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Israel-Hamas war: West Bank raid won't derail cease-fire
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week from Davos on World In :60.
Does the Israeli undercover hospital raid in West Bank destroy any chance of a ceasefire with Hamas?I mean what? The fact that you have undercover IDF forces going after people they believe are terrorists in a hospital? I don't see that as more significant in any way than the war that's been going on in Gaza. The issue is that in the West Bank, but there's been a lot of fighting in the West Bank, knocking a lot of news. No, no, no. The big point here is that the Israelis are under more pressure and are willing to accept a more challenging ceasefire deal than they were a couple of weeks ago, both in terms of of how long that cease fire would go on and also what they're negotiating for the number of hostages and what they have to give up in return. It looks like they are getting pretty close, but once again, would have to be approved by the Knesset and Hamas has to say yes. And that has been more challenging than getting the Israelis to the table, at least in the last couple of weeks.Why is it more concerning when TikTok shares US data than when US tech companies do?
Well, I mean, one is the presumption and I think it's a reasonable presumption that if TikTok has your data, the Chinese government will have access to that data. And a lot of Americans are understandably uncomfortable with a foreign government that engages in espionage against the US, having access to citizens’ data as opposed to, say, the US government, which of course, occasionally does so as well. But you are a citizen. You do have those rights, and in principle you're more aligned with it. But you know, also the fact that the Chinese government does not allow Western social media firms, the Meta and the Google surveillance capitalism to operate fully in China. And that means that the Chinese are not having access to American major companies. Some of the biggest drivers of wealth that the United States has. So why would the Americans allow the Chinese to do that in the US? At the very least, you'd want a level playing field, and that means for both sides.
What are the wider consequences of West Africa's “Brexit” moment?
Well, what we're talking about here is that the West African “EU”, which is nothing like the EU, ECOWAS, and it's kind of like an economic and political bloc, but it's not super functional and it's really, really divided. But nonetheless, the three countries in Africa that have recently had military coups and therefore have zero legitimacy of their governments. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have all decided to leave ECOWAS. And you know who's on the ground in those countries? Who has any influence other than the military? It's Russia. And, you know, given that Russia's other friends are North Korea and Iran, that is, generally speaking, not a great thing for West Africa and more broadly.
- Ian Bremmer: Understanding the Israel-Hamas war ›
- Israel-Hamas War: The race to avert escalation in the Middle East ›
- Why the Israel-Hamas war is so divisive ›
- Israel, Hamas, and Hezbollah: Fears of escalation grow ›
- Iran’s leaders are asking for trouble ›
- Israel-Hamas war: Who is responsible for Gaza's enormous civilian death toll? - GZERO Media ›
Pakistan-Iran attacks: Another Middle East conflict heats up
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week from Davos on World In :60.
How was White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s statement on a two state solution received in Davos?
Well, I mean, people like the idea of a two-state solution. They have absolutely no idea how to get there. And even if you say you could link it to Saudi normalization with Israel, by the way, the Israelis still want, and behind the scenes the Saudis still want. You still have to find a way to govern Palestine, both Gaza and the West Bank. And we are very, very far, I should say Israel is very, very far from having that as a possibility. So are the Palestinians.
Could the attacks between Pakistan and Iran ignite into a bigger conflict?
Yes, it absolutely could, but has almost nothing to do with Gaza. It was that ISIS attack in Iran that the Iranians are responding to. This is about domestic security, domestic concerns. That's why they hit Pakistan. That's why Pakistan hit them back. But no question, this is a tinderbox. The Middle East, it's very dry and we've got a lot of sparks. And I expect that this conflict is only going to escalate further.
Finally, what should we expect from the Ukraine peace summit to be held in Geneva?
Well, not very much, because the Russians won't participate. And President Putin has absolutely no incentive to give anything. The reason he's talking about diplomacy right now is because he's hoping to shake a few Europeans free and say, yeah, yeah, you should talk. You should sit down with them. It's making it easier to create a wedge inside Europe, especially once Trump gets the Republican nomination, who is clearly on that side. But we are very, very far from peace. In fact, we've got the Ukrainians right now on the back foot and deeply, deeply dissatisfied with it.
Peace in Ukraine is world's priority, says UN chief António Guterres
As the 78th annual UN General Assembly week gets underway in New York—bringing diplomats, ministers, and heads of state together— there is a growing divide in the international community over Ukraine. In the US we’ve heard rumblings from GOP candidates about decreasing or stopping aid, and the once favorable opinion among Americans for continued support has dropped.
