Signs of Preliminary Accords Emerge in Gaza and Lebanon

Information I have been made privy to carries a glimmer of optimism amid the prevailing pessimism surrounding Israel's brutal war on Gaza and the potential expansion of the Israeli conflict into Lebanon. Firstly, this information suggests that the Americans and Europeans have conveyed willingness on Israel's part to engage in a diplomatic solution in Lebanon based on the idea of separating its northern front from the war Gaza, driven by public pressure demanding a resolution to the displacement of 140,000 Israeli from the north and uncertainty about Hezbollah's advanced missile arsenal. Secondly, negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza have not been disrupted by the massacre at Nabulsi roundabout. Hamas has only threatened to halt the negotiations if such incidents are repeated, while maintaining its commitment to delivering its final draft on the ceasefire in the Strip. Meanwhile, U.S. diplomacy is enaging with Arab counterparts to ensure security guarantees and a roadmap with clear timelines for a gradual transition to Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza and the West Bank, provided that discussions would start gradually after that about the future and form of a Palestinian state.

On the Lebanese front, according to reliable sources, the upcoming week will witness shuttle visits by President Joe Biden's envoy, Amos Hochstein, to Lebanon and Israel as soon as a temporary ceasefire in Gaza appears assured. Hochstein brings with him a plan and a roadmap for implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701 with a clear mechanism leading to the institutionalization of the Blue Line that separates Lebanon from Israel; and an international agreement on its interpretation after resolving the seven disputed border points and addressing the remaining six points.

Hochstein begins his mission from the principle of sparing Lebanon and Israel a devastating war, with the hope of reaching a formula for the stability of southern Lebanon and northern Israel, backed by U.S. guarantees. The essence of his proposals lies in Hezbollah's agreement to withdraw from southern Lebanon to the north of the Litani River within a range of 7 to 10 kilometres. Then approximately 10,000 members of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will then take over the administration of that area. In return, Israel pledges to halt violations of Lebanese sovereignty—be it by sea, land, or air—and to cease air sorties in Lebanese airspace.

According to the same sources, Hochstein has potential solutions for the six disputed points. As for Shebaa Farms and the hills of Kfar Shuba, they will be in a second phase of negotiations conducted by the 'Tripartite Committee,' comprising Lebanon, Israel, and the United Nations.

We are talking here not about 'peace' but rather 'stability.' Currently, there's no project for a peace treaty or normalization between Lebanon and Israel. There's a reconsideration of the cost of the potential major war between Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon—a cost affecting not only Lebanon but also Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran with its missiles planted in Lebanese territories.

Any full-scale Israeli war on Lebanon undoubtedly means an Israeli-Iranian proxy war through Hezbollah, even if at the expense of the Lebanese people. Iran's investment in Hezbollah's arsenal is a blatant violation of Lebanese sovereignty—an investment Tehran is unwilling to relinquish at present. It's part of the larger bilateral negotiations with the United States, which Tehran considers of utmost importance. Furthermore, Iran is not ready for an Iranian-Israeli war regardless of the motive or trigger.

The commonly circulated formulas for addressing the Lebanese-Israeli border issue rely on a win-win equation if war is avoided, according to an official who asked not to be named; and a lose-lose scenario for Israel and Hezbollah-Iran if war breaks out. These are face-saving formulas. While Hezbollah isn't enthusiastic about withdrawing north of the Litani River, it may need to reposition itself if Amos Hochstein's efforts succeed, and secure the required assurances from Israel and indirectly from Iran.

The U.S. administration is making every effort to address Israeli obstinacy—or rather, Israeli arrogance towards its demands. It's seeking to garner support from all players in the Middle East—the Arab Gulf states, Iran, and Turkey—to ensure its presidential election campaign is not marred by the Israeli war on Gaza or a potential one on Lebanon. It needs a peaceful approach, not an impossible peace agreement at this stage. The discussion is about temporary arrangements and stability, not a comprehensive settlement.

