Trump's "Prosper Africa" reboot as a solution to DRC and Rwanda's M23 Problem...

The on-again-off-again conflict in DRC involving M23 Rebels and possibly Rwanda is difficult to discern, particularly because of the complex interplay of political, ethnic, and economic factors; but mineral resources (cobalt and coltan) and the redistribution of wealth is certainly at its core. Absent a meaningful agreement and strict control around extraction, refining, and redistribution the ongoing conflict will only continue. The extraction of cobalt/coltan in DRC/Rwanda either by rebel groups who've manage to wrangle control from legitimate government entities, as was reported in Kalembe, or by government bodies themselves, only serves to finance the perpetuation of these conflicts, and also hinders broader efforts toward regional stability and ethical international trade.

Rwanda's alleged support for M23 is partly attributed to its interest in accessing and profiting from these mineral resources. Historically, Rwanda has been implicated in the smuggling of coltan from DRC, labeling it as Rwandan to evade international scrutiny. This, and various other means of illicit trade undermines efforts to establish transparent and conflict-free mineral supply chains. Concerns about conflict minerals have been documented since the early 2000s and have been the subject of legislative and regulatory action elsewhere, as well as broader international attention and guidance. Internationally, the presence of conflict minerals in supply chains poses ethical and legal challenges for U.S. companies. Despite regulations like the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires companies to disclose the use of conflict minerals, enforcement remains challenging. The resurgence of violence and corruption in the region has rendered some traceability efforts ineffective, leading to the contamination of global supply chains with conflict-tainted minerals. The problem becomes increasingly a U.S. business problem as these resources, whether categorized as "conflict minerals" or not, enter the larger supply chains of U.S. dominated industries.

Addressing this issue (as well as the conflict itself) will certainly require a multifaceted approach, including enforcing stricter traceability measures, promoting transparent mining practices, and fostering diplomatic solutions to the underlying political tensions. Can a tailored and targeted geo-economic U.S. policy--as I outlined in President Trump 2.0: What about Africa? in this space help? The answer may just be yes. but it is also most certainly may be no.

The “Prosper Africa” strategy anchored by the 2018 Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act and the newly established Development Finance Corporation (DFC) is therefore well positioned.... However, the American private sector--the key leverage point for the Build Act unfortunately is not. American companies hold a relatively small market share in the DRC's mining industry and thus have very limited foothold in the extractive policy and supply-chain. The sector is dominated by companies from China, Canada, and Europe. Chinese firms in particular, have made substantial investments in the DRC, securing significant control over the country's cobalt and copper production.

Despite this there may be some creative ways to create and integrate U.S. businesses and technologies within and around the extraction, servicing, transporting, refining, and manufacturing of these minerals--one that benefits both U.S. businesses and African partners. Figuring this out will take major political will, the deployment of diplomatic and private resources. So more thought on a multifaceted economic solution, one that include government backed private sector investment, diplomatic protections, enhanced security arrangements and social protections are worthwhile. There are also pitfalls associated with a hard press in DRC, including reputational risk and the potential for entanglement in an environment already fraught with human rights abuses, corruptions, and rampant illicit activity.

Will there be sufficient political-will and risk-tolerance for DRC in 2025?...

The answer is: Likely not, especially given the state of geopolitics and rising tensions around the world. The pressures on the international system, as far a resources and time, will likely only shrink in the near term and thus it will be increasingly up to the regional actors, namely DRC, Rwanda, and M23 Rebels to resolve this conflict internally, notwithstanding all the other systemically problematic aspects of the cobalt/coltan mining industry. .