Leaders from the Global South, such as President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, are calling for a shift in focus away from Europe to getting international development back on track, to talking about debt relief and increasing access to financing. They want to see real progress on the much-vaunted “Sustainable Development Goals” that member nations have vowed to accomplish by 2030. What they don’t want to do is to spend the entire week talking about a distant European war.
But, as UN Secretary-General António Guterres tells Ian Bremmer in an exclusive interview for GZERO World, ending the war in Ukraine is the top priority. “The single most important thing is to have peace in Ukraine," Guterres tells Ian. "The war in Ukraine is a complicating factor of everything else, so the first thing that we need is to stop that war.”
Watch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld or on US public television. Check local listings.
- Podcast: UN Secretary-General António Guterres explains why peace in Ukraine is his top priority ›
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- António Guterres: Ukraine war united NATO, but further divided the world ›
- An interview with UN Secretary-General António Guterres ›
- UN chief: We must avoid the mistakes that led to World War I - GZERO Media ›
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Russia-Ukraine War: Is a diplomatic solution possible?
It sounds almost naive to ask the question, but here it goes: can diplomacy end the war in Ukraine?
No one expects Putin to start playing ball, but might there be a way out of a war where there appears to be no end to the bloodletting and combat? Marie Yovanovitch, former US Ambassador to Ukraine, believes diplomacy must continue until the last vestige of hope is gone. Still, she doesn't think we should treat Russia with kid gloves while holding Ukraine's feet to the fire.
We must avoid a situation, Yovanovitch says, "where there's an agreement where the international community keeps on looking at Ukraine to do its part, but, you know, too hard to make Russia do its part, and so we don't pressure the Russians."
Yovanovitch joins Ian Bremmer for a wide-ranging interview about the state of Ukraine's counteroffensive and the war at large in the latest episode of GZERO World.
Watch this episode: Ukraine's counteroffensive on the brink
And watch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld and on US public television. Check local listings.
Ukraine's counteroffensive on the brink
In the year and a half since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it has felt like the momentum has consistently been with Ukraine and its Western backers. But is that beginning to change? Months into the long-awaited Ukrainian counteroffensive, Kyiv has little to show for its military push. So why hasn't it been more effective?
While it looks like Ukraine’s military has recently launched a major thrust towards the south towards the Sea of Azov, the tide of war has yet to meaningfully change. So why haven’t the Ukrainians managed to do more, and to do it faster? And if a military resolution to the conflict isn’t coming any time soon, could a diplomatic solution be back on the table? Ian Bremmer addresses these questions with former US ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch on GZERO World.
The two discuss a range of topics, from the state of the counteroffensive to whether a diplomatic resolution to the war is still possible. They also look back at Yevgeny Prigozhin's failed--or aborted, or curtailed--coup. Yovanovitch, for one, doesn't think that story is over by a long shot.
Watch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld or on US public television. Check local listings.
- Ukraine ups the ante ›
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- What We're Watching: Africa got grain, Ukraine counteroffensive, CCP save the date ›
- Ukraine’s counteroffensive: Prospects for success, unity, and peace ›
- Why Ukraine's strategy is "stretch, starve, strike" - GZERO Media ›
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Saudi-led peace talks on Ukraine
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here. A Quick Take to kick off your week hot summer week.
And the Saudis are saying that they are going to host a broad peace conference on Ukraine this weekend. Lots to unpack here. First of all, the Ukrainians are going. It looks like the Americans are sending Jake Sullivan, the national security advisor. He's been back and forth to the kingdom a fair bit of late. And the Ukrainians are saying that these talks will be on the basis of the ten-point peace plan that they rolled out last year. Nothing particularly earth-shattering about that plan. Not a surprise they'd be okay with it. It is the Russians returning all the land.It is war reparations being paid by Russia. It is war crimes being fully investigated, prosecuted. None of which is acceptable to the Kremlin. But if the Saudis are hosting it, the Ukrainians are part of it, and everyone is invited - the Chinese, the Indians, the Brazilians, the Europeans, but not the Russians. And what we seem to see is that the Russians haven't had communications directly with the Saudis on this, and instead you have the Kremlin spokesperson saying they're studying it. You know, they're of course, they want to be constructive. That's the official position. So we're going to see where this is going. It's pretty interesting.