On the Palestinian front, the talk isn't about a final resolution but about preliminary understandings and arrangements. The starting point is U.S. and regional guarantees for Israel's security, on the condition that Israel stops settlement construction and acknowledges the principle of a Palestinian state and Palestinian rights, leading to peace down the road.

What Israel is demanding is a commitment from the United States not to support the establishment of a Palestinian state if it includes Hamas. Israel insists on an unequivocal rejection of the establishment of a Palestinian state unless it receives U.S. assurances of not recognizing a Palestinian state that includes Hamas elements.

Negotiations continue behind closed doors, involving talks with Egypt and Qatar regarding the future of Hamas and ensuring there is no military presence of Hamas in Gaza. Negotiations with Jordan and Egypt are also underway for a real transition to Palestinian sovereignty over both Gaza and the West Bank, with discussions on the Palestinian state to be held in a subsequent international conference. Discussions focus on three stages: cessation of hostilities in tandem with Israel building a separation barrier; an actual transfer of authority to the Palestinian Authority in Gaza following the formation of a technocratic government; and the convening of an international conference that adopts a clear timeline. Notably, both Oslo and Camp David deliberately lacked a timeline - a critical oversight.

The new situation echoes old sentiments and hopes for a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This conflict has evolved in recent years, almost reducing down into a Palestinian-Israeli dispute, accompanied by Iranian claims of being the custodian of the Palestinian cause after the perceived "abandonment" by the Arab nations. This is according to Iran's strategic marketing and justification for creating, financing, and arming militias and armies under its command in four Arab countries: Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

Iranian one-upmanship today is not military in nature but rather conciliatory after Tehran prioritized its bilateral relations with the Biden administration. Iran shirked any responsibility for the "calculated adventures" of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, on October 7, and the subsequent Israeli retaliation targeting civilians and destroying infrastructure in Gaza in search of Hamas leadership in the tunnels.

The new-old dynamic involves a return to the language of "process" in the quest for a grand settlement, a term entrenched for decades in the expression "peace process" in the Middle East. Initially, many were inclined to believe that the significant events on October 7 might pave the way for the "Grand Bargain," transitioning the Middle East towards the desired peace. However, this enthusiasm waned due to Israel's unprecedented obstinacy towards the United States and the clear rejection by the Israeli public opinion and government of the "two-state solution."

Reports remains conflicting, mirroring the fluidity of events on the ground. Definitively predicting the fate of the Israeli war on Gaza or Lebanon, which Israel is still baiting into war, remains challenging. Meanwhile, Hezbollah, following Iran's decision, is navigating the waters between its allegiance to Tehran and its strategic interests – The organization is weighing the cost of war on its military infrastructure more heavily than the calculations of destruction for all of Lebanon.

Reports suggest that U.S. efforts persist, not only to dissuade Israel from executing the military operation it prepared against Lebanon, to destroy Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal and threats even if it turns Lebanon into another Gaza; but also, to secure preliminary understandings in the Palestinian issue. These understandings aim to halt the bloodshed in Gaza and cease Israeli operations against Palestinians in the West Bank, in exchange for American and Arab guarantees.

No one currently is discussing a "grand bargain", a "permanent settlement" or an opportunity for a qualitative leap in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as was the case immediately after Hamas October 7 attack. These attacks are seen as heroic by the majority of Arabs and as intolerable terrorism by the West. Rather, tThe language today leans towards "containment" and initiating a "process" that does not necessarily lead to the establishment of the Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with its capital in East Jerusalem, a discourse that now belongs to what stood before October 7.

The language post-October 7 in Western capitals begins with agreeing with Israel to end the military presence of the Hamas movement in Gaza, building the separation barrier, ensuring Israel's security, rejecting the continuation of Israeli military operations in Rafah, and opposing Israeli control of Gaza while insisting on Palestinian administration of the territory. Israel is required to halt settlement construction and settle for acknowledging the principle of the establishment of a Palestinian state in some form and vision, although not the previously envisioned Palestinian state.