The Danger of Unconstrained Wars and Unpredictable Escalations

There was a moment of panic this week when unidentified missiles hit inside the territory of NATO member Poland. The president of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky said they were Russian missiles, but he was challenged by US President Joe Biden and NATO leaders who affirmed that the evidence indicated they were Ukrainian anti-air defence missiles intercepting Russian bombardment of Ukraine. The Western prudence was not the result of a change in attitude vis-à-vis Russian President Vladimir Putin and his war in Ukraine but reflected automatic caution against slipping into a third world war triggered by the possible involvement of a NATO member in a war against Russia in Ukraine.

In truth, Poland slipping into the Ukraine war is an accident waiting to happen, or in the future could be an intended accident unless the war between Russia and the West in Ukraine is contained or ended. A cold winter is coming, the Russian intense bombardment campaign is ongoing, and the risk of nuclear war stands and could in turn be the result of an accident. Therefore, this week’s panicked episode may be a useful opportunity for leaders to catch their breath and think profoundly of measures to step up coordination between allies as well as consider the raft of options available to them in light of developments on the battlefield.

General Mark Milley, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, again appealed to Kyiv to use its military advantage to launch peace talks with Russia that could now favour it. Milley’s view is that completely dislodging Russian forces from Ukraine will not be an easily attainable goal for Zelensky given Putin and the Russian military’s determination to maintain control of Crimea.

President Biden himself was somewhat upset this week by President Zelensky’s conduct. To some, the Ukrainian president had rushed by accusing Russia of striking Poland with missiles during the G20 summit in Bali – including the G7 group who are NATO member states – to mobilize more support for his country. The optics surrounding the public dispute in determining what had happened were not reassuring. Washington even sought the help of NATO capitals to rein in Zelensky, who initially persisted in his claims until he backed down after pressure from intelligence services, which confirmed the missiles had not been fired by Russia.

The Kremlin, in its own way, was grateful to the White House and praised the wisdom of President Biden, signalling it was ready for negotiations to end the war, even if just to test the waters. The US president and US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan had previously said it was up to Ukraine to decide whether it was ready for negotiations. This message, however, contains between its lines an appeal to Zelensky to negotiate instead of continuing a war that could escalate into a global cataclysm. Washington realizes at the same time that the Kremlin will not accept negotiations that would reverse Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories, and is aware that Putin sees peace talks as a defeat he would simply not accept.

All this means that the worst is yet to come for Russia and Ukraine. There are no guarantees that a war between Russia and NATO erupting as a result of a calculated error or a staged accident, or a real one, can be contained. The Russian president will not willingly relinquish the Ukrainian territories he has annexed or those he plans to conquer. For his part, the Ukrainian president faces popular opposition against surrendering Ukrainian territories as part of a negotiated settlement with Russia. Therefore, there is nothing on the horizon now that suggests the war in Ukraine could be contained and prevented from expanding into a larger, even world war.

However, interesting ideas are being exchanged behind the scenes in the capitals concerned, following the crisis in Poland and the possibility of a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. These ideas, as a starting point, distinguish between a ceasefire and a peace treaty between Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, a peace treaty requires making a deal on the disputed territories, which is impossible not only because of the circumstances of Putin and Zelensky, but also because the constitutions of Russia and Ukraine do not allow ceding territory.

“This is a conflict between two constitutions”, as an expert on Russia and Ukraine put it, “not between two presidents”. Consequently, Putin and Zelensky cannot negotiate a peace that would require them to cede territory. Therefore, “instead of talking about negotiations over an impossible peace agreement, efforts must be made towards negotiations and agreement on security principles and guarantees for the two countries and finding creative formulas that bypass the issue of territories”, added the source who is familiar with what is taking place behind the scenes.

What is happening behind the scenes includes exploring gradual steps that could lead to negotiations – not between Putin and Zelensky but at a lower level – that may be able to reconcile an affirmation of the Ukrainian de jure ownership of the territories while acknowledging they are under Russian administration.

An informed source pointed out what he termed a “Western idea” pushed for by Germany and France for a Christmas ceasefire between 20 December and 15 January. The idea in principle has implicit Ukrainian approval despite the public insistence on the ten points put forward to the G20 summit by President Zelensky as a roadmap for negotiations.

Some in Ukraine are encouraging the leadership to accept a ceasefire, because of the huge devastation resulting from the Russian war on Ukraine. Kyiv expects up to 50 percent of the country’s infrastructure will be destroyed if the Russian bombardment continues at its current pace.

On the other hand, accepting a ceasefire is very difficult for Putin, especially as some in the military would see this as a repetition of the Minsk agreement. Subsequently, accepting a ceasefire would be a quintessentially political decision by the Russian president, one that would be against the will of the Russian military.

Some world powers oppose NATO’s push to drive Russia out of Europe, inflict a crushing defeat on Moscow, and remove Putin from power. The positions of the major powers were clear at the Bali summit, which avoided political confrontations: China, India, and Indonesia have reservations on NATO’s conduct, and could have well seen Zelensky’s positions as a form of existential recklessness.

The war in Ukraine imposed itself on the G20 summit triggered by the crisis in Poland and nuclear concerns. But the bilateral summit between the US president and Chinese President Xi Jinping saw a consensus on sending a shared message to the Russian president declaring that nuclear threats are unacceptable to both sides.

Careful navigation to avoid confrontation was a clear feature of the US-Chinese summit. The two leaders clung to their traditional, divergent positions on several issues, from Taiwan to the economy to their rivalry on strategic dominance. But they both avoided using a tone of escalation, defiance, and obstruction. Biden spoke the language of managing the rivalry and avoiding conflict. While there were differences in their views and stances, Biden affirmed he did not believe the United States and China were in a new cold war.

The first meeting between the two men as presidents succeeded in signalling a readiness for dialogue to resolve differences. From this standpoint, the summit was reassuring. It was also expedient for President Biden, who underscored the wisdom in managing rivalry and avoiding conflict with China.

The Bali summit was an overall success for the US president, who emerged as a serious, composed leader handling a major crisis. He did not make any hasty decisions on the issue of the missiles in Poland, which could have changed the entire equation in the indirect war between Russia and NATO. He did not try to outmanoeuvre his Chinese counterpart, instead pursuing a firm but flexible tone.

Biden may have thus passed important foreign policy tests in handling the Chinese president, NATO leaders, and the G7 group, acting rationally on the Poland crisis as the leader of the world’s preeminent superpower.

By contrast, former President Donald Trump is fighting a domestic battle imposed on him by the unfavourable outcome of the midterm elections that revealed a structural weakness that could radically impact his presidential ambitions. Trump’s announcement did not tackle foreign policy except by criticising the Biden administration’s conduct during the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Trump linked the restoration of American ‘greatness’ to him returning to the White House, but he did not put forward a program for global leadership as had been anticipated.

The midterm elections ended up thinning out extremists from both the Democratic and Republican camps. The message from American voters was that they need a lot of reason, pragmatism, and wisdom. This is a very difficult period of global economic slowdown triggered by the ongoing war in Ukraine and its impact on global geopolitics.

The world is in a state of anxiety. Last week’s developments rekindled terror of a third world war that almost erupted out of Poland. Containing the fear is necessary but what must not be ignored is that the missile incident in Poland was not a fleeting event. It is a serious indication of what could happen in the future, accidentally or otherwise.

It is crucial to manage crises but that is no alternative to a strategic resolution of unconstrained wars and unpredictable escalations.