I mean, on the first point, the United States is consistent with its public policy that there are no Ukraine negotiations without the Ukrainians in the lead, can't talk about any of this unless it is the Ukrainian plan.So that's basically the starting point for the weekend. Hard to imagine that that is all that is said coming out of the talks. In other words, very interesting to see, if not that the Ukrainians should be expected to negotiate against themselves, but rather in the context of their present counter-offensive. Do they say anything about Crimea and the fact that that can be staged, even though they're never going to say, “No, it's just your territory, Russia, you can take it.”Might there be willingness to say that the reparations that need to be paid can be paid by anybody doesn't have to come from Russia. So if the Europeans are providing the aid to reconstruct Ukraine, as long as the aid comes, I mean, I can see things that can come out of this weekend that would be constructive and that could be multilateral with full Ukrainian engagement. That in no way makes it feel that the Ukrainians are giving up the store or look weak or under massive international pressure. So that's the first important point here.
The second is that the Saudis, of course, have had a fantastic year, maybe the best trajectory in terms of governance on the international stage of any of the G-20, which is kind of shocking if you think about, you know, where they've been over the last few years. Massive popularity for Mohammed bin Salman among every young person, say, under 40 in the kingdom, most of the world happily engaging the Gulf Cooperation Council, much more consolidated with the Saudis than it had been over the past years. Yes, there have been some tensions with the UAE, but nothing like what we've seen with Qatar recently. I mean, Al Saud reaching out to Syria and getting them reengage the peace plan. China facilitated it with the Iranians and Saudi Arabia, strong relations between the Saudis and Netanyahu, maybe joining the Abraham Accords by the end of this year. And now the Saudis taking the lead on the most substantive to date, it looks like, high-level Ukrainian talks. So that's also worth watching.
But I think the biggest point here is that the West has had a big problem outside of NATO with the Global South because so far, the policy has basically been support the war to allow the Ukrainians to defend themselves, to get their territory back, but not having much credible to say on what eventual peace talks would look like. And if you're in the Global South, you know, you want to know who's trying to end this war, because this war is not in our interests and we know it, we of course, we believe in Ukrainian territorial integrity, but we'd really like to see food and fertilizer just like get back to the global marketplace and stop having, you know, all of this on our shoulders. And we have no interest in sanctions against Russia. Well, we're trying to do business with these people, as we always have. So the fact that we would now have the ability for the West working with at least some of the Global South in talking about negotiation puts a lot more pressure on Russia and improves the diplomatic position of NATO as a whole. And the timing is kind of critical here because, yes, the counteroffensive is now truly engaged in earnest probably for the next month or two.
But, you know, you want to be in a position to start negotiations when the West is strong and consolidated and when Ukraine is fully aligned with it, at least publicly. And that's probably going to be less true in, say, six-month time as the US political cycle plays out and there's more internal fighting over how much economic and humanitarian support Ukraine is going to get as the Europeans start seeing more opposition as that occurs. Right now it's mostly Hungary that can get railroaded by the other European Union states, but soon it may well end up being Czechia. I could see Italy potentially in that basket, you know, Slovakia, other countries, because the fiscal constraints are going to grow. And if the Americans aren't providing as much economic support, it's going to be harder for some of the Europeans, too. So you definitely want a position where you're talking about what negotiations could look like and either get the Russians involved, or isolate the Russians. But either way, a better position to be in, then you're only talking about war, and the war is getting less support even among your own population. So in that regard, what the Saudis are doing here seems very smart to me. I'm not at all surprised the Americans and Ukrainians are fully engaged. They've clearly been coordinating with them closely over the past weeks. And we will watch this weekend very carefully to see where it goes.
That's it for me. And I'll talk to you all real soon.
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Ukraine’s counteroffensive: Prospects for success, unity, and peace
I haven’t written about the war in Ukraine in a while, largely because not much has changed since my last dispatch on the subject 10 weeks ago. But now that we’re seeing signs that the start of the long-awaited Ukrainian counteroffensive is nearing, it’s time for me to tell you how I think it’s going to go and what it’ll mean for the trajectory of the war.
I’m modestly optimistic about Ukraine’s odds. In part, this is because of how all-in the US and its NATO allies are on Kyiv’s success, having provided everything short of fighter jets and boots on the ground. And in part, it’s because of how patient the Ukrainians have proven to be in building up new units and incorporating Western weapons and ammunition – and how competently they’ve defended against Russia’s failed winter offensive.
I expect that Ukraine will be able to recapture a sizeable amount of land, especially in the south, but will fail to break the land bridge between Russia and Crimea and threaten Russian control of the peninsula. Russia, which has about 350,000 troops dug in heavily armed defensive positions across the front lines and especially in the Zaporizhzhia region, will suffer significant losses but maintain overall cohesion. Having spent the last several months building up significant defensive capabilities in anticipation of a Ukrainian advance against the land bridge, they won’t get routed.
