Where do Hamas and Hezbollah Sit in Iran's New Regional and International Positioning?

It is too early to talk about the restructuring of the Middle East and permanent solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Indeed, this phase is still about formulating agreements and transitional arrangements based on the dealings of and lessons learned by the Israeli government, Hamas, and Iran and its proxies. What can be said now is, firstly, that there is a serious opportunity for de-escalation and provisional solutions, against the possibility of uncalculated escalation resulting from blunders or machinations of actors outside the circle of major players. Secondly, Israel will not regain any prestige or military, political, or moral strength it once claimed to have until it radically and seriously reinvents itself: It will never be secure again until it realizes that it must reach a solution with the Palestinians; or face a repetition of what happened on October 7th. Thirdly, despite Hamas’s euphoria with its unexpected ‘success’ and its ability to shatter Israel's military prestige, it has emerged from this confrontation weaker and in need of rescue, amid allegations it uses civilians for its authoritarian purposes and its Iranian and Israeli calculations. Fourthly, the painful Gaza war may hold the key to a new regional-international deal and coexistence, not only between Arabs and Israelis but also between Iran and Israel through security and deconfliction mechanisms. Fifthly, the main players who will be developing a "sustainable peace" plan, as stated by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in the next chapter are the United States primarily and essential Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, which have the tools to pressure Israel if it genuinely seeks peace with the Arabs, not just normalization in its previous form. 

It has long been said that a "grand bargain" traditionally results from a major event that changes the equation. October 7th indeed changed the equation because it revealed structural weaknesses in the Israeli military and intelligence establishment. Then, Israel's retaliatory actions against Palestinian civilians in Gaza, in violation of international law and humanitarian law, changed the global perception of Israel and triggered protests and condemnations against it. This came despite initial regional and international sympathy with Israel following Hamas’s actions and the condemnation of its massacre against Israeli civilians. 

Hamas will not be part of any grand bargain. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will not be part of the grand bargain or any new regional security system either. Both have removed themselves from the equation, even though both are part of "the event" that could precipitate the grand bargain. Both have previously served each other’s interests in an accomplice-like relationship that emerged since the rise of Hamas as a challenge to the Fatah movement and the Palestinian Authority, with Israeli blessing. Today, both Netanyahu and Hamas are weaker, and both are obstacles to achieving a "lasting peace". However, at this transitional phase, they are necessary to complete a prisoner and hostage exchange deal. Therefore, they will be able to buy time until further notice. 

But a necessary distinction exists between the fate of Benjamin Netanyahu and the fate of Hamas, although they are both difficult to eliminate from the current equation. The Israeli people - and the United States - will decide the fate of Netanyahu. As for Hamas, its fate is in the hands of Iran not the Palestinian people. 

Iran has pocketed a number of gains because it imposed itself as a player in the October 7th event without bearing responsibility for it. It managed to play the Hamas card without burning its own hands, and the Hezbollah card without incurring more than "limited" losses, represented by the killing of over 50 Hezbollah members in clashes between the Shia party and Israel so far within their so-called "rules of engagement." 

Hezbollah and Hamas are now figuring out how to sustain their old positions in the new Iranian context. In other words, both realize that Iran is a party to behind-the-scenes talks, primarily with the United States and with the regional countries with a view to establish a new security system in which Tehran has a strong voice. 

These are major issues among states, not among movements and parties subordinate to states. Hezbollah and Hamas are contemplating how to renew their future and their tactics, in order to keep themselves viable in the new regional-strategic situation, within the context of the grand bargain. 

Iran is the winner, but Hezbollah and Hamas are not losers in the sense that their days are over. Iran does not want to dispense away with either of them. Rather, it opposes the elimination of Hamas and will prevent such scenario using its own means. As for Hezbollah, it remains an essential tool in Iran's strategy as well as in its new positioning. Thus, Hezbollah remains highly significant, and Iran is eager to ensure it continues to operate according to the pattern it desires. 

The Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, has masterfully navigated between war and warning, making it seem as if he holds the initiative. The party has paid a price with the death of its fighters, after it entered a war with Israel but still within the boundaries of the rules of engagement, based on consultations and instructions from Tehran, and not in coordination with the Lebanese government. In fact, Hezbollah violated the sovereignty of the state, undermined the security of Lebanese citizens, and put it at the mercy of Hassan Nasrallah's agenda and timing, between his calculated absences and appearances, which frayed people's nerves. 

