this is Cyril Ramaphosa who – for better or for worse - has to attempt to retain both credibility and authority as he attempts to limit any further damage and steer the country away from veering towards being a 'failed state'.

But, the damage is done.

In the months to come, South Africa will be owed a full investigation into the events of this week. At the time of writing, there are too many unknowns to make a definitive statement on the underlying causes for the destabilisation witnessed. Still, there are a number of rising issues to develop and interrogate.

• The disruption of the decade-long Jacob Zuma-based patronage and state-capture networks - following the ascent to power of Cyril Ramaphosa - has seriously destabilised the ANC.

• The criminal investigations of Jacob Zuma, ANC Secretary General, Ace Magashule and other Gupta-linked personalities have raised the political stakes internally to a point where the destablisation of the Ramaphosa Presidency may be seen as revenge, retribution or even an attempt at a revolution (insurrection). It was always evident that inherent dangers occur when a reform process threatens embedded interests.

• It is entirely possible that rogue elements within the state security apparatus loyal to Zuma faction would seek to mobilise pliable groups – some ethnically and regionally based, some quasi-militia and some plain criminal – to force the hand of the broader ANC to pardon the charged Jacob Zuma and even intimidate the courts into a reversal of their earlier decision to incarcerate the former President.

• The failure – or deliberate absence – of the intelligence services to adequately warn of pending violence played into the destablisation scenario. A deep state within the state was waiting for an opportunity to potentially orchestrate such a manoeuvre. An investigation into the attacks on such a strategic economic corridor, cell-phone masts and a water-treatment plant suggests strategic and sophisticated sabotage at play.

• The high poverty levels and economic pain being felt by tens of thousands of South Africa – exacerbated by the Covid lockdown – provided a combustible backdrop (wittingly or unwittingly) for political exploitation leading to mass looting and an attempt at ungovernability. A contributory factor is a macro misaligned ANC economic policy that has failed to produce jobs over more than a decade instead squandering resources and confidence via ideologically moribund dictats.

• A woefully inadequate (or reluctant) response by public order policing has laid bare the glaring failure of the broader security cluster and has been a severe embarrassment to Ramaphosa himself. And, at the time of writing, the limited deployment of the SANDF and the reluctance to engage looters directly under their noses remains inexplicable unless the ghosts of Marikana – and that disastrous outcome - continue to haunt the President.

• Beyond the failure of security, the communications abilities within the Office of the Presidency have been a failure. The public addresses have been poor, missing the mark and failed to land a credible message epitomised by concurrent looting.

• The President has also been embarrassed by the performance of the few members of the Executive that have appeared in public. Largely devoid of a cohesive or convincing message, they have scrambled – often incoherently - to justify their response despite glaring visuals of carnage underway completely undeterred.

• Ultimately, even if a semblance of order can be restored, the damage will have been done to both the credibility and authority of the Ramaphosa Presidency – in terms of its Constitutionally-mandated role to protect both lives and property. If these events indeed represent a deliberate and orchestrated plan, it will have succeeded in that objective even though the fate of Jacob Zuma in the short-term and that of Cyril Ramaphosa in the medium term remains unknown.

All these issues require thorough and independent dissection. But the broader political malaise – amplified by the economic – points to the deficiencies of the political state. To that end, this last week is perhaps the saddest wake-up call the country had had in decades. 

If this is the ‘last hurrah’ of the Zuma era playing itself out in one last stand, that might go some way to a resolution. But the endemic decline across governance and failure to provide growth policies sets the scene for more to come. 

If you don’t create jobs and growth while providing affordable safety nets and the example of transparent and ethical governance, the political weaknesses of a state battling with failure are ripe for exploitation by competing factions. 

This time it might’ve been Zuma that lit the fuse, next time it will be something else. 

For the ANC, this is a moment of reckoning. The appeasement of populists and demagogues – both inside and outside the party – will lead to continued disaster and its potential collapse. For South Africans, it’s time to reappraise electoral allegiances to send the governing party a strong message. But more broadly, it’s time for all South Africans – from business to labour to religious groups to NGO’s to raise their voices in a common, united and forceful call for change. 

The appeasement of decline has to end.

Daniel Silke is a Political-Economy Analyst and Keynote Speaker based in Cape Town. Follow him on Twitter @DanielSilke and view his website at www.danielsilkeglobal.com.