Rather than react with a major escalation of the war, such as by using tactical nukes in Ukraine, Russia’s response to the limited losses will be closer to business-as-usual (aka brutal but not existentially so).
Ukraine’s Western partners will see this outcome of limited gains and minimal escalation as a win, ensuring that political and military support for Kyiv will remain robust through 2024 despite growing Republican resistance and European war weariness.
Diplomatic efforts to bring about a truce will fall flat, as Ukrainian gains will dampen Kyiv’s already minimal desire to compromise and Russian losses won’t be large enough to force Moscow to the negotiating table. That includes the peace push by Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who last week spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the first time since the war began and offered economic support for Ukraine’s reconstruction in exchange for a ceasefire (for more on Xi’s role as peace broker, watch my latest QuickTake).
In this “goldilocks” scenario – my base case – Ukraine’s counteroffensive will yield just enough gains to maintain strong Western political and military support while minimizing the risk of major Russian escalation.
But of course, this isn’t the only possible scenario. In fact, there are two other ways this could go that I see as plausible (if less so).
The next most likely scenario is that Ukraine’s counteroffensive makes too little progress, failing to retake meaningful swathes of land and leaving the front lines roughly unchanged. This could happen if Ukrainian forces prove unable to execute combined arms operations effectively, fail to adjust to the multiple new weapons systems they’ve received from NATO, or run out of ammunition before they’ve managed to overcome well dug-in Russian defensive lines.
Disappointment with Ukraine’s counteroffensive and the prospect of a prolonged stalemate would lead Western and especially American political support for Kyiv to start to falter. With US presidential elections around the corner and a more than even chance that Donald Trump is the Republican nominee, Congress would start openly questioning the end goal of US involvement in Ukraine. Military aid would be scaled back, and calls for negotiations from many Republicans and most Europeans would get louder.
At this point, Xi’s recent peace offer will start to look more attractive – not so much to the Ukrainians, who’ll remain extremely reluctant to make concessions, but certainly to significant pieces of the Western coalition. Under pressure from their allies, Kyiv and Moscow may or may not reluctantly agree to talk. But what’s certain is that the gap between the Russian and Ukrainian positions will remain unbridgeable, keeping a durable peace out of reach.
Less likely but still plausible is the possibility that the counteroffensive makes more dramatic progress, and Ukraine manages to cut off the land bridge and threaten Russia’s hold of Crimea. As I said, this is quite a long shot but not inconceivable. If the new Western armored infantry vehicles, artillery, and rocket systems allow the Ukrainians to break Russian defenses around Tokmak, they could potentially advance relatively quickly toward Melitopol.
Moscow would respond to this massive strategic loss by significantly escalating destructive asymmetric attacks against NATO states, possibly with cyber and physical sabotage of US and European critical infrastructure. While many analysts believe Crimea is a “red line” for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who in their view would consider using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine in response, I find it very unlikely that he’d doom his regime and risk mutually assured destruction over the peninsula.
What Russia might do in this scenario, however, is request direct military assistance from its “friend without limits,” China. Yet China has thus far shown very little willingness to back up its “friendship” with Russia with anything more than words. It’s likely Xi would only heed Putin’s request if Russia was on the verge of “losing” the war, to prevent a Russian collapse and the instability that would ensue. And even then, the bar for direct lethal aid is very high, as Xi knows it would trigger US sanctions on Beijing, threaten China’s relationship with its second-largest trading partner (Europe), tarnish its standing with the Global South, and dramatically escalate the US-China confrontation.
Whether or not China decides to enter the fray, there’d be no path for peace talks in this scenario. The Russians would be extremely reluctant to negotiate from a position of such weakness, while the Ukrainians would want to try to seize even more land before sitting down with someone they consider a war criminal.
In fact, the biggest “hope” (if you can call it that) for a ceasefire sooner than later lies with a fourth, most remote scenario in which the counteroffensive not only fails, but Russia makes meaningful gains of its own.
Should Russia successfully repel Ukraine’s attacks and capture significant new territory in the Donbas or elsewhere, fear of further losses could push Zelensky toward diplomacy. Both sides would have an incentive to de-escalate, but talks would have little chance of achieving a lasting – let alone just – peace given the fundamentally irreconcilable differences between the Russian and Ukrainian positions.
Notably, to the extent that we’re likely to see any negotiations (however futile) between the Russians and the Ukrainians under any scenario, it’s the Chinese rather than the Americans or the Europeans who’ll be best positioned to broker them.
