Abstract
This work presents two implementation attacks against cryptographic algorithms. Based on these two presented attacks, this thesis shows that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone. Hence, cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all implementation attacks, have they already been realized or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is understood.
About the author
Dr. Juliane Krämer studied Mathematics, Economy, and Computer Science at the Technische Universität (TU) Berlin. She received her PhD from TU Berlin in 2015, where she conducted research on implementation attacks under the supervision of Prof. Jean-Pierre Seifert. Her PhD thesis was nominated for the GI-Dissertationspreis 2015 and for the CAST/GI Promotionspreis IT-Sicherheit 2015/2016. She is now a postdoctoral researcher at TU Darmstadt, working in the group of Prof. Johannes Buchmann on post-quantum cryptography. Juliane Krämer is one of the GI Junior Fellows of Gesellschaft für Informatik (German Computer Science Society).
Technische Universität Darmstadt, Fachbereich Informatik, 64289 Darmstadt, Germany
©2016 Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