Worse still, Hezbollah opened the Lebanese-Israeli border to Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and various other Palestinian armed factions in the name of unifying the fronts of resistance, in a complete violation of not only sovereignty but also the will of the Lebanese people, who refuse to be dragged into the "resistance" war to serve as a bargaining chip. 

If Hassan Nasrallah is indeed seeking to revitalize his party in light of Iran's move towards a new regional security system that safeguards its interests, now is the time to present his party as a Lebanese political entity first and foremost. The regional peace is not ready to accommodate it as an armed entity serving the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Instead, it is time for Hezbollah to reconsider its position. 

This is the time for the leadership of Hezbollah to consider the Lebanese popular base, which rejects the idea of hosting Hamas leaders and its military wing in Lebanon, especially as the Palestinian refugee camps have turned into armed camps. 

Israel is negotiating with Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and other countries regarding hosting Hamas leaders, whose continued presence in Gaza, Israel now rejects. These are sovereign states that decide the boundaries of the presence of Hamas leaders on their territories. As for Lebanon, it lacks state sovereignty, and Hezbollah is the one determining the boundaries of sovereignty and the presence of Palestinian leaders and armed factions on its soil. 

It is not enough for the Secretary-General of Hezbollah to respond to the Lebanese people's wishes and entreaties to him not to drag Lebanon into a destructive war that would lead to its demise, and to refrain from declaring war on Israel. What the situation and the geopolitical landscape demand is for Hezbollah's leadership to redefine its position in the Lebanese internal scene, in line with the people's demands, allowing the party to have a role in the country's political future. They must also scrutinize Hezbollah’s usefulness for Iran in the upcoming regional landscape where there could no longer be a need for the party if states agree on a new regional security system. 

Hamas has chosen the path to save itself through concessions over the path of self-destruction. Before Hassan Nasrallah's speech on Friday, Hamas had moved towards a compromise, expressing its willingness to accept less than its previous demand of Israel releasing all Hamas prisoners. It informed intermediaries that it is ready to agree to Israel releasing half of the prisoners in exchange for the hostages it is holding. In return, it requested a ceasefire, and for Israel to halt its military operation and political suppression of the movement, which had been successful despite its high human cost. 

The timing of Hamas's efforts to save itself by showing flexibility sends a signal to Hezbollah to reduce the escalation. At the time of writing, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah has not yet delivered his anticipated speech despite a media campaign focusing on teasing shots of his threatening finger and his ring finger. It was not clear whether he would threaten war but refrain from announcing the expansion of the war, in line with Hamas's need to save its skin or with Iran's instructions, especially on the eve of the arrival of the U.S. Secretary of State in the region. 

Iran is securing its place at the table for the restructuring of the Middle East, both in terms of security and politics. Iran acknowledges that there is no place for Hezbollah or Hamas in major negotiations for permanent solutions. Blinken hinted at having a project for lasting peace, but his trip now is focusing on transitional arrangements, particularly those related to the release of hostages, even if it involves accepting compromises sought by Hamas. This, in addition to restraining Israel from destroying the civilian infrastructure in Gaza with actions that can be documented as war crimes, similar to the crimes committed by Hamas. 

What Blinken also aims to do is envisioning the post-Gaza war scenario – who will govern it in the absence of Hamas? Is it possible to place it under temporary international-Arab administration until a clear roadmap for a lasting peace emerges? 

Hamas has been an obstacle to the two-state solution, which Israel also rejected and obstructed. If the Biden administration succeeds in pushing post-Netanyahu and post-October 7 Israel to finally accept a two-state Solution, in one way or another, it will be able to pave the way for a historic breakthrough in the Middle East and achieve a lasting peace with most Arab countries, with minor exceptions. Moreover, Iran might surprise everyone by participating in the grand bargain that secures its interests in exchange for renouncing its commitment to destroying the "Zionist entity." 

All of this may seem premature today, and developments, whether intentional or unintentional, may shatter any notion of lasting peace. However, practical indicators and political pressures suggest that Arab countries involved in normalizing relations with Israel are willing to assist the Biden administration in finding the necessary formula for this peace. Iran might not be too far from the dynamics of the "grand bargain." It all depends on the determination of the United States to convince Israel that the time has indeed come to choose lasting peace. Otherwise, more October surprises will continue to haunt Israel and, thus, bring about more self-destruction.