While a long-term, sustainable settlement is probably many, many years away, Xi’s unique leverage over Putin gives him the best chance of anyone to give it a shot. Coming on the back of the Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement recently brokered by Beijing and China’s offer to mediate Israel/Palestine talks last week, even an unsuccessful peace push will bolster Xi’s narrative that China is ready to take on a constructive role as a diplomatic superpower capable of challenging the US for global influence.- Ukrainian offensive tests Russian defenses - GZERO Media ›
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- Podcast: Is Ukraine's counteroffensive failing, or is the tide about to turn? - GZERO Media ›
- Why Ukraine's strategy is "stretch, starve, strike" - GZERO Media ›
- Ukraine's counteroffensive on the brink - GZERO Media ›
Xi plays peace broker
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take from Los Angeles of all places, but I want to talk about the latest, with the war in Ukraine.
We have seen a little bit more fighting over the last week, the Ukrainians facing more bombing against its civilians and unfortunately significant numbers dead, including children. And the Ukrainians with a drone attack against an energy and oil depot in Crimea with some pretty big explosions and damage to infrastructure presently held illegally by the Russians. In between all that, the big news of the week was Xi Jinping, President of China, finally belatedly, but importantly reaching out directly to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. They spoke for an hour. It was, and be sure this was planned on the anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, and coming out of it, the Chinese telling Zelenskyy that they would very much support doing a lot to directly provide economic support for reconstruction, but in return, they want to see a ceasefire: in other words, ending this war as soon as possible.
Now, Ukraine is not going to accept that. They have a demand of a peace plan, 10 points that they've put together, which includes getting all of their land back and having the Russian president and others tried as war criminals and having war reparations paid by Russia to Ukraine, none of which is going to be negotiated by Putin. Plus, there is a counter-offensive that the Ukrainian government, one of the most telegraphed counter-offensives, probably in history, preparing to launch with significant support from the United States and NATO on the ground really any day now, and they're hoping to get more of their territory back. It's very unlikely they'll be able to break the land bridge between Russia and Crimea, which would be the biggest strategic loss that plausibly the Russians could face soon. It is likely that they will be able to take some territory back from the Russians who have about 350,000 troops dug in defensive positions over the course of the next few months, and then that's probably about the extent of how much the territory is likely to move in the coming six to 12 months.
And that means with the American presidential elections coming up with a reasonable likelihood that Trump gets the GOP nomination and much less supportive of the Ukrainians, and with many of the Europeans in particular, the French, but also the German, the Italians, the Spaniards, and others, much more interested in starting negotiations. That's why the Chinese offer starts to look interesting because at this point, Xi Jinping may not have the support of Ukraine, but he may have the support of significant pieces of the Western coalition.
Xi Jinping also is the most important global leader that can speak at length directly to Zelensky and Putin. The Americans and NATO members can't do that. They all think that Russia is run by a war criminal. Erdoğan is the one exception though he's in bad health right now, and he might not be president for much longer in Turkey with elections that are looking very dicey. It's also going to face an enormous amount of backlash either way, given how close that election is going to be run. Then you've got the Secretary-General, the UN, my good friend António Guterres, who has working relations with both leaders, but not nearly as strong as the Chinese president does.
So given all of that, suddenly Xi Jinping looks to be in a position where the diplomacy around Ukraine in say four months, six months, nine months time of the world, seems more aligned with him than it does with the Americans, and that's exactly why he decided to announce what he did. That's why he decided to make that call. Is it going to work? It's hard to see. I mean, the space between the Ukrainians and the Russians continues to be very large indeed, but to the extent that there's likely to be any negotiations reopening between the Russians and the Ukrainians, not at the head of state level, but at some working level, high diplomatic level, the Chinese are likely to play much of a role.
In this regard, what Xi Jinping did on the back of the negotiation breakthrough that they've had with Iran and Saudi Arabia as well as their foreign minister a week ago, reaching out to both the Israeli and Palestinian foreign ministers and saying, hey, we can be an honest broker in a way that the Americans for whom Israel is their top ally in the Middle East, cannot. We want to play that role. They're not going to get a breakthrough, but they can show the global South and even some of the advanced industrial democracies that China can potentially be someone you want to engage with on international diplomatic issues.
That is exactly where Xi Jinping wants to be. He's in a much better position globally, not just with Putin, but also on the international stage than he was six months, nine months, certainly 12, 14 months when the Russians launched the war in Ukraine, February 24th ago. That is a big deal. It's something the Americans are uncomfortable with. They're going to be watching very, very carefully, and it's potentially a problem for NATO. So watch this space. This is where we are. Root for the Ukrainians with the counter-offensive. We'll see where it goes, and then we'll see if negotiations actually open.