Trump’s Doctrine, Biden’s Knot, and the Iranian ideology

The difficulty of predicting the results of the US presidential election is nothing new, but with two men in their seventies fighting a brutal battle the uncertainty has intensified and the vice presidential candidates have become an important consideration for American voters given that it’s highly possible they could also become president. If Donald Trump wins a second term, his doctrine will not change much. And most likely, Vice President Mike Pence would continue his vision if he were to become president. Kamala Harris, the Democratic VP candidate, has less experience than Mr Pence and lacks the global network that has allowed him to serve as a distinctive VP, and not just a shadow of President Trump. Ms Harris however has experience in Congress and US domestic priorities. She is also the first African-American and Asian-American woman running for what is effectively the post of president-in-waiting. Both VP candidates face opposition from segments of the voters. Mr Pence is seen by some as a religious zealot and a right-wing hardliner. Ms Harris is meanwhile seen by some as an African-American presidential candidate, a successor of Barack Obama, whose presidency triggered the extreme polarization in American politics later entrenched by Donald Trump. Most of the world is waiting for the outcome of an unusual US presidential election, including policymakers anxious about the implications of the uncertainty for their ability to predict future US policies, and make decisions, and on its effect on prolonging conflicts, as it encourages actors to capitalize on the vacuum to impose new realities, as Iran is doing for example, in Iraq and Lebanon.

When it comes to Lebanon, Iran’s strategic decision is not reliant upon the outcome of the US elections. According to reports, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, who are in charge of the Lebanese dossier, are putting the final touches on a plan adopted months ago for Lebanon’s ‘renewal’ under Iranian management. The plan would ensure total Iranian control of any Lebanese government, expanding Iranian influence over the Lebanese national army, and dominating the media narratives to promote the idea of Lebanon as a “stable state under Iranian control” through Hezbollah, according to informed sources, who said the IRGC have concluded “there are no domestic political forces capable of reviving Lebanon, and no foreign actors interested or able to control and manipulate Lebanon like Iran can”.

Whatever the worth of the IRGC’s calculations, the most fitting description of the time that separates us from the inauguration of the US president in January will be ‘stability undermined’. As such, Stability Redefined was the title of the 17th e-policy circle of the Beirut Institute Summit in Abu Dhabi this week, attended by: Reem El Hashemy, UAE Minister of State for International Cooperation and Managing Director for the Dubai World Expo 2020; Indian former national security adviser, former foreign minister, and former high commissioner in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, as well as former ambassador to China and Israel Shivshankar Menon; presidnt of the Council on Foreign Relations and former Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State Richard Haass; and former director of the US National Intelligence and former ambassador to Germany as week as US special envoy to peace negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo, Richard Grenell. (YouTube Link Here).

Reem El Hashemy stressed that the UAE does not base its relations with other states on an ideological perspective or on the nature of relations between the states with which the UAE has good relations, including the US, China, India, and Russia. Rather, she said, the UAE builds its foreign policy on a spirit of “dialogue and cooperation”. She said: “We have tough conversations with everybody because we also are very keen on ensuring that our own national and strategic interests are met in a win-win setup, and a win-win situation. And here I would say that if you look at our relationship with China, our relationship with India, our relationship with the United States, you'll see that it's a very open, and frank, and strong relationship… you have different partners for different causes and your ability to speak through debate dialogue, disagree, agree, is actually a strength of your also foreign policy”.

Ms El Hashemy said Emirati relations with China are “strategic and strong”, and also with India, adding: “[we] are going to be launching our strategic dialogue with the United States in a couple of weeks and all of this sort of comes together in a way in which the UAE tries to delicately navigate so that we can continue to find opportunities as opposed to get stumped by the obstacles”.

India is not able to follow a similar policy to the UAE’s, given its fraught relations with China and Pakistan, and its domestic problems. However, the Gulf region, according to Mr Menon, “is our DNA”. He said relations with the US have improved as tensions increased with China, adding: “I think we should be grateful to China for having helped us to improve the relationship but that's not all. I mean there's much more congruence here in terms of for instance simple things, maritime security throughout the Indo-pacific, serves both our interests. We can't transform India develop India without the US, the US is an essential partner”. However, Mr Mennon was also keen to stress the importance of building partnerships and what he called “coalitions of the willing”, saying: “This is the time to build a new multilateralism of our own”.

