Today in History: Operation Hailstone (1944)
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs
An international forum aimed at forging Indo-Pacific policy, strategy, and partnerships.
Introduction
Operation Hailstone was a large-scale air and surface attack conducted by the United States Navy against Truk Lagoon on 17-18 February 1944. The Japanese Imperial Navy had used Truk as an anchorage for its large Combined Fleet, which included fortifications such as shore batteries, antiaircraft guns, and airfields. Truk's location in the Caroline Islands made it an excellent shipping hub for armaments and aircraft. Prior to Hailstone, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had to relocate the Combined Fleet's forward base due to the Allied offensive campaign against them. The operation caught a good number of Japanese ships and destroyed about 250 warplanes. As a result, the Japanese Navy had to relocate the Combined Fleet's forward base, and Truk remained effectively isolated for the remainder of the war. The American island-hopping campaign in the Central Pacific bypassed important Japanese garrisons and airfields in the Bismarck Archipelago, the Caroline Islands, the Marshalls, and Palau. The attack on Truk forced the Japanese to abandon it as a forward operating base, and it served as an important step in the Central Pacific Campaign.
Background
The Japanese occupied Micronesia, including the Caroline Islands, in 1914, and established Truk as a base as early as 1939. The base was used to provide anchorage for warships and port facilities for shipping between the home islands and the Southern Resources Area. The development of Truk began in earnest, and in hurried fashion, only in late 1943, with the extension of airfields, erection of shore batteries, and other defensive measures taken against a US invasion.
US Perception of Truk's Defenses
Despite the US perception of Truk as a heavily fortified base, the Japanese did not significantly reinforce or protect the base against land attacks. The US military expected that Truk was defended by a large number of aircraft and a significant ground force. However, the Japanese had begun withdrawing fleet units from its anchorages as early as October 1943. The effective abandonment of Truk as a forward operating base accelerated during the first week of February 1944, following Japanese sightings of US Marine Corps PB4Y-1 Liberator reconnaissance planes sent to reconnoiter the area.
Air Raids on Truk
Because aircraft stationed at Truk could potentially interfere with the upcoming invasion of Eniwetok, and because Truk had recently served as a ferry point for the resupply of aircraft to Rabaul, Admiral Raymond Spruance ordered Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force, designated TF 58, to conduct air raids against Truk.
On 17 February 1944, three carrier task groups moved into position and began launching their first fighter sweep, and the US carrier aircraft achieved total surprise due to the lack of active Japanese air patrol and the inability of Truk's radar to detect low-flying planes. This surprise attack led to a one-sided victory, with US Navy fighter pilots in their Grumman F6F Hellcats achieving significant success against the outdated Mitsubishi A6M Zero planes flown by the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service (IJNAS) pilots.
Following this initial attack, torpedo bomber and dive bomber squadrons from the carrier air groups were responsible for inflicting the bulk of the damage on Japanese ground facilities. The US carrier aircraft dropped fragmentation and incendiary bombs on runways at Eten Island and the seaplane base on Moen Island, resulting in the destruction of dozens of aircraft. Subsequent joint attacks by dive bombers and Avenger torpedo bombers further damaged runways and destroyed hangar facilities. In addition to attacking ground targets, the US carrier aircraft also targeted Japanese ships, with multiple air groups attacking those ships able to make for open sea steamed for the North Pass exit from the lagoon while weathering repeated aerial attacks.
One group of warships that received special attention from carrier bombers consisted of the cruiser Katori, auxiliary cruiser Akagi Maru, destroyers Maikaze and Nowaki, and minesweeper Shonan Maru. Multiple air groups attacked these ships, inflicting serious damage. Reports of the group of warships fleeing through North Pass reached Admiral Spruance, who ordered his carrier air groups to stop attacking Katori and her companions. He then put himself in tactical command of Task Group 50.9, which included four destroyers, heavy cruisers Minneapolis and New Orleans, and the new battleships Iowa and New Jersey. This group engaged in a surface engagement against the previously damaged Japanese ships. The US Navy surface combatants incurred virtually no damage, and it was the only time in their careers that Iowa and New Jersey had fired their main armament at enemy ships.
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Conclusion
The Battle of Truk Lagoon, also known as Operation Hailstone, was a significant victory for the United States in the Pacific Theater of World War II. The surprise attack on Truk, a major Japanese naval base, resulted in the destruction of numerous ships, aircraft, and ground facilities, as well as the deaths of many Japanese soldiers and sailors. The US Navy's successful use of carrier-based aircraft, supported by submarines and surface ships, demonstrated the effectiveness of combined arms operations and set the stage for further Allied advances in the Pacific. The Battle of Truk Lagoon remains a testament to the bravery and skill of American military personnel and a symbol of the sacrifices made to ensure victory in World War II.
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