For his part, Richard Haass had a lot of criticism against Donald Trump’s style of government and foreign policy, stressing that “we live in an era where no country on its own can protect its own interests better than it can by working with others, be it against climate change, or infectious disease, or terrorism, or proliferation”. He argued that sovereignty does not give anyone the right to carry out genocide against their people, destroy rainforests, or threaten other countries, saying: “the Obama administration made a mistake with the so-called red line and Syrian chemicals. This administration, the Trump administration, I would argue, made a major mistake in abandoning the Kurds, who were the best partner the United States had in Syria dealing with the challenges there”. Mr Haass said a Joe Biden presidency would not be an extension of the Obama presidency. “Four years have passed since President Obama, it's a different country, it's a different world, so anyone who says it would be Obama's third term, is wrong”.

Mr Haass also criticized Trump’s Iran policy, and argued that the Abraham Accords between the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel will not end the crisis between the Palestinians and Israel, saying: “the challenge is for Palestinians to come up with the unified leadership that's willing to negotiate with Israel, and I think it's with Israel to have a serious national conversation about what compromise it is prepared to make in order to see its future as both Jewish and Democratic”.

The Trump administration is still working to mobilize more Arab countries to join the Abraham Accords, which the Trump team views as a historic achievement. Richard Grenell, who is very close to President Trump and has been touted as a possible future secretary of state or national security adviser if Trump is re-elected, said “let me just say that there are three or four countries that are eager to do this [join the accords] that are that we are talking to. I think that you will see more”.

According to well-informed sources, the three countries are Oman, Sudan, and Morocco. This was almost confirmed by Mr Grenell himself, who, after I suggested these countries, said: “I will not correct you”.

Mr Grenell explained during the session what he called the Trump Doctrine for the second term, saying: “I believe that what's developing is a Trump doctrine of two phases. One is very tough sanctions: we have the toughest sanctions ever on North Korea, we have the toughest sanctions ever on Iran, we have the toughest sanctions ever on Russia. But also what we have is the ability to talk to these countries and to have an exit plan which is, we will engage with you, we will talk with you if the behavior changes, then we will adjust our US government sanctions, policies or leverage”.

Regarding China, Mr Grenell suggested Trump’s strategy is supported by both Republicans and Democrats, and European allies. Concerning China’s partnership with Iran, he said: “I do think that that's going to affect the Belt and Road, I think it's going to affect the relationship with Iran, we're very concerned about that. I think we've got a lot of friends in the region and in the Arab world that are also focused on making sure that Iran and China do not form some sort of a partnership that gets out of control”.

But Iran is seriously determined to implement its strategy based on full partnership with China, and has made tactical steps in this direction on issues of interest to it, led by Lebanon. The IRGC will not wait for the outcome of the US election and has decided that Lebanon belongs to Iran, period. Iran’s wager is on the weakness and fragmentation of Lebanese domestic players and the fatigue of regional and international players traditionally interested in Lebanon.

According to reports, Tehran has developed a ‘renewal plan’ for Lebanon as a ‘domestic issue’ for Iran, subject to Iran’s ideological vision, but with a pragmatic touch that will ensure ‘soft and flexible control’ over the country while transforming the face and fate of Lebanon to become fully subordinate to Iran. This means Lebanon will not be allowed to reach a peace deal with Israel but must remain a ‘frontline’ for permanent resistance. It will not be allowed to have a foreign policy independent of Iran’s broad foreign policy constants, including the definition of who is friend and who is foe. The Lebanese army will no longer be allowed to fall under the influence of any other power, and will be removed from the political equation to become an enforcer of the new Lebanon being designed by the IRGC.

This is how Iran envisions implementing this plan: Establishing a stable government with an economic vision that will then receive financial injections from China and others, governing Lebanon for 3-4 years under the broad title of ‘national salvation’. At the same time, this government would help consolidate Iranian dominance over Lebanon, but in an inconspicuous way to avoid provoking adversarial forces. Next, new faces would be introduced to the Lebanese political arena, while Hezbollah would remain a constant component and guarantor of Iranian policy in Lebanon, to make quick and effective decisions while maintaining loyalty to Iran’s strategic goals. The plan would also see some form of soft dominance established over Lebanese media, while the protest movement will be infiltrated or weakened. In other words, Iran will work to leverage the demise of traditional politics in Lebanon to coronate itself as the de-facto ruler of Lebanon.

The IRGC is relentlessly determined to implement this strategy, benefiting from the US election paralysis, unless local, regional, and/or international opposition emerges. Indeed, the IRGC overconfidence can be challenged and thwarted if the forces opposed to Iran’s strategy, in Lebanon, the region, and the world, respond with a serious pragmatic strategy that relies not only on US sanctions but somehow puts an end to the Lebanese perpetual claim of being helpless.